The right to effective judicial protection is driving to a significant evolution of EU administrative law, especially in view of the multijurisdictional nature of the European administrative structure. This Article focuses on gaps in judicial protection arising from mutual recognition in transnational interactions between the administrative authorities of the EU’s Member States. It first sets the ground by examining the ingredients of the equation: The fundamental right to effective judicial protection, the concept and forms of mutual recognition, and the notion of European administrative space. Next, this Article assesses the judicial protection that private parties can obtain from national courts in these transnational scenarios. Procedure, substance, and deference are separately explored here, in order to draw out blind spots and deficiencies, as well as to suggest possible solutions to address at least some of them. This Article ends with a brief summary of the main findings.

This Article frames the precautionary principle as an inner limit to the EU institutions’ broad discretion in the field of EU risk regulation, contextualizing recourse to the principle against the more encompassing backdrop of socially acceptable risk approaches. On these grounds, it inquires to what extent the precautionary principle may be successfully invoked in challenges to acts which are deemed insufficiently protective. The opening sections set the ground for the analysis. The third section analyzes challenges to regulatory acts, arguing that the Court has followed a quantitative threshold approach. This is legally tenable and appropriate; however, it cannot do justice to the true nature of the precautionary principle. The following sections analyze cases involving legislative acts. This includes an in-depth examination of the recent Blaise case, which has put judicial review of compliance with the precautionary principle under the spotlight. Against this overall background, this Article concludes that judicial review can hardly do justice to the precautionary principle, as applicable to the risk management process and underpinning EU legislative frameworks. It will ultimately rest on EU risk managers and EU legislators to ensure that the principle is applied and that its overarching goals are pursued.

Increasingly, populists and authoritarians have discovered for themselves the notion of constitutional identity as a practical excuse to sidestep transnational legal obligations, as well as to vindicate their constitutional projects on the whole from concerns about the rule of law and other shared European values. This has led some scholars to highlight the “dangers of constitutional identity,” brandishing it as an “inherently dangerous concept,” and suggesting that the concept ought to be abandoned. This Article argues that the anti-pluralist critiques of constitutional identity, while rightly criticizing the authoritarian appropriations of constitutional identity, ultimately go too far and draw the wrong conclusions. Simply dismissing the concept of constitutional identity will not lead to the disappearance of the meanings imparted through it. The authoritarian and populist appropriations of constitutional identity must be identified and understood as abuses of the concept. By eliding constitutional identity with its abuse, the anti-pluralist critique sacrifices a more intimate understanding of the realities of constitutional identity abuse to a likely unattainable normative vision of uncontested EU law primacy. In advancing this critique, I will further outline three potential avenues for understanding constitutional identity abuse, differentiating between its substantive, generative, and relational aspects. Constitutional identity claims can be abusive by virtue of their substantive content, how they have come about, as well as how they are advanced.

The German Federal Constitutional Court’s climate decision provides a nuanced acknowledgment of climate change’s constitutional relevance. In this Article, the author critically assesses how the Court innovatively sought to capture the intergenerational equity dimension of climate mitigation through a combination of negative and positive duties stemming from constitutional law. The Article demonstrates how despite progressive findings on intergenerational equity and the innovative invocation of negative duties, the operative part of the decision turned out to be rather limited. Because of remaining uncertainties about the allowable national carbon budget, the Court was unable to require the legislator to enact a stricter reduction path. The author argues that the Court could have narrowed remaining uncertainties, without engaging in judicial activism, by adopting an international and constitutional minimum approach to calculating the national budget and by adjusting the burden of proof. Finally, the Article highlights how the German legislator, by going beyond what was required by the Court “trapped itself” on an ambitious reduction path, opening opportunities for future constitutional complaints.

This Article highlights the legal and procedural restrictions a Member States faces during its withdrawal from the EU and subsequent talks on a future trade relationship by analyzing the unprecedented case of the UK. One such restriction consists of an obligation to negotiate withdrawal as a result of the principle of sincere cooperation. Other limits derive from the withdrawal process itself, designed as it was by the European institutions on the basis of a very scant Article 50 TEU. By then comparing the three substantive pillars of the EU-UK WA—citizens’ rights, the financial settlement, and the Irish border— with the UK’s initial negotiating red lines, I offer two conclusions: That the aforementioned constraints on the withdrawing state can significantly weaken the defense of its interests during its withdrawal process and that having to agree to important issues in a first and separate stage of “orderly withdrawal” talks also diminishes the state’s bargaining power with regards to the next stage of negotiating a future partnership with the EU.

The European Union has a comprehensive legal framework in place for the authorization, traceability, and labelling of genetically modified organisms, the aim of which is to create a unified market while simultaneously ensuring that the placing on the market of the products concerned will not pose a risk to human or animal health or to the environment. This framework sets out complex, multi-level procedures which entail the cooperation and sharing of information between various national and European authorities. Filling a gap in the literature, this contribution focuses on the challenges to the system of judicial accountability that emerge in this particular system of multi-level administration. This Article shows that the problems posed by composite procedures in terms of access to justice and effective judicial protection can possibly be solved in light of the current rules concerning the division of labor between national and European courts and the applicable case law of the Court of Justice. As this Article will show, many more unsolved issues arise instead with respect to the compliance with the requirements of access to justice provided by the Aarhus Convention.

There is an increasing involvement of lawyers and law firms in public affairs through activities that are aimed at influencing legislative and regulatory developments. Law firms offer services which can be regarded as lobbying, and yet, to the detriment of transparent policy-making, they are reluctant to register in the European Union Transparency Register (EUTR) and provide information about their activities. As growing attention is paid to the need to regulate lobbying at the EU and Member State levels, the question arises as to whether and to what extent such regulatory framework should also cover certain services provided by law firms, that is, legal lobbying. This Article charts the phenomenon of legal lobbying and its regulation in the EU context. It shows how the EUTR attempts to distinguish between legal services and lobbying by defining two lawyer roles: a legal expert, and an advocate. These roles allow the possibility to pinpoint two unresolved issues associated with legal lobbying: the scope of professional secrecy, and the meaning of the legal advice exception. An important conclusion is that regulatory clarification is necessary to resolve ambiguities and broadly address the implications that legal lobbying raises in terms of transparent and legitimate law-making processes.

This Article grapples with the instrumentalization of the past in Romania, in the specific context of “judicial lustration” measures. It argues that decommunization and lustration policies, which could not be pursued in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of state socialism in 1989, were weaponized much later and used in order to advance other purposes. In 2006, an expedited judicial vetting procedure, in the context of the EU-driven fight against corruption, was repurposed by the center-right as a lustration instrument. In the same year, the dismantling of an intelligence service created after 1991 in the Justice Ministry (SIPA) to monitor ‘vulnerabilities’ in the justice system has set in motion a long series of failed attempts to bring closure to the question regarding the service’s archives, fomenting continuities of suspicion until today. More recently, in 2018, a form of ‘mock-judicial lustration’ has been used by the political left to deflect or at least delegitimize repressive anti-corruption policies. The new “lustration procedure” implicitly equated the recent cooperation between prosecutors and intelligence officers, in the context of the fight against corruption, with past practices of collusion between the members of the judiciary and the communist Securitate. These three episodes of ‘dealing with the past’ are reviewed in order to showcase path-dependencies. Such path-dependencies are not linked only with carryovers from or throwbacks to the communist past. Rather, pre- and post-communist deficiencies of modernization, combined more recently with gaps in post-accession monitoring by the EU Commission, create continuities of peripheral instrumentalism. Various narratives, such as decommunization, the fight against graft, judicial reform and the rule of law are used to legitimize short-term consequentialism, evincing a resilient, structural resistance to legislative and legal normativity.

The recent decision by the German Constitutional Court in Neubauer et al. versus Germany has been attracting considerable attention around the globe. The Court ordered the German legislature to correct and to significantly tighten up existing climate law provisions, to increase the ambition of these provisions, and to strengthen future mitigation pathways. Several commentators have hailed it as an example of what is possible when the judiciary steps in to fill gaps in global climate governance as a result of governments failing to act or acting inadequately. In this article, I explore the extent to which the Court in Karlsruhe has innovatively managed to embrace a holistic planetary view of climate science, climate change impacts, planetary justice, planetary stewardship, earth system vulnerability, and global climate law, within the context of a human-dominated geological epoch, to guide its reasoning and findings. My proposal is that courts will have to increasingly follow a planetary perspective that is grounded in the Anthropocene context when adjudicating matters related to global disruptors such as climate change. This decision offers a first, and important, example of a promising new paradigm that I term planetary climate litigation.

Constitutional amendment difficulty or rigidity has generated extensive literature in recent times, both conceptually and empirically. Although constitutional scholars seem divided about the importance and significance of amendment limits, there has been a proliferation of indicators and statistical analysis. In this Article, while recognizing the normative debate, we provide an empirical exploration for thirty-seven countries based on factor analysis of both formal procedural rules—usually the focus of empirical work—and substantial amendment rules—which are less developed in the quantitative literature. We discuss the existing contradictions across available indicators. Implications for the literature are derived.

Application of international treaty and customary international law at the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is increasingly recognized by scholars as problematic regarding legal certainty. This Article seeks to illustrate why this is and to propose reform. Through comparing judicial approaches in the application of international law at the CJEU to its approach in internal case law, it is argued that in the frequent absence of proportionality in external case law the Court has utilized, redeployed, or varied other judicial devices in an effort to retain the discretion which proportionality affords. These are argued to effect legal certainty and established concepts of justice within the EU legal system. Accordingly, it is submitted that proportionality should be transplanted fully and openly to external relations case law and that support for this can be extrapolated from existing literature.

Many countries are in the process of replacing outdated sex offense regulations with laws that accurately correspond to late modern ideas about gender equality, sexual self-determination, and consensual sex. One example is Sweden, where a law that defines rape based on a criterion of nonvoluntary participation entered into force in 2018. This article analyzes the representation of rape in the new law and legal discourse in Sweden, and shows that rape is represented as a matter of choice and communication in sexual situations. Further, the new rape law is coupled to an emerging problem within such disparate spheres as public health, social media campaigns, sexual education, and gender studies; namely, the problem of sexual communication and gray zones in sexual encounters. To understand this new representation of rape, further exploration is suggested both into the effects of sexual violence being framed as a matter of individual choice, consent, and communication in late modernity and into the role of criminal law in the era of thin normativity. The article concludes that the new rape law sends a clear message about what sex should be—namely, something voluntary—but does not accurately describe the crime and the conduct that deserves criminal censure.

From its inception, the academic study of EU administrative law has relied heavily on doctrinal categories, concepts and principles, borrowed from the administrative law of the Member States. It has largely preferred research agendas such as the Europeanisation of national administrative law or the development of common European principles derived from national administrative laws. Legal doctrine has also engaged in the critique of EU administrative law when it fails to account for the normative standards that national administrative law must usually observe. Whereas all these constitute important research agendas, they reproduce in particularly acute terms a familiar paradox. While the existence of a European administration and administrative law beyond the state cannot be seriously disputed today, legal doctrine tends to consider them, implicitly or explicitly, from the perspective of the administrative law of the nation-state. The so-called “touch of stateness” has had a firm grip on EU administrative law, even though it includes unique aspects that lack any precedent in national laws. The article considers, and proposes a methodological approach to address, the ways in which preconceptions and normative expectations originating in national law have conditioned, and indeed prevented, the deeper doctrinal development of EU administrative law.

In most EU policy areas, procedural cooperation between national administrations takes place through the shared implementation of “composite” decision-making procedures, facilitated by the operation of multijurisdictional networks or horizontal or vertical information exchange. In the context of asylum policy, such administrative cooperation has been necessary in the distribution of asylum seekers—in accordance with the Dublin III Regulation, which allocates responsibility among Member States to examine an asylum application. In addition to rules in the Regulation itself—Article 34—information sharing also takes place through Eurodac, an EU-wide centralized information system. This Article examines whether the Dublin system ensures effective judicial and administrative remedies in the operationalization of multijurisdictional information networks. It analyzes the relevant Eurodac and Dublin-related legislation, national implementation, and national case law through the lens of administrative cooperation. The assumption that the data exchanged has been acquired and processed lawfully, due to interstate trust, and the extent to which that assumption is rebuttable, are central themes throughout this Article. It is argued that administrative cooperation through information sharing takes precedence over the right to an effective remedy, and that, in practice, judicial and extrajudicial remedies are insufficient to protect asylum seekers.

All jurisdictions assume a concept of an act of a sexual nature by regulating sex crimes. Until the sex revolution and feminist movements for equality in sexual relations, criminal law was mostly concerned with specific types of sexual acts, particularly non-marital sexual intercourse. With the paradigm shift of recent years, criminalization tends to embrace all acts of a sexual nature with another person without her valid consent. Whether the law contains a definition of a sexual act or not, borderline cases show that neither merely objective criteria nor purely subjective elements can serve as basis for the description of the conduct under prohibition. Our Article tries to overcome this deficit in the criminal law theory. Sexual acts should not be understood through the metaphor of a “picture,” as German legal scholars believe, but with the metaphor of a script played out by an actor as sexual theorists put it.

Challenging the assumption of perfect legal knowledge, this Article employs social psychology to better understand how individuals make decisions about legal compliance under imperfect information conditions. It adapts the informational aspects of “social influence conception of criminal deterrence” to regulatory compliance at large. However, it conceptualizes social influence as more than just “visible deterrence.” Social Psychology helps us to understand who, how many, and what kind of behaviors constitute adequate social proof to guide an individual’s decision on compliance. Additionally, the interaction of social proof and legal compliance is considered within a dynamic framework in relation to specific rules and across the system. Within this framework, compliance/non-compliance cascades across different rules and can create a perception about legal compliance at large, which in turn guides initial expectations with respect to new laws. Over time, this can create high/low compliance equilibriums within which societies operate. Understanding this informational role that social influence plays in legal compliance can further our understanding of what motivates compliance, the potency of the expressive functions of law in societies operating within different compliance equilibriums, and inform policy discussions on how to improve compliance—both voluntary and through sanction/incentives.

Today’s central banks wield extraordinary powers, both monetary and regulatory, and with a capacity to substitute for elected governments tempted to pass the buck. Debates about central banking’s powers and legitimacy barely touch, however, on whether and how monetary independence fits with the values that drive constitutionalism. It turns out that, for modern economies using fiat money, independence is a corollary of the higher level separation of (fiscal) powers between the legislative and executive branches. Even though independence is necessary, it needs to be carefully constrained by a “money-credit constitution.” Those general arguments, applicable in liberal democracies, do not carry across cleanly to the euro area. A principled case can be made for the ECB’s mandate being specially tight, but that is in tension with its de facto role as the emergency economic actor for the euro area. Facing up to that will be necessary sooner or later.

This study examines how the climate litigation approach builds pathways to face climate emergency. In light of recent jurisdictional developments, this article underlines the links between legislation, litigation, and public policies to trace ways, progress and obstacles to face it. Those emergent dynamics contribute to build a lasting and sustainable climate change legal regime. Intertwining the different climate disputes in the world and the progress made through the elaboration of different climate laws allow to have a panoramic visibility on this new mode of climate governance which appears in filigree today all over the world and especially in France.

The Article deals with the actual functioning of the judicial power and the limits of its independence facing an illiberal or authoritarian state. The Article offers a skeptical analysis of the past and especially of the judiciary’s future in Central Europe, with a primary focus on Czechia and Slovakia. After a brief excursion into the times before the installment of communist regimes in the late 1940s, attention shifts to the development of the judiciary during the three decades after the fall of communist rule. In this context, the Article deals with different models of administration of the judiciary and shows how they can function in normal democracy and under the conditions of emerging authoritarianism. It also characterizes different perspectives on the judiciary in common law and continental law and posits different capacities of judges to resist authoritarians in various legal cultures. Finally, it sketches future prospects and attempts to define the typology of judiciary models in authoritarian and totalitarian states.

Members of Parliament have traditionally enjoyed different kinds of immunities; nowadays, these are openly criticized on several grounds. The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has recently given a judgment on the inviolability of European Parliament’s members, which might be regarded as a milestone in its scarce case law on the matter: Oriol Junqueras Vies, Judgment of the Grand Chamber of December 19, 2019. This Article intends to summarize and comment on this decision, a preliminary reference requested by the Spanish Supreme Court in a notorious criminal procedure, connected with the suspended referendum on Catalonia’s independence. The CJEU reinforces the inviolability of Members of European Parliament (MEPs), thus strengthening the powers of this institution. However, the judgment perhaps fails to fully capture European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) case law and was rendered at a time when the controversy on Mr. Junqueras had arguably become outdated.