The Constitutional Treaty was thought to address the new challenges occurring in front of the enlarged Europe in relation to the rapidly changing international political, economic, social and cultural circumstances. In this respect, the problem of the new quality of the European Union is being repeatedly disputed. If the EU is to be something more than an arrangement for inter-state cooperation, the Union has to be able to act rationally on a collective basis, in a way that different interests or preferences will give priority to seeking agreement over self-interest maximization. The question of whether the EU envisaged in the Constitutional Treaty represents a deeper form of integration can be answered by examining its ability to achieve consensus on conflicting issues and to form a common will about how to solve common problems. The field in which the most controversies arise nowadays is that of biotechnology and biomedicine.

The question of churches and religious communities in the EU/EC law arose for the first time in 1997, when Declaration No. 11 on the status of churches and non-confessional organisations was attached to the Amsterdam Treaty. According to this Declaration, “The European Union will respect and does not prejudice the status under national law of churches and religious associations or communities in the Member States. The European Union will equally respect the status of philosophical and non-confessional organisations.” The content of this Declaration was commented on many times by distinguished experts of the European ecclesiastical law. Art. I-52 of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (Constitutional Treaty/CT) repeats in paragraph one and two Declaration No. 11, and introduces in paragraph three a provision on dialogue between the EU and religious bodies: “Recognising their identity and their specific contribution, the Union shall maintain an open, transparent and regular dialogue with these churches and organisations.”

The “unity dogma” has long characterized the European law discourse. In many of its landmark decisions the European Court of Justice had recourse to the “unity argument,” such as in Costa vs. E.N.E.L., where it rightly states that “the executive force of Community law cannot vary from one state to another … without jeopardizing the attainment of the objectives of the Treaty.” Other expressions of the “unity dogma” include the legal principle of non-discrimination enshrined in the fundamental freedoms, which lie at the heart of the single market, or the political concept of acquis communautaire obliging new Member States to subscribe to all existing Community laws. Indeed, the establishment of a supranational legal order requires a continued focus on its uniform application in the Member States without which the effectiveness of European law is at stake. My intention is not to call into question the underlying rationale of this quest for unity. The aim of this contribution is rather to show that the asymmetric non-participation of individual Member States in selected areas of Union activity can be embedded into the existing European legal order and does not contradict its constitutional aspirations, thereby giving substance to the Union's motto “United in Diversity.”

Discussing the withdrawal provision pursuant to Article I-60 of the Constitutional Treaty (CT), also referred to as the sunset clause, in the morning light of the establishment of a European Constitution is pretty much like talking about divorce on your wedding day. Before I try to start analyzing the text of this new provision, I will briefly outline the status of the legal debate on the right of withdrawal from the current EU/EC Treaty. In this context, I would like to highlight three aspects by making one political and two legal observations.