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Judicial Lawmaking by Judicial Restraint? The Potential of Balancing in International Economic Law

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Thomas Kleinlein

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In the framework of this project, both the WTO dispute settlement system and international investment tribunals are portrayed as core actors in judicial lawmaking. By weaving international trade law and investment law on the roughly timbered looms of imperfect treaty law, they have proven to be successful creators of the fabrics of a world trade order and of investment protection standards, respectively. Such effective lawmaking, on the part of particular “regimes,” has the potential to increase the fragmentation of international law. Consequently, international judicial institutions are not only spotted as originators of fragmentation, but—as interpreters of international law—also as addressees of strategies in response presented in the 2006 Report of the ILC Study Group on Fragmentation. It is the Study Group's comforting message that a considerable part of the difficulties arising from the diversification and expansion of international law can be overcome by recourse to a “coherent legal-professional technique.” The Fragmentation Report highlights that conflict resolution and interpretation cannot be distinguished: “[w]hether there is a conflict and what can be done with prima facie conflicts depends on the way the relevant rules are interpreted.” According to the Report, coherence can be established by interpreting legal norms with due regard to their normative environment.

Type
II. Judicial Lawmaking for Economic Governance: The ICSID and the WTO
Information
German Law Journal , Volume 12 , Issue 5: Beyond Dispute: International Judicial Institutions as Lawmakers , 01 May 2011 , pp. 1141 - 1174
Copyright
Copyright © 2011 by German Law Journal GbR 

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