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Incommunicado Detention in Germany: An Example of Reactive Anti-terror Legislation and Long-term Consequences

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Anna Oehmichen

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Of all anti-terror-laws adopted in Germany in the last thirty years, one of the most famous measures is certainly the so-called Kontaktsperregesetz, an Act introducing the possibility of incommunicado detention in the case of imminent terrorist threats. It is the prime example of how far reactive legislation can go, under the pretext to fight terrorism. This form of incommunicado detention was adopted in 1977, by introducing a new section (section 4, Sections 31–38) to the Introductory Act to the Judicature Act (Einführungsgesetz zum Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz, hereinafter EGGVG). The provisions were enacted in response to a particular terrorist incident, and have not been applied since. Surprisingly enough, in April 2006, a seemingly new provision was added to this regime (Section 38a EGGVG), however, as we will later see, this regulation is in fact not new, but has only changed its systematic position within the enormous legislative forest of Germany, and, at the same time, its legal nature (from transitory to permanent). Section 38a EGGVG extends the scope of application of incommunicado detention considerably, by allowing it to be used not only in terrorist cases, but also for other forms of criminal organizations like mafia. It thus increases the possibility of prisoners to be absolutely isolated from other inmates, family, friends, and even from their defense counsels, for up to thirty days; a period which can be prolonged for an indefinite period of time, provided that certain requirements are met.

Type
Articles
Information
German Law Journal , Volume 9 , Issue 7 , 01 July 2008 , pp. 855 - 888
Copyright
Copyright © 2008 by German Law Journal GbR 

References

1 Kontaktsperre literally means “Blocking of Contacts” and “Gesetz“ may be translated as the legislative Act or Statute, so that Kontaktsperregesetz, literally translated, means “Act concerning the blocking of contacts”.Google Scholar

2 Reactive legislation is legislation that responds to particular events (also known as “ad hoc” legislation, or, in German, Anlassgesetzgebung adopted in view of a certain occasion).Google Scholar

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4 In theory, the incommunicado detention could already be applied to organised crime since 1977, as seen in the transitory provision of Article 2 of the Act amending the Introductory Act to the Judicature Act of 30 September 1977. Einführungsgesetz zum Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz, Sept. 30, 1977, Federal Law Gazette (Bundesgesetzblatt, hereinafter: BGBI.) I; See infra B. However, this provision has had little, if any, practical application; it was a transitory provision that the legislator of 1977 did not deem necessary to include in the section governing the incommunicado detention in general, namely Section 4 of the EGGVG. Google Scholar

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18 Since 2002, terrorism is also criminalised under 129b StGB, concerning terrorist acts committed abroad.Google Scholar

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23 This group originated from the students’ peace movement. Some of the students started to radicalise as their aims to change the world by demonstrations were frustrated. When Benno Ohnesorg, a demonstrating student, was shot by the police in an uprising and the responsible police man was subsequently acquitted, protest grew and some of the extreme left-wing students decided that only violence would be capable of changing the current unsatisfying situation. Thus the RAF was formed on 14 May 1970. See Stefan Aust, Der Baader Meinhof Komplex (8th ed. 1998) (the book was also translated into the English language, under the title “The Baader-Meinhof Gang”); Pieter H. Bakker Schut, Politische Verteidigung in Strafsachen, doctoral thesis (1986)(discussing the anti-terror laws of the 1970s and its impact on defence lawyers).Google Scholar

24 Peter Lorenz, candidate for the Christian Democratic Party CDU. Google Scholar

25 President of the Berlin Regional Court, Günther von Drenckmann (killed in 1974), Attorney General Siegfried Buback and Jürgen Ponto, Manager of the Dresdner Bank (both killed in 1977).Google Scholar

26 See Dünnebier, Hanns, Ausschließung von Verteidigern und Beschränkung der Verteidigung, 29 Neue Juristische Wochenzeitschrift 1–7 (1976) (discussing changes in the Anti-Terror-Act of 20 December 1974 [providing for the exclusion of defence counsel (Section 138a, b of the German Code of Criminal Procedure (Strafprozessordnung), the restriction of a maximum of three chosen defence counsels per accused (Section 137(1) StPO), the prohibition for defence counsels to defend more than one person accused of the same criminal act (Section 146 StPO), and the possibility of in absentia trials under certain circumstances (Section 231(2) StPO]); Dr. Hans-Jochen, Strafverfahrensrecht und Terrorismus - eine Bilanz, 31 Neue Juristische Wochenzeitschrift 1217–1228 (1978) (regarding the development of anti-terror laws during the 1970s, particularly the Second Anti-Terror-Act of 18 August 1976 which further reduced the rights of the accused the defence by introducing judicial control of written communication between the accused and his lawyer in the case of terrorist charges [Sections 148(2) StPO, in conjunction with Section 148a StPO]; Dahs, Hans, Das “Anti-Terroristen-Gesetz” - eine Niederlage des Rechtsstaats, 29 Neue Juristische Wochenzeitschrift 2145–2151 (1976).Google Scholar

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28 Schut, Bakker, supra note 23, at 479.Google Scholar

29 The Berlin justice administration was in fact the only Länder justice ministry arguing that the incommunicado detention lacked a legal basis and was contrary to other regulations.Google Scholar

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31 Other examples are the so-called eaves-dropping affair on the nuclear physicist Traube as well as the secret recordings of conversations between prisoners and their defence lawyers in the prison of Stuttgart-Stammheim. See Rudolph Augstein, Adolph Arndt, Hermann Borgs-Maciejewski, and others, Verfassungsschutz bricht Verfassung – Lauschangriff auf Bürger T, Der Spiegel, February 28, 1977 (title story) 19–34; Rudolphi, Hans-Joachim, Die Gesetzgebung zur Bekämpfung des Terrorismus - Versuch einer kritischen Würdigung, 11 Juristische Arbeitsblätter 1–9, 4 (Jan. 1979).Google Scholar

32 The application of this justifying norm requires an imminent danger for a number of enumerated strong legal interests (like life and limb, physical integrity…) and that, when balancing the interest at risk against the interest which will be restricted by the relevant action, that the first one will substantially (wesentlich) prevail. When weighing the interest in the given case, life and limb of the abducted person, against the interests of the detainees, such as the right to free communication with the defence, to effective defence, to physical and psychological integrity, a substantial prevailing of the one over the other is not at all evident. Further, there is an (on-going) academic debate as to whether Section 34 StGB can serve at all to justify encroachments from the public authorities, or whether it is only applicable to private persons. See Böttcher, Reinhard, Vierter Abschnitt, Kontaktsperre. Vorbemerkungen zu §§ 31 ff EGGVG, in Löwe/Rosenberg. Die Strafprozeßordnung und das Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz Großkommentar 25 (2003) (Böttcher EGGVG, Vor § 31); Amelung, Knut, Nochmals: § 34 StGB als öffentlichrechtliche Eingriffsnorm, 1/31 Neue Juristische Wochenzeitschrift 623–624 (1978). However, the Bundesgerichtshof held in its decision of Sept. 23, 1977 that in the present case, the human life, the highest interest of our justice system, was at stake. Balanced against the only temporarily restricted right to free defence, the latter one was much less important. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Sept. 23, 1977, Decisions of the Federal Court of Justice in Criminal Matters (Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofs in Strafsachen, hereinafter BGHSt) 27, 260, 262. Google Scholar

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34 The Federal Constitutional Court argued that the negative consequences of suspending the contact blockage (i.e. that the terrorist kidnappers would receive additional indications and orders from the imprisoned RAF members, which would present an additional threat to the life of the abducted persons, and which would considerably hamper the authorities’ efforts to free the abducted person) would outweigh the consequences of the temporary restrictions of the rights of the defence. In the Court's view, the fact that this general measure concerned indiscriminately all defence lawyers was considered as unavoidable and had to be temporarily accepted. BVerfGE 46, 1.Google Scholar

35 Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt, Decision of Sept. 16, 1977, case no. 3VAs 57, 62, 63/77, 30 Neue Juristische Wochenzeitschrift 2177 (1977).Google Scholar

36 The Government gave three main reasons for the necessity of this law: (1) the use of the underlying principle of the justifying state of emergency under Section 34 StGB should not be of longer duration than absolutely necessary, (2) a uniform application of the measure within the Federal Republic of Germany was only possible by legislative act, and (3) the situation where in particular cases judicial decisions and the actions of the executive branch were not in conformity had to be terminated as soon as possible. (Böttcher EGGVG, Vor § 31 supra note 32).Google Scholar

37 A bill was presented by the factions of the political parties represented in the Federal Parliament, the Bundestag (CDU/CSU, SPD, FDP), on 28 September 1977. The bill was discussed by the Bundestag the very same day (in the first reading). The next day, the committee on legal affairs (Rechtsausschluss) read and modified the draft. Their version was adopted by second and third parliamentary reading on 29 September with high majority. The Federal Council of Germany (representing the interests of the Länder), the Bundesrat gave its consent one day later. The Act was promulgated on 1 October and entered into force the following day. Böttcher EGGVG, Vor § 31; See supra note 32 at n.7-9.Google Scholar

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  1. (1)

    (1) A suspected international terrorist may be detained under a provision specified in subsection (2) despite the fact that his removal or departure from the United Kingdom is prevented (whether temporarily or indefinitely) by—

  2. (a)

    (a) a point of law which wholly or partly relates to an international agreement, or

  3. (b)

    (b) a practical consideration.

  4. (2)

    (2) The provisions mentioned in subsection (1) are—

  5. (a)

    (a) paragraph 16 of Schedule 2 to the Immigration Act 1971 (c. 77) (detention of persons liable to examination or removal), and

  6. (b)

    (b) paragraph 2 of Schedule 3 to that Act (detention pending deportation).”

Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, Sec. 23, available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2001/ukpga_20010024_en_1 (May 27, 2008).

91 Human Rights Act 1998 (Designated Derogation) Order 2001, No. 3644, available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/si/si2001/20013644.htm (visited on 27–05-08).Google Scholar

92 This second derogation seemed necessary not only to forestall a possible breach of the UK's obligations under the Covenant, but also in order to protect the derogation under the ECHR from challenge: under Article 15 ECHR derogation measures are only allowed, among other things, if they are consistent with the other obligations of the Member State under international law.Google Scholar

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94 See Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2005/ukpga_20050002_en_1 (May 27, 2008).Google Scholar

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97 Brennan v. United Kingdom, App. No. 39846/98, Eur. Comm'n H.R. (2001).Google Scholar

98 Article 384bis LECrim speaks of a crime “cometido por persona integrada o relacionada con bandas armadas o individuos terroristas o rebeldes.”Google Scholar

99 Article 509 (1) LECrim reads as follows: “El Juez de Instrucción o tribunal podrá acordar excepcionalmente la detención o prisión incomunicadas para evitar que se sustraigan a la acción de la justicia personas supuestamente implicadas en los hechos investigados, que éstas puedan actuar contra bienes jurídicos de la víctima, que se oculten, alteren o destruyan pruebas relacionadas con su comisión, o que se cometan nuevos hechos delictivos.”Google Scholar

100 Initially the detention is limited to five days maximum. However, in the case of a terrorist crime (for the purposes of Article 384bis), or in case of a crime which requires a certain level of organisation and the participation of two or more actors, this period can be prolonged by another five days and, ultimately, by another three days. See Article 509(2) LECrim. Google Scholar

101 See Article 527 LECrim. Google Scholar

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103 Human Rights Watch, ¿Sentando ejemplo? Medidas antiterroristas en España, available at http://www.hrw.org/spanish/informes/2005/spain0105/ [Spanish]; http://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/spain0105/ [English]), at 25 (May 27, 2008); Human Rights Commission of the United Nations, Apr. 23, 2003, Res. 2003/32, para. 14.Google Scholar

104 Norme sull'ordinamento penitenziario e sulla esecuzione delle misure privative e limitative della libertà, Gazz. Ulff., n. 212 (Aug. 9, 1975).Google Scholar

105 According to Article D. 283–1-7, once the prisoner has spent one year in solitary confinement, the minister of justice can, by derogation from Article D. 283–1, decide to prolong solitary confinement for a duration of four more months. This decision again can be taken several times. The solitary confinement may last, in exceptional cases, longer than two years, namely if the placement in solitary confinement constitutes the only means to assure the security of persons or of the establishment. In this case, the decision on prolongation must be especially motivated.Google Scholar

106 Ramirez-Sanchez v France, Eur. Ct. H.R., App. No. 59450/00 (2005).Google Scholar

107 Notwithstanding, the Strasbourg Court found that the French Government had violated Article 13 of the Convention, as the then applicable French law did not provide a remedy for the applicant to contest the decision to prolong his detention in solitary confinement.Google Scholar

108 Ramirez Sanchez v. France (Eur. Court H.R., Grand Chamber Judgment of 4 July 2006, app. no. 59450/00).Google Scholar

109 See Güney, Necla, Country Report on Turkey, in supra note 102, 557.Google Scholar

110 In the case of Demír and Others v Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R., App. Nos. 21380/93; 21381/93; 21383/93, 1998-IV (1998) (holding that the applicants’ incommunicado detention for at least sixteen or twenty-three days, without any possibility of seeing a judge or other judicial officer, amounted to a breach of Article 3 ECHR); Aksoy v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R., App. No. 21987/93, 1996-VI, at para. 84 (1996) (expressing that the court was not persuaded that the situation necessitated holding Mr Aksoy on suspicion of involvement in terrorist offences for fourteen days or more in incommunicado detention without access to a judge or other judicial officer). See also Orhan v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R., App. No. 25656/94 (2002); Elci and Others v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R., App. Nos. 23145/93 and 25091/94 (2003);, Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R., App. Nos. 46827/99 and 46951/99, 2005-I (2005); Sarı and Çolak v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R., App. Nos. 42596/98 and 42603/98 (2006); Taş v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R., App. No. 24396/94 (2000).Google Scholar

111 Act No. 3713, Art. 1–4, Law to Fight Terrorism (Apr. 12, 1991), available at http://www.icj.org/IMG/Turkey1991law.pdf (Feb. 27, 2008). Article 16 of the Act reads as follows: “(1) The sentences of those convicted under the provisions of this law shall be executed in special penal institutions built with rooms each capable of holding between one and three persons.Google Scholar

  1. (2)

    (2) In such institutions, free visits may not be allowed. Contacts between the convicts and communication with other convicts may be prevented.

  2. (3)

    (3) Those convicts who have served at least one third of their sentences with good conduct and have less than three years to serve before becoming entitled to conditional release may be transferred to other closed penal centres.

  3. (4)

    (4) Those held in pre-trial detention for crimes within the scope of this law shall be kept in detention centres as described in paragraph 1. The provisions of paragraph 2 shall also apply to pre-trial detainees.”

112 “Definition of Terrorism:

Article 1.

  1. (1)

    (1) Terrorism is any kind of act done by one or more persons belonging to an organization with the aim of changing the characteristics of the Republic as specified in the Constitution, its political, legal, social, secular and economic system, damaging the indivisible unity of the State with its territory and nation, endangering the existence of the Turkish State and Republic, weakening or destroying or seizing the authority of the State, eliminating fundamental rights and freedoms, or damaging the internal and external security of the State, public order or general health by means of pressure, force and violence, terror, intimidation, oppression or threat.

  2. (2)

    (2) An organization for the purposes of this Law is constituted by two or more persons coming together for a common purpose.

  3. (3)

    (3) The term “organization” also includes formations, associations, armed associations, gangs or armed gangs as described in the Turkish Penal Code and in the provisions of special laws.

Terrorist Offenders:

Article 2. (1) Any member of an organization, founded to attain the aims defined in Article 1, who commits a crime in furtherance of these aims, individually or in concert with others, or any member of such an organization, even if he does not commit such a crime, shall be deemed to be a terrorist offender.

  1. (2)

    (2) Persons who are not members of a terrorist organization, but commit a crime in the name of the organization, are also deemed to be terrorist offenders and shall be subject to the same punishment as members of such organizations.

Terrorist Offences:

Article 3. Offences defined in Articles 125, 131, 146, 147, 148, 149, 156, 168, 171 and 172 of the Turkish Penal Code are terrorist offences.

Offences committed for terrorist purposes:

Article 4. In applying this Law offences defined in:

  1. a)

    a) Articles 145, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 169 and the second paragraph of Article 499 of the Turkish Penal Code and

  2. b)

    b) offences defined in Article 9, part (b), (c) and (e) of Law 2845 on the Foundation and Criminal Procedure at State Security Courts are terrorist offences if they are committed for terrorist purposes as described in Article 1.” See Act No. 3713, Art. 1–4, Law to Fight Terrorism (Apr. 12, 1991).

113 See supra E. I.; Supra note 96.Google Scholar

114 For example, those prisoners who were either convicted or arrested under the suspicion of having committed one of the offences which a terrorist organisation, within the meaning of Section 129a StGB, aimed to commit.Google Scholar

115 With respect to those prisoners mentioned under Section 31 EGGVG that were suspected of or convicted for an offence as listed under Section 129a StGB, without an explicit link to a terrorist organisation needed, the German Federal Constitutional Court referred to the earlier decision of the German Federal Court of Justice of 13 October 1977, where on basis of the purpose and the legislative history of Sections 31 et seq. EGGVG it was decided that also for this group of prisoners that as an additional – unwritten – requirement a context with organised terrorism had to be established. The Constitutional Court precised that when interpreted this way, Article 31 (second sentence) EGGVG was compatible with the German Constitution. See BVerfG supra note 20, at para. 130.Google Scholar

116 This becomes even more probable, following the recent discussions in Germany, instigated by the German home secretary Wolfgang Schäuble who proposed inter alia preventive custody for terrorist suspects. See Darnstädt, Thomas, Im Vorfeld des Bösen, Der Spiegel, July 9, 2007, at 18–30.Google Scholar