Of all anti-terror-laws adopted in Germany in the last thirty years, one of the most famous measures is certainly the so-called Kontaktsperregesetz, an Act introducing the possibility of incommunicado detention in the case of imminent terrorist threats. It is the prime example of how far reactive legislation can go, under the pretext to fight terrorism. This form of incommunicado detention was adopted in 1977, by introducing a new section (section 4, Sections 31–38) to the Introductory Act to the Judicature Act (Einführungsgesetz zum Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz, hereinafter EGGVG). The provisions were enacted in response to a particular terrorist incident, and have not been applied since. Surprisingly enough, in April 2006, a seemingly new provision was added to this regime (Section 38a EGGVG), however, as we will later see, this regulation is in fact not new, but has only changed its systematic position within the enormous legislative forest of Germany, and, at the same time, its legal nature (from transitory to permanent). Section 38a EGGVG extends the scope of application of incommunicado detention considerably, by allowing it to be used not only in terrorist cases, but also for other forms of criminal organizations like mafia. It thus increases the possibility of prisoners to be absolutely isolated from other inmates, family, friends, and even from their defense counsels, for up to thirty days; a period which can be prolonged for an indefinite period of time, provided that certain requirements are met.

“Twenty years ago today our country fell into deep ditches of darkness—twenty years later, today, we are a country united and a nation elevated.”

Those were the words of Rwanda's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Louis Mushikiwabo, on 7 April 2014, as he spoke to the Rwandan People at the twentieth anniversary of the beginning of the Rwandan genocide. Thousands of Rwandans gathered at Rwanda's main sports stadium, the Amahoro stadium, in Kigali to mourn their losses together. Ban Kimoon, the UN Secretary-General, lit a flame at the Kigali Genocide Memorial Center and not only expressed his solidarity with all Rwandans, but also emphasized that the United Nations could and should have done more to avoid the most devastating chapter in Rwanda's history.

This Article evaluates the merits and problems of comparative constitutional law as an interpretive means by the courts. It pleas for a nuanced perspective towards both agents and methods of comparative constitutional law. The Article is in favor of the use of comparative constitutional law by the courts. However, challenges as to the legitimation of comparison in court, functional limits of comparative constitutional law in the judiciary, and methodological questions remain to be solved. As far as constitutional and supreme courts are concerned, this Article argues that arguments derived from comparison should be regarded as a means of persuasive reasoning.

The practice of law has been challenged by the promulgation of transnational norms associated with “corporate social responsibility” (“CSR”), arising beyond the State, with little or no connection to traditional sources of positive law. These phenomena, which we will refer to as “transnational CSR norms,” are increasingly important guides to behaviour for corporate actors, despite the fact that adherence to such norms is not “required” by positive legal systems. Perhaps for this reason, transnational CSR norms are typically poorly understood and possibly underutilized in the practice of law. The purpose of this paper will be to determine, by recourse to legal theory, whether, and if so how, transnational CSR norms may be related to positive legal systems, and therefore to the practice of law. In so doing, we will seek to develop a theoretical understanding of the role transnational CSR norms can, do, and ought to play within processes of legal reasoning, particularly from the theoretical starting points offered by analytical/ positivist, and discursive theories of law.

Sometimes it seems that the EC directives could be a framework for the Canadian anti-discrimination system, too. They open ways to create procedures which are working for a long time in Canada. This does not mean this can be adopted in EC member states because there are too many peculiarities amongst domestic legislation. The problem seems to combine the directives, formed by influence from the North American legislation,130 with the European understanding of law. Especially in Germany, where employees are well protected by the law, the well-balanced system of rights is in danger. This danger does not seem to be banished by the new AGG which adopted many regulations of the directives without giving answers to questions of its implementation. But seeing the practice in other countries could bring thought-provoking impulses for the embodiment and the use of anti-discrimination law.

This Article argues that distributional concerns constitute the heart of environmental regulation; they are not restricted to pre-policy values or post-policy effects that need to dealt with. On the contrary, they characterize the selection of environmental policies, and their properties. Different interests, preferences, and values with respect to a policy instrument can be made commensurable using the language of distribution. The centrality of distribution as an organizing principle may be elusive on account of it being too vaguely construed or too narrowly defined. This necessitates the articulation of a typology of distributional concerns. To this end, it is suggested that the distribution of benefits and burdens, distribution of responsibility, distribution of membership and distribution of capabilities could be useful categories to develop and assess environmental regulation. This framework is then applied to an unsuspecting candidate, the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS).

“To be or not to be?” – in a sense that has always been the question of ethics, of the life worth living, and philosophy would be the search for the answer to that question. In this essay I would like to propose an alternative formulation and interpret it, rather grotesquely (Shakespeare I'm not), as the following: “To ontologize the ethical or not to ontologize the ethical: that is the question of politics.” Ultimately, I would like to suggest that this is a question that must but cannot be answered, or at least answered by philosophy, by a philosophy that retains the ideal of an “answer” that conforms to the form of knowledge. The vehicle for this exposition will be several texts by Jacques Derrida (primarily “Force of Law: The ‘Mystical Foundation of Authority'” and Specters of Marx). My hope is that this discussion will ultimately justify (or at least excuse) my grotesque paraphrase of Hamlet as well as my rather pretentious subtitle.

The limitations of the management board's directive powers in German Stock Corporations are an important issue in German Corporate law. The German Stock Corporation or Aktiengesellschaft (“AG”) is the corporate organizational form most directly comparable to the publicly held corporation in the U.S. It is regulated by the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG). The defining feature of the AG is a two-tier board structure containing both a management board (Vorstand), which is in charge of managing the corporation, and a supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat), which is elected by the shareholders' meeting (Hauptversammlung) and which appoints and supervises the management board. The two boards are completely separate from each other, no overlap in membership is permitted.

Mark Mazower's latest book, No Enchanted Palace: the End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations intelligently weaves in the League of Nations as the primary informant of the United Nations to deconstruct any claims of discontinuities between the two institutions. In doing so, Mazower offers an eloquent polemic against the literature's tendency to idolize the United Nations' founding as a symbolic and material break from empire. Exploring the dark sides of its intellectual origins and early years, however, Mazower points to the decolonization movement to argue for the potential of the United Nations as a site of emancipatory struggle — his book concludes with a reinvestment in its promise of a more inclusive and just world order. The issue left to the reader, and which I hope to address in this review essay, is the legitimacy of Mazower's claim that the United Nations has indeed escaped its imperial heritage.

Russian President Vladimir Putin was quoted in a newspaper article last year as claiming that “[b]y their mentality and culture, the people of Russia are Europeans”. The accuracy of this claim has been a topic of considerable debate in Russian literature and politics from the time of Czar Peter the Great at least. The pressing question is whether Russia wants to be part of today's Europe. Mounting evidence from the domestic and foreign policy of the Russian Federation suggests that the answer to this question is ‘nyet'.

How are we to understand the state of citizenship in Europe twenty years after the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty? When answering this question, I focus particularly on social citizenship. Social citizenship may be understood as a form of political relationship among citizens extending to each collective protection against the financial risks associated with the life cycle, including dependency when young, ill heath, accidents, and the vulnerabilities of old age. Collective protection against these financial risks takes the form of social rights within the welfare state, including rights to income protection, access to health care, and the provision of education. Within the most economically developed European states, securing these rights has since 1945 been seen as central to the democratic legitimacy of these states, as well as an aspirational standard for democratizing societies seeking to achieve “the concrete substance civilised life” and the associated “general reduction of risk and insecurity”1 at all levels that the welfare state provides.

The International Court of Justice's advisory opinion favoring the legal status of the Kosovar declaration of independence came as an exhilarating surprise to many in Kosovo. The spirit of suspicion and negative perception of most internationals (US citizens being a notable but not exclusive exception) meant that a favorable ruling from an international court was unexpected.

The judgment rendered by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) on May 27, 2019, deemed Germany’s prosecution service (Staatsanwaltschaft) legally incompetent for the purpose of issuing European arrest warrants (EAW) due to its lack of institutional independence. As a consequence, the question of how the German criminal prosecution system differs from the approaches taken by other European countries issuing European arrest warrants arises and raises the question of whether the German prosecution service truly is insufficiently independent in this respect. Debates amongst legal scholars have ensued in the wake of the CJEU’s judgment—the Court not yet having proffered any solutions regarding the re-establishment of the institutional independence—and this article shall discuss the lack of independence and acquaint the reader with possible solutions.

On 2 October 2013, Protocol No. 16 to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) was opened for signature by the Member States of the Council of Europe (CoE). The protocol, that has so far been signed by sixteen States and ratified by Albania, Georgia, Lithuania, San Marino and Slovenia, will enter into force in case of ratification by at least ten Member States. If the protocol becomes effective, it will expand the European Court of Human Rights’ competence to give advisory opinions upon request by domestic high courts and tribunals.