This article discusses the EU supply chain legislation, by virtue of the recently adopted Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD) which aims to reduce negative sustainability impacts in global supply chains with regard to a list of human rights and environmental standards specified in its Annex I of the CSDDD.

We argue that the CSDDD marks a fundamental change on the EU level, from disclosure duties to mandating prevention of, and compensation for, adverse sustainability impacts in supply chains.

We further find that the CSDDD is a legal transplant combining the principles laid down in the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises on Responsible Business and those of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, along with elements of French supply chain legislation from 2017 (which relies on a private enforcement model) and the German supply chain law from 2021 (which is based on a public enforcement model). Like all legal transplants, the resulting legal text generally prompts questions about consistency and specifically raises doubts as to whether combining all of the components of a private and a public enforcement model is proportionate for the purpose of the CSDDD which is to ensure that companies take effective steps to counter violations of human rights and environmental standards in global supply chains. The scope provisions (including smaller in-scope EU firms while leaving non-EU peers of a similar size aside) paired with significant high compliance burden provide grounds to argue that the CSDDD impacts on the competitiveness of these smaller in-scope EU companies, and thus the EU economy at large.

This article analyses the constitutional framework regulating states of emergency in Poland and addresses key issues related to their interpretation and implementation. The first part discusses the conditions for declaring martial law, a state of an extraordinary situation, and a state of natural disaster, as well as the specific rules for the operation of public authorities in such emergencies. The next part analyses the practice, revealing the consistent reluctance of Polish authorities to invoke states of emergency, even in circumstances that seem to justify such measures. Consequently, a state of emergency under the 1997 Constitution was declared in Poland only once – in 2021, in response to a migration crisis on the border with Belarus. No constitutional emergency was declared during the COVID-19 pandemic, despite the introduction of far-reaching restrictions on individual rights and freedoms. The article argues that state authorities can abuse emergency regulations, either through their unjustified application or by deliberately circumventing them.

The paper offers a comprehensive overview of Hungary’s emergency law and its misuse over the four years since its introduction in March 2020. Hungary serves as a clear example of how a “state of danger” – initially intended as an exceptional legal measure – can become normalised through repeated declarations. The populist government’s continuous use of emergency powers has led to unchecked lawmaking and the manipulation of legal frameworks to advance populist agendas. The article argues that while Hungary’s detailed emergency provisions in the Fundamental Law were intended to serve as a form of constitutional risk management, after four years of living in a permanent “state of danger”, the scholarly debate has shifted to whether this very risk management has itself become the risk. According to emergency law theory, managing constitutional risks is equally vital in the emergency legal order. Yet in Hungary, both the black letter of the law and the constitutional practices observed during and after the COVID-19 pandemic – along with the Ninth Amendment to the Fundamental Law, which introduced a new emergency regime in 2021 – reveal that constitutional risk management has ultimately failed. This is manifest in the erosion of the separation of powers, the weakening of judicial review, and the shrinking of human rights protections. The article substantiates its argument by examining the related constitutional framework and constitutional practice in Hungary between 2020 and 2024.

The impact of the European Union (EU) in strengthening nanotechnology risk regulation in non-EU countries is still an under-researched topic. This article focuses on the EU’s influence on its trading partners, using the case study of Israel, which in 2023 adopted restrictions on nanotechnology in cosmetics products following the EU. It is argued that EU risk regulation have been both a trigger and a formative factor for the development of Israeli nanomaterials restrictions. The importance and economic interdependence in the EU market for cosmetics has prompted a response from Israeli policymakers. In addition, the EU regulatory capacity through its expertise and sanctioning authority have influenced the Israeli regulatory agenda. The article shows that the impact of EU regulation also coincided with domestic economic factors, concerns about technology policy and policymakers’ preference for stringent standards. Israel’s risk regulation of nanomaterials in cosmetics provides a useful case study for analyzing the EU’s regulatory impact on its trading partners. Once again, stricter EU’s health and safety regulation drives those of its trading partner upward.

The ECtHR’s landmark judgment in the case Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland contains novel findings on procedural and substantive aspects of human rights protection in the climate change context. To reconcile effective protection of Convention rights with the exclusion of actiones populares, the Court set a high threshold for the individual applicants’ victim status while applying mostly formal criteria to the locus standi of the applicant association. On this count, only the association’s application was admissible. On the merits, the Court found violations of Articles 8 and 6(1) ECHR because Switzerland failed to comply with its positive obligation to protect individuals from the adverse effects of climate change and its courts did not engage seriously with the applicant association’s action. This case note takes a closer look at the ECtHR’s interpretation of standing for individuals and associations and discusses its (non-)alignment with previous case law. In particular, it reflects on the Court’s implicit understanding of the concept of victim in KlimaSeniorinnen and explores whether allowing representative standing is justified based on the Court’s existing case law. The case note concludes with an outlook on the enforcement of collective human rights issues through associations.

This paper traces the legislative process of the EU Artificial Intelligence Act (AI Act) to provide an empirical and critical account of the choices made in its formation. It specifically focuses on the dynamics that led to increasing or lowering fundamental rights protection in the final text and their implications for fundamental rights. Adopting process-tracing methods, the paper sheds light on the institutional differences and agreements behind this landmark legislation. It then analyses the implications of political compromise for fundamental rights protection. The core message it aims to convey is to read the AI Act with its institutional setting and political context in mind. As this paper shows, the different policy aims and mandates of the three EU institutions, compounded by the unprecedented level of redrafting and the short time needed to reach a political agreement, influenced the formulation of the AI Act. Looking forward, the paper points to the role of implementation, enforcement and judicial interpretation in enhancing the protection of fundamental rights in the age of AI.

In the past decade, the legal and economic literature on blockchain technology and its applications has flourished. This new technology holds great promise for enhancing the efficiency of contracting. Building on the classic Coase theorem, blockchain as a decentralised mechanism of decision-making should be superior to centralised regulation, possibly yielding substantial efficiency gains. Notably, it also has the potential to improve the allocation of property rights and reduce transaction costs.

However, many of these enthusiastic views about what blockchain technology may bring are overblown. This article demonstrates that blockchain creates a variety of new externalities, which cannot be addressed by the decentralised actors using it. The most obvious of them is the environmental externality stemming from the energy-intensive mining process. In addition, more immediate externalities emerge, for example through the operational and legal risks of being part of a blockchain transaction, which are particularly evident in the crypto economy. Moreover, issues surrounding blockchain governance may exacerbate these challenges.

In conclusion, we propose several regulatory strategies to mitigate these shortcomings and harness the full potential of blockchain technology.

A Decentralised Autonomous Organisation (DAO) is a new form of digital enterprise that operates on blockchain networks. It enables a new model of collaboration through diverse capital contributions and equitable sharing of benefits and risks. This paper explores the legal dimensions of DAO token transferability, a vital aspect for the expansion of DAO operations. First, it evaluates how property law (including the proposal by the Law Commission of England and Wales for a third category of digital asset ownership) might apply to DAO tokens so as to mitigate legal risks and ensure smooth transferability. Secondly, it investigates the potential for DAO software protocols to implement contractual transferability restrictions and examines their technological design. Finally, it looks at the legal enforceability of such restrictions and the policies needed to support their legal recognition.

Regulatory norms, rules, and arrangements enshrined in and established by EU pharmaceutical law travel internationally and influence foreign legal systems, regulatory practices, pharmaceutical company conduct, health systems’ functioning, and ultimately patient access to medicines and human health worldwide. This paper applies the mechanisms of Europeanisation (conditionality, socialisation, externalisation, and mimicry) to explain how these EU norms, rules and arrangements are diffused globally, with a focus on developing economies. Using the ongoing revision of the EU’s pharmaceutical legislation as a case study, this paper selects three innovative legislative proposals therein (i.e. environmental risk assessments for antimicrobials; reporting of public funding for medicines R&D; revised clinical test data and market protection, including a transferrable exclusivity voucher). Through the lens of Europeanisation, this paper postulates how these three legislative proposals, if adopted, would travel globally to developing economies, under which conditions, and with which likely impacts. This paper addresses several gaps in the literature, namely by introducing a global lens to the existing analyses of the EU’s revision of pharmaceutical law, by revealing the theory behind the emerging evidence of the EU’s influence over global pharmaceutical markets, and by positioning the case of pharmaceutical regulation in low- and middle-income countries among the scholarship on the global regulatory influence of EU internal market law.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, the European Union (EU) observed a major centralisation of competence in public health policy – the EU Vaccines Strategy. Yet increased centralisation or integration is not always desirable because the EU lacks a layer of democratic control to ensure transparency and accountability. This feature highlights the need to better understand and assess the EU’s actions during the pandemic. This paper aims to assess the effectiveness of the EU Vaccines Strategy and contributes to the wider debate on the centralisation of power at Union level. The joint procurement of COVID-19 vaccines is considered a success, as it avoided a “vaccine scramble” by the EU Member States. However, the fact that the Member States were obliged to purchase more than they needed and the lack of transparency in the negotiations with companies on the procurement of vaccines have raised questions about the integrity of the Commission’s exercise of executive power.

The 2022–2023 Qatargate scandal – which entailed the widespread undermining of Union democracy by members of the European Parliament acting on behalf of third countries – has rocked the European Union to its core. The proposal by the Commission aimed at establishing transparency and accountability surrounding such activities cannot therefore come at a more appropriate time. But does the proposal live up to its objectives? Here, this piece casts doubt on whether that is the case, with this piece exploring Qatargate as an example, as well as the content, constitutionality, and criticism of the proposal. This Article also makes comparisons to Union-based representation activities and the Commission’s approach to antidumping, and shines light on the Commission’s treatment of third-country actors and representatives thereof.

The COVID-19 pandemic has clearly demonstrated that international cooperation to combat pandemics is insufficient. The World Health Organization has, therefore, recently reformed the International Health Regulations based on the experience of the COVID 19-pandemic. The World Health Assembly also plans to adopt a new Pandemic Agreement to further strengthen international cooperation. However, negotiations have not yet been successful, and this year’s World Health Assembly agreed to extend the negotiations for the Pandemic Agreement by one year. Reason enough to analyse and critically evaluate the reform efforts in detail, and to give an outlook on the future of international pandemic law.

The new EU Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation (“MiCA”) emphasises the prevention of market abuse as one of its five main objectives. This paper critically analyzes MiCA’s provisions on market abuse (Title VI), applying the new rules to the primary categories of crypto-asset market integrity risks to provide a coherent interpretation. In doing so, we consider both the pre-existing legal framework for protecting market integrity, chiefly the Market Abuse Regulation (“MAR”), and the unique features of crypto-asset markets. We find that by largely replicating MAR, MiCA presents “new wine in old bottles” challenges, as crypto-assets introduce novel issues that the legislator attempts to address with a subset of existing tools. The extent to which “decentralized finance” (DeFi) activities will incur liability under MiCA’s anti-market abuse provisions remains unclear, particularly regarding various blockchain network participants. Furthermore, classifying MEV strategies as market abuse may prove difficult. The absence of certain safe-harbor provisions present in MAR, such as those for self-insiders and buy-back and stabilisation schemes, may create uncertainty and potentially chill legitimate market behavior under MiCA.

The European legislator has included the fulfilment service provider (FSP) in European product safety legislation as a new responsible economic operator (EO) in e-commerce for instances where no other EO is based in the European Union. As a matter of coherency, this adjusted personal scope of product safety law will likely be mirrored in a revised product liability directive. This article explores to what extent the aims and expectations of European legislator with respect to these legal changes (law in the books) align with the perceptions of FSPs and legal advisors in the field (law in action). This is done by means of a legal analysis of the goals and envisioned effects of these changes as well as a semi-structured interview study on how FSPs and legal advisors in the field perceive this new role, responsibility, and liability. The findings provide indications that product safety law currently in force might not (yet) lead to the desired effects. The findings also make us question the extent to which victim compensation is actually improved by the proposed adjustment of the personal scope of the product liability directive.

In comparison to other high-risk industrial sectors, human rights due diligence (HRDD) in the arms sector remains unclear and underdeveloped. This article elucidates how supply chain regulations can provide pertinent guidance for clarifying and elaborating the standards and requirements of the HRDD obligations of arms companies. Part I reaffirms the importance of independent HRDD obligations for arms companies due to the significant human rights risks posed by arms exports. Part II contextualises the limitations in the development of HRDD in the arms industry by examining the corporate policies of major arms companies. Part III explicates why supply chain regulations for conflict minerals are suitable guidance for clarifying and elaborating the HRDD obligations of arms companies. Part IV details five elements of an HRDD framework for arms companies that are essential for comprehensively identifying, evaluating and addressing the human rights risks of arms exports. Part V offers concluding remarks.

The Artificial Intelligence Act (AI Act) of the European Union (EU) claims to be based on a risk-based approach to avoid over-regulation and to respect the principle of legislative proportionality. This paper argues that risk-based regulation is indeed the right approach to AI regulation. At the same time, however, the paper shows that important provisions of the AI Act do not follow a truly risk-based approach. Yet, this is nothing that cannot be fixed. The AI Act provides for sufficient tools to support future-proof legislation and to implement it in line with a genuine risk-based approach. Against this background, the paper analyses how the AI Act should be applied and implemented according to its original intention of a risk-based approach, and what lessons legislators around the world can learn from the AI Act in regulating AI.

The analysis of liability aspects facing Artificial Intelligence (‘AI’)-generated outputs under copyright and related rights has been overlooked compared to other issues connected to the development and use of AI. This study fills this gap by exploring pertinent questions under international, EU and UK law. Specifically, the study tackles actionable reproduction, allocation of liability, and availability of defences. The analysis ultimately shows that, while it is clear that each case will need to be decided on its own merits, the generative AI output phase raises several profiles of liability under copyright law. If the goal of policymakers and relevant stakeholders is to ensure the balanced and sustainable development of AI, then the issues related to the generation and dissemination of AI outputs need to be given ample attention and a greater role in the debate than what has been the case so far, whether it is in the context of risk assessment and compliance, licensing initiatives, or in contentious scenarios.

Since limiting judicial independence in Hungary and Poland, the politics of the rule of law crisis have been examined by various scholars discussing conflicts within and between EU and domestic institutions. The rule of law is no longer a purely national affair – it is of high political salience both for the Member States and the EU polity. The question addressed here is: how has the rule of law crisis reshaped the EU’s modes of governance? We argue that to safeguard this common value, the EU is evolving into a regulatory polity (3.0). This development marks a shift from Majone’s EU regulatory state’s focus on regulating markets (1.0) and regulation in core state powers in times of crises (2.0) to regulation on the core values of the polity (3.0). The article shows that in a context of growing dissensus over the rule of law, EU institutional actors have sought to strengthen “rulemaking,” “rule monitoring” and “rule enforcement” through a regulatory approach anchored in a market logic. It also shows that shifting from the traditional regulatory state 1.0 to regulation in core state powers 2.0, the regulatory polity 3.0 strengthens the EU’s institutional capacity to act when the rule of law is under strain through depoliticised “rule monitoring” and politicised “rulemaking“ and “rule enforcement“ as illustrated in the cases of Hungary and Poland discussed in this article.

Over the last fifteen years, the European Union has built up its regulatory response to the rule of law crisis. That framework seeks to address rule of law-related undesirable events depending on whether or not they have already occurred. As risk prevention has a limited role in the EU’s rule of law policy, undesirable events are mostly dealt with in the context of crisis management. Evaluation, reaction and conditionality mechanisms are all affected by issues relating to operability and legitimacy which reduce their overall performance. The resulting moderate efficiency of crisis management tools may still be improved by making use of the upgraded rule of law mechanisms in a systemic way.