In contrast to traditional extradition law, the political offense exemption has been abolished within the framework of the European Arrest Warrant (EAW). Notwithstanding its overall success, the EAW does not constitute an adequate instrument with regard to political offenses. In light of the recent case of the former Catalan President, Carles Puigdemont, the abolition has proven to be too hasty and the justificatory force behind the principles of mutual trust and recognition is, with respect hereto, rather limited. The damage caused to these principles by upholding the exemption would be negligible, given the small number of cases—Puigdemont being the first political offender requested under the aegis of the EAW. However, the potential benefits are substantial, given that the exemption provides for a higher level of human rights protection—analogous to the values of European Union (EU). Solely relying on the double criminality requirement in order to properly take into account the specificities of the Member States’ legal systems essentially positions the judges at the forefront of where mutual trust and constitutional identity collide. Moreover, the exemption prevents states from intervening in other states’ internal political conflicts, through the medium of criminal law.

This Article explores the similarities between the principles which guide the judiciary nowadays and those typical for the functioning of the Communist justice system, particularly the susceptibility to obedience to the requests, orders, or meeting anticipations. The habitus of the judges typical for the authoritarian regime has persisted until these days and was the main reason for the judicial corruption revealed in the “Threema scandal.” This Article’s argument does not connect the judiciary’s dependency to the Communist legacy embodied in members of the judiciary who served before 1989 and are active today. Still, the argument presumes that the Communist heritage is a key to understanding the current situation. The past heritage is hidden in the habitus of the agents or members of the judiciary. This habitus may be unconscious yet defining for the behavior of the agents. The Article aims to identify which continuities of the judicial habitus are apparent in the current judiciary. To demonstrate changes in the position of the judiciary, it presents a thesis of the development of the judiciary from an instrument of the governing party in maintaining a homogenous and subordinated society to the current situation of the Slovak judiciary, defined as a crisis of mental independence resulting in inappropriate behavior and corruption.

In the last decades, an increasing number of EU institutions and agencies have been given the power to conduct administrative inspections. While the legal literature has traditionally focused on the Commission’s inspection powers in competition proceedings, the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), the European Central Bank (ECB), the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), and the European Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA) are also entrusted with such powers. The Commission has also been granted inspection powers in the field of Food Safety. Inspection powers can have a crucial impact on the fundamental right of the inviolability of the home, recognized by the Court of Justice as a general principle of EU law, and protected under Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) and Article 7 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (ECFR). This Article argues that the current remedies do not fulfill all the criteria set forth by the Strasbourg Court for ex post judicial control vis-à vis inspections to be full and effective, in particular when these powers are used in the context of composite procedures, and suggests remedies to improve the system of review, in order to effectively protect fundamental rights.

For the first time in its history, the EU is in the process of acquiring significant and genuine permanent operational powers. A new Regulation on the European Border and Coast Guard provides Frontex with a permanent corps of 10,000 border guards—3,000 of which will be EU agents—its own equipment, and its own competences to intervene along the EU borders and beyond. The operational powers will allow the EU to directly and physically intervene in tangible reality.

This Article argues that the conferral of operational powers on the EU poses a risk to individual legal protection. This is because once authorities have acquired operational powers of a certain extent and quality, they can afford to act against or without the law by simply overpowering or eluding the legal mechanisms that normally constrain the exercise of public power. So far, Members of the European Parliament and academics critical of Frontex and the new Regulation have overlooked this issue and concentrated exclusively on how to legally constrain the exercise of operational powers. This Article addresses this blind spot by examining whether and how public law should place legal constraints not only on the exercise but also on the build-up of operational powers.

This article covers the recent trends in climate change litigation in India, capturing the peculiarities of the Indian judicial system that lend it the will, ability, and credibility to accommodate emerging principles of climate change laws within the law of the land. While tracing the historical underpinnings of judicial activism, environmental considerations, and strength of democratic institutions, this Article discusses some of the current developments in climate change case law in the country. Finally, in showcasing an increasing and immersive trend towards the inculcation of international principles of environmental law, this article establishes the dichotomy between an active judicial system applying international environmental principles at the domestic level and the roadblocks in terms of climate litigation in the recent times.

Due to the reconceptualization of rape and other sexual offenses as violations of one's sexual autonomy, consent has replaced the element of force as the focal point of rape law. This shift to a “consent model” of rape has prompted much discussion about the scope of sexual autonomy and the problem of “rape by deception” in legal scholarship. Most theorists of consent argue that certain forms of deception invalidate any token of consent in the same way as forcible sexual contact. However, there is also a widely shared concern that criminalizing sex-by-deception poses serious problems in terms of drawing the line between deceptions that violate sexual autonomy and deceptions that do not. This Article offers an account of principles that should be considered when examining legal cases related to sex-by-deception. These principles are examined and articulated in a way that strikes a balance between responsibility, autonomy, and rights such as the right to privacy.

The Article deals with the protection of consumer borrowers and lending investors in peer-to-peer lending within the legal framework provided by EU credit laws. This is the legal framework for EU Member States in the area of loans to consumers. In particular, the article analyses the business model of taking lending decisions on financial technologies (“Fintech”) and big data vis-à-vis the legal obligation of the creditworthiness assessment by lenders. At the same time, it extends the applicability of such a business model to the credit-risk analysis undertaken in the interest of lenders. Ultimately, it questions to what extent EU law caters for peer-to-peer lending, and and to what extent consumers and lenders can find protection. It hints that peer-to-peer lending presents risks for both consumers and lenders, falling short of legal obligations and established practices for their protection.

This special section tells the story of Covid-19 through the lens of national responses, serious concerns about unprecedented human rights limitations and infringements, and the respective role of courts in public health emergencies. It compiles perspectives on disease control developments in Brazil, Italy, Poland, Taiwan, the U.S., and the EU to explore various aspects of judicial review protecting, or failing to protect, human rights. It offers insights from states and regions which have experienced high pandemic rates or may attract attention for not treating human rights as a priority. Amidst the crisis of multilateralism and the World Health Organization (WHO) authority, and the fact that public health is typically a national power, the Articles focus on the state-level analyses to inspire comparative findings and further research. The section also draws on diversity and transdisciplinarity. The contributions are authored by scholars specializing in wide-ranging areas of law, including constitutional, health, private, and human rights law, as well as in political philosophy and public health. This text introduces the special section by offering a broader picture of the human rights’ problématique in times of pandemics.

This Article represents the first comprehensive study of the EU query process, a form of flexible extra-judicial cooperation between the European Ombudsman and the national ombud offices on the interpretation and application of EU law across member states. The way this cooperation is constructed brings imminently to mind the preliminary reference procedure: A national office submits a query within the scope of EU law to the European Ombudsman who, after consultation with the Commission—in the vast majority of cases—provides a reply. Upon closer examination, however, this Article illustrates key differences between the two procedures, while pointing out the added value of the EU query procedure compared to the preliminary reference. More specifically, while the interpretation that is provided is not authoritative or legally binding (among other differences), thanks to the flexibility of this instrument, interpretative guidance is provided at an early stage in case a problem in the interpretation and application of EU law arises, and thus litigation may be avoided. Furthermore, the EU query procedure serves as a reliable source of information for both the European and the national sides. However, this Article also identifies a number of challenges in relation to the transparency of the scheme, its effective functioning, as well as its interplay with other instruments, such as the infringement procedure.

In this Article, we argue that the uncertainty of UK national motor vehicle insurance law—when viewed with respect to its European Union (EU) parent, the Motor Vehicle Insurance Directive (MVID)—was never satisfactorily addressed, primarily when using the remedy available through the non-contractual liability of the State. The EU enforcement mechanisms were equally haphazard in their effectiveness and success in affording rights to third-party victims. Given the link between the MVID and the free movement of persons and goods, on which the harmonization of insurance protection was based, we present the first Article establishing an argument that those offending aspects of UK national law should have been disapplied. The UK has concluded its agreement to withdraw its membership of the EU—and thus no longer to be bound by EU law and the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice. Yet until the transitional period ends, the UK remained aligned to EU law and those defects present in national law should have been remedied. Therefore, the remedy issued from the Factortame line of case authorities may have proven to be the most effective way to grant access to rights which were denied to third-party victims in the UK. Here we present a justification for its application.

As a reaction to the killing and beheading of two soldiers in the Syrian Civil War, the German Federal Court of Justice (BGH) set a milestone in the interpretation of § 8(1) no. 9 of the German Code of Crimes against International Law (VStGB). The judges confirmed the conviction of a young German citizen with Syrian roots, Aria L., who had been tried and convicted before the Higher Regional Court of Frankfurt am Main (Oberlandesgericht (OLG) Frankfurt am Main). Within the certiorari, the BGH reviewed whether the statute conformed with the principle of legality found within the Grundgesetz (GG), Germany’s constitution. The Court held that the corpse of a person killed is protected from desecration under humanitarian law pursuant to § 8(1) no. 9 VStGB, the equivalent to Article 8(2)(b)(xxi) and (3)(ii) of the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court (ICC). Reviewing this particular decision, it was determined that under the circumstances of a non-international armed conflict, beheading someone, placing the head on a metal rod, and taking pictures afterward in order to upload them onto social media is gravely humiliating and degrading. The head is incomparably the part of the body that identifies a person. Furthermore, it is irrelevant whether the perpetrator had any physical influence over the person. In addition, war crimes can be committed in a non-international conflict, which should, however, be treated equally as an international conflict. This outcome triggered diverse reactions amongst legal scholars, especially due to the extension of the understanding of a “person” who is to be protected under humanitarian law.

The Hungarian judiciary has reacted to the political change of recent years in a twofold way. Some judges have resisted political pressure and decided cases according to the law and their conscience, while others, showing the signs of judicial populism, have deferred to the interests of the government. The paper explains the relationship between this twofold behavior and the bureaucratic tradition of the Hungarian justice system. The conclusion is that the bureaucratic model of organization has certain features that can make judges more resistant to political pressure, while other elements of the model can lead to judicial deference. Nonetheless, these latter elements are not necessary components of the ‘Weberian’ justice system.

The emergence of new interactions, notably those online, has led to the parallel development of criminal behaviors—not all of which are captured by the current legal framework. This article addresses the challenge posed to criminal law by the emergence of technologically facilitated violence, specifically its sexualized online forms. In particular, it argues for cautious yet specific criminalization of violent behaviors online whilst considering the broader criminal liabilities of all actors involved in the facilitation and perpetration of digital sexual violence. This article draws upon national—contentious—examples of attempts to regulate disruptive sexual violence perpetrated through digital means, with particular attention given to provisions in the UK, Germany, and France.

Climate change has become a household term. As the climate crisis grows increasingly pressing, climate litigation has proven instrumental as a driver for change. Brazil is an important jurisdiction for climate matters: It is the sixth largest global greenhouse gas emitter, responsible for 3.2 percent of global emissions,1 and home to the largest extension of the Amazon rainforest. Climate litigation has been gaining traction, but it is still far less frequent than environmental litigation at large. Against the backdrop of the state and trends of climate litigation in the country, this article explores theoretical and practical avenues to further expand the strategic deployment of climate cases in Brazil. First, it analyzes how climate claims can be construed with arguments that are impervious to the political question doctrine. Second, it explores possibilities of bringing claims against private entities, challenging more granular obligations arising out of Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) frameworks. Third, it discusses the role of lawyers in bridging theoretical and practical gaps, namely those between environmental law and climate law, between scientific experts and courts, and between international and domestic climate change regimes.

Emergencies are exceptions to the rule. Laws that respond to emergencies can create exceptions to rules that protect human rights. In long lasting emergencies, these exceptions can become the rule, diluting human rights and eroding the rule of law. In the United States, the COVID-19 pandemic prompted states to change rules governing commercial and personal activities to prevent the spread of the coronavirus. Many governors’ executive orders were challenged as violations of the constitutionally protected rights of those affected. Judges are deciding whether emergencies can justify more restrictions than would be permitted in normal circumstances and whether some rights deserve more protection than others, even in an emergency. This article analyzes ongoing litigation involving emergency restrictions on religious freedom and access to reproductive health services. These cases suggest that some judges are altering the standards of judicial review of the state’s emergency powers in ways that could permanently strengthen some rights and dilute others in normal circumstances.

Quite a few recent ECJ judgments touch on various elements of territorial rule. Thereby, they raise the profile of the main question this Article asks: Which territorial claims does the EU make? To provide an answer, the present Article discusses and categorizes the individual elements of territoriality in the EU’s architecture. The influence of EU law on national territorial rule on the one hand and the emergence of territorial governance elements at the European level on the other provide the main pillars of the inquiry. Once combined, these features not only help to improve our understanding of the EU’s distinctly supranational conception of territoriality. What is more, the discussion raises several important legitimacy questions. As a consequence, the Article calls for the development of a theoretical model to evaluate and justify territoriality in a political community beyond the state.

Is the Covid-19 pandemic changing the constitutional-power structures of our democracies? Is this centennial public health emergency irreversibly constraining our liberties? The paper examines recent state-measures of containment during the initial phase of spread of the Covid-19 crisis. It compares primarily the Italian scenario with the Chinese and the American one. It asks whether the measures adopted particularly in the Italian case (known as DPCMs) amount to a state of exception or to a use of emergency powers. Cognizant of the authoritarian risks in severed enjoyments of constitutional rights, the authors conclude that this is not what occurred in the case of solid democracies. At the level of governmental analysis, the “decree” strategy of the Italian DPCMs allude to paternalistic forms of power-exercise that empty the self-determining prerogative of the parliament.

Electoral disinformation has become one of the most challenging problems for democratic states. All of them are facing the phenomenon of - both online and offline - dissemination of false information during pre-electoral period, which is harmful for individual and collective rights. As a consequence, some European countries adopted special measures, including summary judicial proceedings in order to declare that information or materials used in electioneering are false and to prohibit its further dissemination. There are already three rulings of the ECtHR concerning this expeditious judicial examination provided in the Polish law. In December 2018 France passed complex regulation against manipulation of information that include similar mechanisms. This article, basing on the ECtHR’s case law and some national experiences, attempts to define the minimal European standard for measures targeted at electoral disinformation, especially judicial summary proceeding. It contains the analysis of the notion of electoral disinformation, defines the state’s positive obligations in this sphere, and indicates mayor challenges for the legal framework. The principal argument is that summary judicial proceedings – if adequately designed – cannot be questioned from the Convention standpoint and provide a partial solution to the problem of electoral disinformation.

Whether in Germany or abroad, victims of sexual violence typically played only a minor part in criminal proceedings, serving primarily as witnesses due to the widespread public and objective nature of the trial.1 This led to victim disempowerment and a paternalistic method of State protection of victims.2 During the last decades, this perception underwent major changes in European legal systems, owing to a rising awareness of victim’s needs, especially in cases of sexual violence.3 International and European conventions and treaties played a major role4 by establishing an international regulatory framework. To implement those international standards, domestic criminal laws have changed significantly on both substantive and procedural levels. Today, Germany’s criminal procedure law contains many mechanisms for protecting victims. Nevertheless, in cases of sexual violence, the implementation of these mechanisms in criminal proceedings leaves much to desire due to the affect of gender stereotypes and rape myths. This Article argues that in these cases the law in action ultimately fails to meet international requirements.