Since 2010, a national scheme regulates the registration, accreditation and discipline of health professionals in Australia (the ‘National Law’). This research examines disciplinary cases from tribunals nationwide to address the question: Has the national regulation of health professionals produced consistency in outcomes in serious cases of professional misconduct? All publicly available Australian tribunal-level decisions concerning complaints of serious misconduct and/or impairment brought against the five most populous regulated health professions (nurses and midwives, doctors, psychologists, pharmacists and dentists) were analysed for the period from 1 July 2010 to 30 June 2017. Each case was coded by reference to a typology of misconduct, practitioner characteristics and outcome, allowing for comparisons to be drawn both as between the professions and as between jurisdictions. Major disparities were identified in outcomes across the professions, with doctors being subject to less severe outcomes than other professions, in particular in comparison with nurses, even when the same main head of misconduct was in issue. Marked disparities were also identified between outcomes in different states and territories, suggesting that the National Law is not being applied in a uniform manner. This article examines these disparities and explores possible contributing factors.

This article reviews the equity crowdfunding law and practice in Australia. It argues that a light regulatory approach for issuers and investors is required to ensure that crowd-sourced equity funding (CSEF) is attractive enough to both investors and issuers. At the same time, it argues that regulation focused on preventing and detecting fraud is essential for CSEF to be successful. The article therefore recommends that caps on the amount each investor can invest are not desirable and, instead, suggests other means of safeguarding against fraud, like the use of whistleblower programs, investor education and reliable dispute resolution mechanisms, in addition to what the legislation provides.

Space law is regulated largely by international treaties which have little to say regarding the use and regulation of commercial space. As the costs of access to outer space decrease and the benefits exponentially increase, more countries are seeking to support and encourage ‘NewSpace’ entrepreneurs in order to establish commercial space industries. Australia has been a minor player in the space domain, primarily through involvement with Europe and the US since the late 1960s, but its domestic legislation bears little relevance to the shape of space industry today. Australia’s neighbour, New Zealand, now wants to become a NewSpace incubator and has recently enacted legislation designed to make it a competitive host nation for launch providers. This article will compare the regulatory space regimes of these two countries to provide an assessment of the importance of domestic regulation in fostering competitive commercial space services, for countries seeking to become competitive in the commercial space race.

Digital currency is a ‘disrupter’ of financial services and currency markets, and as such presents new regulatory challenges. International regulatory responses to digital currency range from being largely ignored in some jurisdictions to being banned in others, with most jurisdictions charting a middle course of ‘wait and see’ while attempting to deal with pressing issues (such as taxation liability and potential money laundering and terrorism financing issues). This article explains digital currency, its benefits, its problems, its risks and the regulatory response so far. It analyses the extent to which the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC, the national securities regulator) may or may not have regulatory power and jurisdiction under existing Australian law, and the role of other relevant regulators and institutions. It concludes that digital currency may well be a ‘financial product’ under Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 763A (though many suppliers/issuers of that product will be website operators located outside Australia). If it is a financial product, ASIC would also have jurisdiction over issuers and markets that trade in that product. This conclusion could easily be fortified by legislative confirmation; however, it is suggested that ASIC should in all events test its powers to determine whether any legislative change is needed. Regulation by ASIC would add to recent moves to deal with digital currency by the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC) and the Australian Taxation Office (ATO). In all cases, this article argues that the time has come for Commonwealth regulation of digital currencies by ASIC as the relevant regulator. This would then trigger the obligations set out in the Corporations Act and the ASIC Act, including Australian Financial Services Licensing, Australian Market Licensing, standards of efficiency, honesty and fairness, disclosure provisions, possible market offences and corporate regulation generally. The suggested jurisdiction of ASIC would build on its existing role as well as the roles of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, the ATO and AUSTRAC.

The High Court has not definitively explained the legal status of the constitutionally implied freedom of political association since its existence was first raised in 1992. Tajjour v New South Wales affirmed the majority view that any constitutional protection enjoyed by political association is derived from the freedom of political communication; or, in the words of the Court, a ‘corollary to’ that freedom. In this article, we argue that the High Court should acknowledge the freedom of political association as a free-standing freedom rather than a corollary of political communication. The reasoning that gave rise to the implied freedom of political communication can also be applied to political association. The Court’s approach to the implication of freedom of communication, of building on the text of ss 7, 24 and 128 of the Constitution and the structures they establish, does not appear to be at odds with the implication of freedom of association. Consequently, we argue the Court has erred in favouring the corollary form of political association (pt IV). The corollary freedom has not been justified and appears either entirely unnecessary (being subsumed by political communication) or overly subjective in application. By contrast, the free-standing freedom could adopt the well-established Lange test of validity with only minor adjustments and therefore represent only a modest development of existing jurisprudence.

In recent years, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission has placed considerable emphasis on the stepping stone approach as a device to establish officers’ liability in respect of corporate contraventions of the law. The approach represents a novel interpretation of the general duties of officers under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (‘CA’). Despite the seriousness of the consequences for an officer that may follow from a finding of liability, the content and boundaries of the approach remain undefined. Critically, the courts’ heightened receptiveness to the approach and the judicial expansion of its scope departs from earlier judicial statements of caution sounded against using the general statutory duties as a mechanism to secure corporate compliance with the law. At a more fundamental level, it is doubtful whether the approach represents a legitimate interpretation of the general statutory duties, to the extent that it subverts several existing routes to officers’ liability and remedies under the CA. It is incumbent on the legislature to correct these inconsistencies by recalibrating the role envisaged for officers under the CA in line with contemporary expectations.

This article examines the recent introduction of state-based regulation to address the increasingly prominent problem of exploitation of vulnerable workers by labour hire providers around Australia. Mounting evidence of underpayments and other breaches of workplace laws has emerged from a range of state and federal inquiries into the labour hire sector in recent years. The article draws parallels between these abuses and the exploitative activities of ‘gangmasters’ in industrial-era Britain. It then closely analyses and compares the labour hire licensing schemes introduced in Victoria, Queensland and South Australia, which aim to combat noncompliance by introducing barriers to entry and eliminate ‘rogue’ operators from the labour hire market. The article assesses the effectiveness of similar licensing and registration schemes in several overseas jurisdictions, especially the gangmasters licensing scheme operating in the United Kingdom since 2004. The article concludes that the licensing schemes introduced under the three state laws are a timely and, most likely, effective new approach to tackling the problem of noncompliance with workplace and other laws. Alternative responses to exploitation at the federal level are also considered, including the 2017 Vulnerable Workers legislation introduced largely in response to systemic underpayments in the 7-Eleven franchise network. Finally, the article observes that federal reform of the labour hire sector may emerge in the near future, given the Labor Opposition’s policy commitment to introduce a national labour hire licensing scheme. In the meantime, the state labour hire licensing schemes examined in this article represent an important step forward in regulation to combat worker exploitation by contemporary Australian ‘gangmasters’.

We provide an empirical study of the High Court’s citation to case law and secondary sources at decade intervals between 1905 and 2015. We document trends in the number and type of citations over time, both for the Court as a whole and for the individual Justices. We find that in each of the sample years between 1905 and 1975, the Court cited relatively few authorities and for most of this period the majority of citations were to the Court’s own previous decisions or to decisions of the English courts. However, over the last four sample years—1985, 1995, 2005 and 2015—the Court cited more authority. The Court cited an increasing proportion of its own previous decisions over this period as well as a higher proportion of authority from a more diverse range of sources, including secondary sources, largely at the expense of citations to English cases. We conclude that this reflects the emergence of a distinct Australian common law with the High Court as its final arbitrator.

Australia has a competition problem: there is not enough of it. Our industries are concentrated. Our markets show signs of weak competition. The way Australia’s courts, parliamentarians and regulators think about competition is partly to blame. Although it has been less influential in Australia than in the United States, the Chicago School’s views on competition have shaped our laws, policies and enforcement practices. The Chicago School views market concentration as a virtue more than a vice. The School contended that barriers to entry are negligible, market power is temporary, most mergers are good, vertical restraints and predatory pricing are either benign or efficient. The growing body of research and experience, however, shows that the Chicago School’s faith in the ability of markets to self-correct and deliver competitive outcomes was misplaced. There is a strong progressive case for repositioning how we think about competition. Focusing more on the competitive process, the structure of markets and the incentives those structures create for firms will play an important role in reducing inequality.

This article critically examines the approach adopted by the courts to causation in securities and financial product disclosure cases, where a plaintiff alleges loss as a result of defective disclosure by a product issuer. The article argues that the reliance approach should be rejected as the sole approach to causation in securities and financial product disclosure cases. The article gives two principal arguments in support of this claim. Firstly, the reliance approach, by insisting that causation may only be established by proving reliance on the disclosure document, implicitly assumes a ‘rational choice’ approach to investor decision-making which, as demonstrated by a significant body of behavioural research, does not accurately reflect the reality of investor decision-making. Secondly, the reliance approach sits at odds with other developments in securities cases and misleading and deceptive conduct jurisprudence. I argue that the courts should recognise that causation may potentially be demonstrated in a variety of ways other than reliance on the disclosure document, including reliance on sources such as communications from financial advisers, newspapers, online sources, briefings, investor roadshows, social media and other marketing practices.