Studies of political machines in American cities have typically been concerned with voting patterns that have allowed machines to control municipal governments and with the mechanisms of machines themselves, which keep political operatives active in city precincts. The presence of ‘material incentives', defined as tangible rewards in the form of city jobs, business opportunities, easements from city regulations, and gifts, is the factor most commonly understood to account for both voter support for machines and for the motivation to participate in the work of machine politics.

Is there a notion of economics in Greek philosophy? How can we interpret it without making anachronistic assumptions? What relationship exists between management of the material world and the ‘good life’? These questions at the centre of W. Booth's paper, examined here, are the subject of a study which tries to point out the present interest of analyses of the Ancient Greeks.

The economic discipline plays a performative role in constructing the moral order of market society. Yet, little attention has been paid to what economists explicitly regard as moral or how they conceive of morality. This article reflects a recent attempt to put morals into economics, that is, to introduce morality as a research topic in behavioural and experimental economics. It maps three research programs that theorize the moral economy. The programs emphasize the moral foundations of market society, the moral limits of market expansion, and the moral consequences of market trading and, thus, appear irreconcilable with classifications of economists as market enthusiasts or moral agnostics. At the same time, however, the literature centres on an “economized” form of morality that is corrective to market inefficiencies, attributed to the responsibility of the individual, and expressed in rational terms. In doing so, this literature contributes to redefining moral problems in economic terms.

Il convient de justifier en quelques mots ce titre prétentieux qui paraît attribuer à M. Lévi-Strauss des idées franchement philosophiques. A en juger par les résultats, fort instructifs, d'une récente discussion de principes (1), il est pourtant clair qu'il serait prématuré de considérer 1' «anthropologie structurale» comme un courant philosophique moderne (du «non-sens» par exemple), qui chercherait à se frayer un chemin au détriment de courants de pensée existants. La démarche structuraliste se propose plutôt de servir à un regroupement de différentes sciences qui se tenaient jusqu'alors jalousement à l'écart l'une de l'autre, en déployant une compréhension globale et cohérente de l'homme et en s'efforçant autant que possible de transcender les façons propres aux sciences humaines pour les replacer dans le cadre d'une science de la nature. Laissons a cette demarche les limites qu'elle s'est elle-même fixées et gardons-nous de lui faire dire plus qu'elle ne veut. Il n'est pas interdit toutefois de comprendre ces nouveaux principes dans leur signification la plus large, en laissant aux sociologues de métier le soin de vérifier leur efficacité au sein des données empiriques. Examinons done les circonstances dans lesquelles apparaît le terme d' «esprit» et son importance pour les sciences humaines en tant que telles.

There has been much talk about the retreat or even death of multiculturalism. Much of this discussion confounds multiculturalism with explicit policy under that name. I argue in this paper that liberal law itself, in particular majority-constraining constitutional law, requires multiculturalism, understood as multiple ways of life that cannot and should not be contained by a state that is to be neutral about individuals’ ultimate values and commitments. The workings of legal multiculturalism are demonstrated through a comparison of benchmark jurisprudence on gays in America and Muslims in Europe. An interesting difference is that for Muslims, liberal law has also functioned as constraint, not only as resource, especially in the post-2001 period of heightened integration concerns.

The legitimacy of modern democratic institutions rests on the ideal of popular sovereignty. The purpose of this paper is to examine the contemporary status of this ideal.

Since space limitations do not permit discussion that would place the concept of popular sovereignty in its historical and intellectual context, we simply postulate a definition. People, by whom we mean individuals acting on the bases of their current preferences, are collectively sovereign if the alternatives open to them as a collectivity are constrained only by conditions independent of anyone's will. Specifically, people are sovereign to the extent that they can alter the existing institutions, including the state and property, and if they can allocate available resources to all feasible uses.

In 906, the Abbot Reginon von Prüm issued a questionnaire concerning the sins perpetrated during the past year within a given parish. Two important improvements can be found in the questionnaire as compared to the already existing handbooks of penance: instead of being used for the private confession of sins, it was designed for a public investigation, and it demonstrates an effort toward some objectivity, by avoiding reproofs or value judgements. For these reasons, it appears as a significant advance in survey questionnaires. A French translation of the questionnaire is provided in the appendix.

This paper's purpose is to exam Turner's (2006a) thesis that Britain neither produced its own public intellectuals nor a distinctive sociology. It aims to outline difficulties with the logic of Turner's argument rather than to discuss any particular public intellectual in Britain. The paper argues that Turner's claim about the comparative insignificance of public intellectuals in Britain reinforces the myth of British exceptionalism and overlooks the significance of the contribution to the public sphere by intellectuals from other disciplines than sociology. It discusses Turner's assumption that intellectual innovation requires massive disruptive and violent change and suggests that such an assertion is not necessarily supported by studies of the conditions of the production of knowledge. Finally, the paper argues that Turner's anguish at the absence of public intellectuals among sociologists in Britain is symptomatic of New Left thinking that models the idea of the intellectual on Gramsci. In conclusion, the paper asserts that Turner's idea of the intellectual fails to note the tension at the heart of the role of public intellectual–the tension between specialist and non-specialist functions.