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DAO Token Transferability: Property, Contract, and Technology

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 December 2024

Joseph Lee*
Affiliation:
Reader in Corporate and Financial Law, University of Manchester, Manchester, UK
Alexandre Fricotté
Affiliation:
LL.M. Exeter, Trainee Lawyer, Paris, France
*
Corresponding author: Joseph Lee; Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

A Decentralised Autonomous Organisation (DAO) is a new form of digital enterprise that operates on blockchain networks. It enables a new model of collaboration through diverse capital contributions and equitable sharing of benefits and risks. This paper explores the legal dimensions of DAO token transferability, a vital aspect for the expansion of DAO operations. First, it evaluates how property law (including the proposal by the Law Commission of England and Wales for a third category of digital asset ownership) might apply to DAO tokens so as to mitigate legal risks and ensure smooth transferability. Secondly, it investigates the potential for DAO software protocols to implement contractual transferability restrictions and examines their technological design. Finally, it looks at the legal enforceability of such restrictions and the policies needed to support their legal recognition.

Type
Articles
Creative Commons
Creative Common License - CCCreative Common License - BY
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution and reproduction, provided the original article is properly cited.
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2025. Published by Cambridge University Press

I. Introduction

A Decentralised Autonomous Organisation (“DAO”) is a novel form of digital enterprise, operating within the blockchain network. It champions a new paradigm of collaboration with diverse capital contributions along with the shared distribution of benefits and risks. Various iterations of DAOs are currently in use, with many more anticipated to emerge. The underlying technological framework, blockchain – a type of distributed ledger technology (“DLT”) – is under continuous development, alongside an expanding suite of blockchain-integrated technological solutions known as smart contracts which are aimed at executing transactions autonomously.

Law and regulation play several fundamental roles: directing policy initiatives, establishing standards for risk management, and fostering an environment conducive to experimentation and innovation. Among the significant risks associated with DAOs are those related to governance tokens – including their nature, functionality, and lifecycle, from issuance to extinction.

DAO tokens are governance tokens which grant voting powers or rights within the DAO community. By analogy with shares in companies, this paper will analyse the transferability of DAO tokens, a critical function for scaling up DAO operations. Transferability prompts the formation of secondary markets, thus providing liquidity for the DAO tokens market. This liquidity reduces the risk of holding DAO tokens, subsequently increasing investment appeal. Moreover, a secondary market offers a mechanism for DAO governance by market participants, similar to traditional capital markets. However, free transferability can undermine the decentralised and trustless essence of DAOs. To ensure the proper distributed governance of DAOs, transfer restrictions can be implemented in smart contracts.

The analogy between shares in company law and DAO tokens under English law will serve as a basis for this examination, with comparisons to French law. The discussion will extend to the legal frameworks that can support or restrict DAO token transferability. We will investigate the interplay between property law, contract law – specifically the enforceability of DAO token holders’ agreements – and blockchain technology. We aim to explain how blockchain technology, particularly through smart contracts and their encoded provisions, provides solutions to address these emerging risks. However, we show that new risks are also created as the rule of law is challenged by the primacy of code (“Code is Law”).

Our analysis will first consider to what extent property law (including the Law Commission of England and Wales’ proposal for a third category of digital asset ownership) could apply to DAO tokens in order to reduce legal risks and safeguard token transferability. Secondly, we will evaluate the potential for DAO software protocols to impose transferability restrictions and look at the technological design of these constraints. Thirdly, we will assess the legal force of such limitations and the policy considerations that underpin the legal recognition of blockchain-embedded transfer restrictions.

II. Transferability of DAO tokens

1. DAO tokens as personal property

a. Capacity of being objects of property rights

A cryptoasset such as a crypto-token (“token”) can be understood as a notional quantity unitFootnote 1 being an unique, unreplicable and separable “data string” or “data structure”Footnote 2 embodied in the correspondence between several copies of a shared registerFootnote 3 generated by a transaction on the system.Footnote 4

It has been treated as property in an unbroken line of court decisionsFootnote 5 and by most commentators.Footnote 6 In Tulip Trading v Van Der Laan, Birss LJ held that a cryptoasset is personal property but more precisely a thing to which property rights can relate.Footnote 7 Tokens indeed present the inherent characteristics of property set out in National Provincial Bank v Ainsworth by being definable, identifiable by third parties, capable in their nature of assumption by third parties, and presenting some degree of permanence or stability.Footnote 8 Most importantly,Footnote 9 tokens can be divestible on transfer and rivalrous.Footnote 10 The capacity of the purchaser to necessarily preclude the use of a token by the seller or any other personFootnote 11 resolves the issue of duplication of informationFootnote 12 and acknowledges its proprietary potential.Footnote 13

Since the 19th century Colonial Bank v Whinney case, it is considered that all personal property things are either in possession or in action and that things in action encompass any personal property that is not in possession. The law knows no other personal property (“tertium quid”) between the two.Footnote 14

A token seems to be excluded from those two categories. It does not present the properties of things in possession which are tangible, moveable, visible, and of which possession can be taken.Footnote 15 Crytoassets are virtual in their formFootnote 16 and thus cannot be possessed.Footnote 17 A token is neither a thing in action narrowly, because it owes its existence to technology, not to recognition by a legal system, like a share. It can be used and enjoyed on the blockchain independently of whether any rights in relation to them may be claimed or enforced by action or proceedings.Footnote 18 Nonetheless, legal rights, in the sense of Hohfeldian claim-rights,Footnote 19 can be “tokenised” or contractually created by terms and conditions attached to a token within a private permissioned blockchain.Footnote 20 Such rights would then be treated as things in action and that use of the token would be enforced by legal action.Footnote 21

Under French law, a statutory definition of tokens has settled the uncertainty by establishing a new type of sui generis incorporeal moveable property.Footnote 22 It defines a token as “any intangible thing representing, in digital form, one or more rights that can be issued, registered, stored or transferred by means of a shared electronic recording device enabling the owner of the asset to be identified, directly or indirectly.”Footnote 23

In AA v Persons Unknown, the High Court of England and Wales acknowledged that cryptocurrencies are neither things in possession nor are they things in action.Footnote 24 However, despite not fitting in these two categories, the High Court held these cryptoassets are nonetheless a form of property because they met the criteria established in National Provincial Bank v Ainsworth.Footnote 25 Thefore, the question is then whether to interpret things in action widely to include cryptoassets such as tokens at the cost of subdividing this categoryFootnote 26 or to create a third category but that would contain things that are potentially different.Footnote 27

b. Third category of personal property

In the absence of a statutory enshrinement, the Law Commission concludes that “courts have deliberately proceeded in a manner that carves out a third common law-based category of thing to which personal property rights can relate.”Footnote 28 Thus, reflecting academic and market support,Footnote 29 the Law Commission advocated for the statutory recognition of a third category of personal property rights, beside things in action or in possession.Footnote 30 Following this recommendation, the Property (Digital Assets etc) BillFootnote 31 has been introduced into Parliament to unlock the development of common law by removing the uncertainty stemming from Colonial Bank v Whinney.Footnote 32

However, based on the point that information cannot attract property rights,Footnote 33 it has been argued that a cryptoasset is nothing more than information on a system with special features (rivalrousness) by virtue of blockchain technology.Footnote 34 Property cannot include anything in relation to which there is no right. Thus, despite being of realisable commercial value,Footnote 35 cryptoassets cannot be recognised in law as property as not being the subject matter of any legal right. They are ultimately numbers represented in code within a system operating over the internet without any commercial use.Footnote 36

Still, cryptoassets especially tokens can display the qualities that enable the power-relationships recognised by the law,Footnote 37 allowing them to be appropriate objects of personal property rights.Footnote 38 Then, the point is neither that the capacity of a cryptoasset to attract property rights depends on whether it already creates other rightsFootnote 39 nor that all cryptoassets without any legal right identified in relation to them can be property.Footnote 40 The point is that courts should be able to recognise, on a case by case analysis, property rights in cryptoassets when they exhibit the indicia required of things qualified in law as property despite no legal right created whether in action or in possession.Footnote 41 In D’Aloia v Persons Unknown Category A & Ors, Footnote 42 Justice Farnhill ruled obiter that “the starting point is the test in National and Provincial Bank v Ainsworth; that will also, often, be the end point.” As a consequence, a cryptoasset is “capable of attracting property rights for the purposes of English law” while being “neither a chose in action nor a chose in possession, but rather a distinct form of property not premised on an underlying legal right.”Footnote 43

Specifically, DAO software protocol-specified tokens (“DAO tokens”) do display themselves the qualities associated with personal property, regardless of whether or not they attach to another right and can therefore fit in this third category of digital assets.Footnote 44 In addition, the transactional and social functions of DAO tokens distinguish them from mere data to an asset with intrinsic economic value that can treated as property.Footnote 45 Foremost, they present, like all tokens, the capacity to effect new transactions which will be recognised as valid by the rules of the system.Footnote 46 According to Farnhill J, this transactional functionality satisfies the “expectation that the transaction will be honoured sufficient form to attract property rights.”Footnote 47 Moreover, DAO tokens confer, by means of an active operation of software by a network of participants,Footnote 48 a bundle of two rights that are combined into a single asset: (i) some kind of economic interest in the protocol’s revenue and (ii) the right to participate in governance.Footnote 49 A DAO token is at the same time a transaction record (instrumentum) and a exercisable content (negotium)Footnote 50 which are interdependent by virtue of technology. Therefore, a DAO token can be an object of personal property rights, as an asset in its own right (in rem),Footnote 51 conferring a bundle of technical rights that could, when applicable, qualify as things in action (in personam).Footnote 52

2. The duality of DAO token transfers

From its very inception, the purpose of blockchain has been to guarantee the transfer of currencies or assets.Footnote 53 Legally recognising DAO tokens as objects of property would pave the way for ease of transferability, increased liquidity and increased efficiency in the deployment of capital.Footnote 54 However, the legal requirements for an effective ownership title transfer remain unclear.

a. Factual transfer

From a technical point of view, creating tokens involves crediting a specific user with a certain initial amount of tokens. This user is identified by an address specific to the system, comparable to the identifier of a person on a computer, accessed via a private key. Smart contracts are then used to circulate this initial amount between different addresses.Footnote 55 The control of the address grants the transactional ability to effect a blockchain transaction with the specific token held at that public address that will be recognised as valid under the relevant consensus algorithm.Footnote 56

The factual requirement to sell tokens is to access the platform using the blockchain device with the private key. According to the UK Jurisdiction Taskforce (“UKJT”), the transferor’s transfer order will modify the public parameter and generate a new one to create a record of the transfer.Footnote 57 This new block of signature is then added to the chain by the transferor authenticating the reception of the token by the transferee. The state of the blockchain is changed. The data representing the “old” token persists in the network, but it ceases to have any value or function because the token is treated by the consensus as spent or cancelled so that any further dealings in it would be rejected. The “new” token is represented by a new pair of data parameters and controlled by a new private key.

Academics and practitioners are divided between the “extinction/creation” analysis and the “persistent thing” analysis.Footnote 58 The first sees a token transfer as the replacement, modification, destruction, cancellation, or elimination of a pre-transfer token by a post-transfer token and the second as the persistence of a notional quantity unit object of property rights through the transaction.Footnote 59 Farnhill J has outlined his preference for the “persistent thing” analysis, notably for the sake of potentially tracing and following ownership of a tokenFootnote 60 while the Law Commission supports the “extinction/creation” analysis.Footnote 61

b. Legal transfer

The Law Commission observes that the technical implementations of tokens replicate or mimic some of the effects of a proprietary relationship with an object: “the functionality of crypto-tokens allows a person to control access to the crypto-token and gives that person the ability to exclude others from it.”Footnote 62 Nevertheless, those who have technical control over a token may not necessarily have legal title because the transfer framework exists technologically, but not yet legally.Footnote 63 The parties’ dealings may change the factual state of the data entries on the ledger but without some legal recognition of a change of title,Footnote 64 it only constitutes a factual, as opposed to a legal, account of transaction.Footnote 65

The Law Commission suggests that the state of the distributed ledger is necessary but insufficient to be regarded as a definitive record of legal title to a token.Footnote 66 On the one hand, the legal title should be founded in the state of the blockchain ie the definitive cryptographic records of the links between transactions.Footnote 67 The technical features of tokens allow the system to recognise that a particular token belongs to a particular person, thereby “conferring on that individual a technical ability to exclude everyone else from the crypto-token.”Footnote 68 On the other hand, the state of the blockchain merely records the factual situation and is not therefore constitutive of a participant’s legal title to any particular token. A right is “a legal construct, so whether it is ‘transferred’ need not take reference from the factual mechanism of the transaction”Footnote 69 but from the required conditions set by law.

However, as the law now stands, there is no statute giving legal effect to the parties’ dealings on the ledger.Footnote 70 Depending on the legal analysis, the transfer could be seen similar to delivery of possession where a thing passes unchanged in the possession of one person to another or to a novation implying the creation of a new thing.Footnote 71

The Law Commission and UNIDROIT recommend the cumulative criteria of (i) “change of control” for offchain transfers and “change of state” coupled with a change of control for onchain transfers, and (ii) intention to transfer title to found a proprietary interest for a valid legal transfer to occur.Footnote 72 Ultimately, a legal transfer would be determined by the primary condition of change of control, functionally equivalent to possession, where the transferee has “sufficient positive and negative control” over the asset and can “identify himself as the person with such abilities.”Footnote 73

Unfortunately, these conditions provoke uncertainty for parties and grant little guidance to judges.Footnote 74 The Law Commission welcomely acknowledges that in certain circumstances such a control-based legal proprietary interest can be separated from (and be inferior to or short of) a superior legal title.Footnote 75 The COALA DAO Model Law also proposes conditions by which transfer of legal ownership can be determined in the context of a DAO. The token holder will be considered a member of the DAO “(a) from the time the ownership of the Tokens is established to be in the possession of an address, or (b) from the time when ownership is first acknowledged by the token holder through an on-chain interaction with the DAO, through staking the tokens, voting with the tokens off-chain whereby results are implemented on-chain, submitting a proposal or transferring the tokens to another address, in the event that no action has been taken by a token holder to acquire a token.”Footnote 76

III. Restrictions on DAO tokens transferability

1. The context of transfer restrictions

a. DAO as an organisation

“THE DAO”, the first DAO to be created, was intended as an investment fund in venture capital with its funding and investments based on the Ethereum blockchain.Footnote 77 Many of the actual DAOs created on the Ethereum blockchain are similar to it.Footnote 78 These “Top layer” DAOs with a function similar to a traditional organisationFootnote 79 can be comparable to a “digital company,”Footnote 80 even though the comparison only relates to its function and is not relevant for every DAO.Footnote 81 On one side, a DAO is made up of token holders presented by some as “shareholders.”Footnote 82 The term “members of a DAO” refers in principle to token holders with governance rights relating to the protocol of the DAO.Footnote 83 The term “participants of a DAO” refers to persons holding tokens in a DAO without governance rights.Footnote 84 On the other side, service providers called “contractors,” or other token holders depending on the DAO, can submit to a majority vote their projects or code updates, called proposals, so that they can be funded or implemented.Footnote 85 “Curators” are technical watchdogs elected by DAO members. They control the smart contract of the proposal ie the computerised transaction protocol supplied by the contractor,Footnote 86 verify if it corresponds to what he is proposing and add its payout address in the DAO whitelist.Footnote 87

A DAO is therefore, first and foremost, a collection of smart contracts encoded in a chosen blockchain, similar to a nexus of contracts following the contractarian theory in company law.Footnote 88 These smarts contracts “contain the assets and encode the bylaws of the entire organisation.”Footnote 89 Taken collectively, they constitute the “software protocol” governing the purpose, operation and governance of the DAO.Footnote 90 The software protocol of a DAO is public, transparent and invariableFootnote 91 which makes it a form of incorruptible organisation whose code can be verified by anybody.Footnote 92 The COALA DAO Model Law also defines a DAO as “smart contracts deployed on a public permissionless blockchain which implements specific decision-making or governance rules enabling a multiplicity of actors to coordinate themselves in a decentralised fashion.”Footnote 93

On the primary market (Initial Coin Offerings), the DAO will deliver tokens to investors in return for their investment in cryptocurrencies. The DAO will organise the decision-making rules relating to the project for which the funds have been raised and, more generally, implement the project presented in the white paper, the presentation document of the DAO.Footnote 94 Regarding “THE DAO” on the Ethereum blockchain, each token given to an investor in exchange for their investment in Ether conferred voting rights and financial rights, the number of tokens created being a function of the amount of Ether paid.Footnote 95

b. The rationale of transfer restrictions

On the secondary market, DAO tokens are generally transferable and available on public liquid token markets where there is no prohibition on transfer.Footnote 96 It is possible for an internet user with no previous knowledge of, experience with, or involvement in a DAO to acquire DAO tokens, particularly when they are admitted to trading on crypto exchange platforms.Footnote 97

Nevertheless, some authors acknowledge that “the future of property innovation is unlikely to build on wholly transferable private property.”Footnote 98 There are indeed legitimate reasons to introduce a degree of intuitu personae in DAOs by limiting, or even preventing, the transferability of DAO tokens. The founder of Ethereum, Vitalik Buterin, warns that transferability can make governance power “flow away from the meek who are most likely to provide valuable input to governance and toward the power-hungry who are most likely to cause problems”: less than 1% of token holders possess 90% of the voting power in the 10 major actual DAOs.Footnote 99

The essence of DAOs being decentralisation, ie the distribution of power among all stakeholders, transferability can be counterproductive as “concentrated interests or incompetent bodies more likely to buy the governance rights up from everyone else would centralise power within the DAO.”Footnote 100

Three main governance failures justifying restrictions on transfer can be observed: the arrival of newcomers misaligned with current token holders’ interests, concentration of power and vote bribing.Footnote 101

In the first place, the entrance of newcomers can trigger coordination issues.Footnote 102 Large financial interests, notably VCs, angels or activist investors are empowered at the expense of other members of the protocol community who use or depend more on it.Footnote 103 This situation leads to conflicts of interests where wealthy token holders over-value the goal of making the token price go up in the short term even if that involves harmful rent extraction.Footnote 104

Secondly, free transferability can also lead to concentration of control where large portions of the supply stays in the hands of a tightly-coordinated clique of insidersFootnote 105 for instance after a takeover bid.Footnote 106 These small groups of wealthy participants called “whales” are empowered and can more successfully execute decisions than large groups of small-holders.

Finally, DAOs in which voting is based on token ownership are subject of being “governed by their most avid users, irrespective of their financial status, in a fair and verifiable way.”Footnote 107 The risk is that an attacker could potentially employ a large number of bots to bribe members and take over a majority of the voting power in the system.Footnote 108

Thus, many DAO developers, such as data engineers, early developers or executives involved in the day to day running of a DAO, might want to design governance mechanisms to ensure the DAO works as a proper decentralised structure. The COALA DAO Model Law acknowledges that mechanisms restricting entry and exit such as withdrawal of tokens, akin to the withdrawal of shares, or restricting token transfers to third parties, akin to the transfer of shares in limited liability companies, should be allowed to protect the interests of minority token holders.Footnote 109

2. The content of transfer restrictions

a. The software protocol: receptacle of the restrictions

From a technical standpoint, the software protocol of the DAO records and enforces the technical encumbrances and conditions that regulate how associated tokens can be used, spent or transferred.Footnote 110 According to the principle of functional equivalence,Footnote 111 it is possible to draw an analogy between articles of association of a company and the software protocol of a DAO in the way they structure the organisation.Footnote 112 According to the COALA DAO Model Law, a DAO is governed by its by-laws (we rather refer in this article to the term articles of association), which are the “rules and regulations that govern the procedures followed by a DAO and its interaction of its members and participants.” It is proposed that DAO articles are laid down by default in its software code.Footnote 113

To implement the restriction, a smart contract would be added to the software protocol so as to disable the function enabling transferability between public key addresses or to encode a restriction on token transfers based on predetermined conditions.Footnote 114 This code update requires consensus to be reached by a majority vote of the members.Footnote 115 Subsequently, the smart contract will be distributed across all the nodes of the blockchain on which the DAO is deployed.Footnote 116 If the proposed transfer fulfills the conditions precedent set by the smart contract, then a new block will automatically be created accordingly on the blockchain, and the token will pass to the purchaser. If the transfer does not meet the conditions precedent, such as the approval by a majority of members or a trigger event, the smart contract will not execute the transfer. The blockchain’s state remains unchanged.Footnote 117

In company law, articles of association are a statutory contractFootnote 118 empowered by case law to establish and clarify share transfer restrictions.Footnote 119 Pursuant to regulatory equivalence,Footnote 120 the software protocol, receptacle of the governance rules, could contain restrictions on the transferability of tokens.Footnote 121

b. Contractual freedom

DAO articles written in plain languageFootnote 122 could be set up along with the software protocol coded on the blockchain. Token transfer restrictions found the DAO articles would fundamentally be of contractual nature and benefit from freedom of contractFootnote 123 similarly to share transfer restrictions.Footnote 124 In the absence of any ad hoc statutory framework, tokens are freely transferable in principle but, the proprietary right to dispose of them could be willingly curbed as well, subject to general property law rules.Footnote 125 The COALA DAO Model Law prescribes a high degree of discretion in how DAOs can establish their organisational, governance and capital structure in their articles seeking the flexibility found in limited liability partnerships or private companies limited by shares.Footnote 126 Modelled on the UK Companies Act 2006, Footnote 127 it could be proposed that “DAO software protocol-specified tokens are transferable in accordance with the DAO’s articles.” This path has been chosen in particular by Wyoming in DAOs’ “Governing Principles.”Footnote 128

It is then possible to imagine all possible clauses existing in articles and shareholders’ agreements in the context of DAOs.Footnote 129 The DeFi ecosystem already offers approaches to limit transferability by technical encumbrances or restrictions with different tradeoffs between security and convenience.Footnote 130

Firstly, there are outright prohibitions on the transferability of tokens, typically found in non-transferable tokens by design (proof of personhood or proof of humanity). One example is “soulbound” tokensFootnote 131 that are “publicly visible, non-transferable and possibly revocable-by-the-issuer, tokens.”Footnote 132 Inalienability can also be temporary in return for voting rights (timelock)Footnote 133 limiting buy-then-vote-then-sell attacks in the short term.Footnote 134

Furthermore, DAO tokens that have not been fully utilised may not be transferable as evidence that the holder has not contributed to or accomplished tasks within the DAO community (proof of participation).Footnote 135

Lastly, in order to vote in favour of a proposal, some DAO protocols require making an enforceable buy-order at a price below the current one. If the proposal has a negative outcome, those who supported it will be forced to buy their opponents out and bear the consequences.Footnote 136

DAO communities are free to invent all types of restrictions as far as it is technologically feasible as put by Vitalik Buterin. Overall, the rationale of token transfers restrictions is a balance between the rationale to limit or prevent transfers and the blockchain ecosystem where so far all the standards are designed around maximum transferability.Footnote 137

IV. Enforceability of restrictions on DAO tokens transferability

1. Performance of the restrictions

a. Binding force by technology

The rules governing a DAO found in the network of smart contracts composing the software protocol are immutable, unbreachable and independent from the legal system. Provisions found in statutes, articles of association or contracts can suffer from breach of contract, whereas DAO’s governance rules will benefit from fully efficient performance.Footnote 138

Their execution is perfected by technology because smart contracts (i) automatically, (ii) immutably and (iii) autonomously execute the rules set out in the code like a vendor machine or ATM.Footnote 139 Firstly, smart contracts are technically binding on the DAO membersFootnote 140 since the software can only run according to the predefined and deterministic terms.Footnote 141 The use of an automated process perfects the performance of contractual terms by making them self-executing.Footnote 142 Secondly, the validated token transfers are irreversible and tamperproof on the blockchain.Footnote 143 Thirdly, there is no room for the debtor’s unwillingness to execute its contractual obligations neither for bad faith, moral hazard or human error.Footnote 144 The performance of rights and obligations does not depend on the parties or a third party but on the encoded protocol. In this respect, smart contracts eliminate counterparty performance riskFootnote 145 and cannot be interfered with or frustrated by a token holder.Footnote 146

b. Binding force in law

As Vitalik Buterin concedes, the term “smart contract” is deceptive,Footnote 147 they do not necessarily constitute legal agreement. When regulating DAO articles regarding transfer restrictions, the question is whether (i) smart contracts can constitute legally binding contracts and (ii) whether a DAO can be a counterparty to such agreement.

DAO members can decide to what extent their contractual governance structure is implemented in the software protocol with three different types of smart contracts.Footnote 148 First, a smart legal contract or “computable contract”Footnote 149 is a contract performance method by which some or all of the contractual obligations are performed automatically by computer code.Footnote 150 Secondly, a hybrid contract is a smart legal contract in which some contractual obligations are defined in natural language and others are defined in code. Finally, a solely code contract is nothing but code in which all the contractual terms are defined and performed automaticallyFootnote 151 in a “higher-level programming language.”Footnote 152

Several states in the United States have recognised the validity of a contract executed on the blockchain by a smart contractFootnote 153 and of a smart contract itself.Footnote 154 The Law Commission concludes that smart contracts can be legal contracts depending on their configuration provided that the requirements for a legally binding contract are met.Footnote 155 In practice, many DAOs use smart legal contracts as a method to perform enforceable obligations under existing legal agreements or solely code contracts to transact without the express intention of the transaction being a function of or creating any legal obligations.Footnote 156 The legal force of the restrictions resides then not in the code, but in the natural language terms external to it.

The second issue is that transfer restrictions will not bind DAOsFootnote 157 because they do not have legal personality without endorsement by a legal system.Footnote 158 Hence a DAO cannot be a holder of rights and obligations like a company is bound by its articles of association towards the shareholders.Footnote 159 Therefore, no contractual right on an issuer can be identified.Footnote 160

Given their decentralised and heterogeneous nature,Footnote 161 it is inherently challenging to apply traditional legal wrappers to DAOs.Footnote 162 The law of England and Wales might characterise this type of organisational structure as an unincorporated association or a general partnershipFootnote 163 but the assignability of the membership or partnership relation appears at odds with token transferability on DLT-based systems.Footnote 164 In French law, the form of a de facto company or an undeclared partnership could apply, however it would be unsuitable for transferability purposes.Footnote 165 For now, only a few jurisdictions have enacted ad hoc DAO regulations.Footnote 166 A DAO incorporated under the law of one of these states presents the distinctive features of having legal personality and governance rules that conform to the prescriptions set out in the law of the state under which it is organised.Footnote 167 This option is discarded for England and Wales by the Law Commission.Footnote 168 Another solution is to superpose to the front-end technological infrastructure a back-end legal architecture which is integrated into the community’s decision-making process, and whose legal status enables it to enter into contracts.Footnote 169

2. Enforcement of the restrictions

a. Primacy of code

Contractual restrictions find their force in the smart contracts composing the software protocol which relies on ex ante governance rather than ex post monitoring and enforcement.Footnote 170 Thus, the execution of contractual transfer restrictions on the blockchain will depend on whether the relevant smart contract of the software protocol defines and/or executes these transfer restrictions.Footnote 171 By so, they will effectively be enforced not because they are legally binding obligations but only because smart contracts compel so. “Code is law” is the rule.Footnote 172

Whatever the smart legal contract does, it will necessarily constitute a “proper performance of the relevant legal obligation”Footnote 173 for which the parties have agreed to be bound to. The inscription of restrictions in the software protocol would allow to dispense with the various stipulations intended to ensure their effectiveness, such as penalty clauses and unilateral promises.Footnote 174 By way of example, a preemption clause in a smart contract will block for a stipulated period any order wrongfully transmitted in favour of a third party and redirect it to the token holders so that they can exercise it.Footnote 175

On the contrary, when technology and law are not aligned, a major concern arises around the ability of the law to be enforced since code is given primacy.Footnote 176 The software protocol takes precedence over the contractual terms and conditions, even if they diverge.Footnote 177 If a token transfer is performed or restricted in breach of a contractual transfer restriction, the transaction will be considered valid on the blockchain environment but invalid in the legal world or vice versa. As a result, an legally invalid transfer can be validly performed and cause a breach of contract requiring ex post enforcement. The enforcement of the contract would require determining somebody responsible within the DAO to change the blockchain’s state, which is incompatible with the absence of legal personality, DAOs’ inherent decentralisation and the immutability of smart contracts.

In company law, articles of association have a greater legal force than shareholders’ agreements, which are simple contracts. In private companies, directors cannot register a transfer of shares if they know it is in breach of the articles of the company and the proprietary title cannot pass.Footnote 178 In French law, transfers violating clauses in articles of association can be declared void.Footnote 179 The legislator could thus recognise and impose DAO articles as a multi-party statutory legal smart contract enforcing transferability provisions in order to ensure alignment between legal obligations and smart contracts while supporting private ordering, which grants DAOs flexibility in applying statutory legislation.

b. Enforcement by a third party

When contractual terms are defined by self-executing code, no dispute can theoretically arise about whether the particular obligation has been performed in accordance with its terms.Footnote 180 Consequently, an enforcement mechanism through the legal system will theoretically never be needed.Footnote 181 But if smart contracts prove to be useful for mechanical or mathematical instructions, they can hardly express in code sophisticated terms and conditions or verify or assess if these are fulfilled.Footnote 182 Contractual transfer restrictions may refer to legal terms of art,Footnote 183 common law doctrinesFootnote 184 or concepts with interpretative content that are incompatible with the binarity of smart contracts.Footnote 185 Hence, need for human discretionary judgment might be needed to ascertain whether such conditions are fulfilled even though the relevance of a decentralised blockchain-based software protocol would be eluded.Footnote 186

A court might classically award remedies for breach of contractFootnote 187 and grant an interim proprietary injunctionFootnote 188 or restitution order.Footnote 189 These judicial tools might find themselves obsolete since the transfers are irreversible and tamper-proof due to the fundamental issue of immutability of the blockchain.Footnote 190 A court could then merely order restitution in value or an “equal and opposite” second transaction reversing the effects of the first transaction still recorded on the blockchain state.Footnote 191 Even if such order was rendered to reverse a token transfer, its enforcement could also depend on a favorable vote from the token holders or on the willingness of software developers or miners to take such action. It is then impractical for a court itself to unwind a validated transaction and to restore the parties to their pre-contractual positions.Footnote 192

When a flaw was discovered in a smart contract of “THE DAO” and millions of Ether “stolen,” the only solution to restore the initial situation and cancel the fraudulent transaction was a code “hard fork.” A new DLT was created for the members who voted for the rescission of the said smart contract’s transactions. But the members who did not vote in favour of the hard fork could continue with the DLT considering the transaction both legally and technically valid.Footnote 193 The legal risk is ultimately constitutive of a risk to the DAO itself where DAOs would split. The multiplication of hard forks could cause the DAO market to collapse.

To avoid the perverse effects of a lawsuit without neglecting the dangerous effects of a hard fork, smart contracts could be conceived as smart “Ricardian contracts,”Footnote 194 mechanisms by which natural language contracts delegate legal authority to an on-chain arbitration association.Footnote 195 The “smart” arbitration agreement could trigger reference to arbitration when conditions constituting a dispute on a DAO token transfer are met or at the request of a party.Footnote 196 The dispute would be submitted to a “digital arbitration” with a power to pause performance of the contract, reverse or complete transactions on the blockchain and even operate or modify the smart contract itself.Footnote 197 The prerequisite for this power is that a “soft fork” functionality is encoded in the smart contracts, provided the blockchain is permissioned, at the benefit of the digital arbitration authority. The software protocol could then provide for the first smart contract encoding the restriction to be short-circuited by another smart contract in the event of a dispute.Footnote 198 It could also include a “self-destruct” or “auto-recission” feature by which the smart contract would delete its code executing the invalid transfer from the blockchain state and transfer the tokens to the specified recipient address.Footnote 199 To that end, awards upholding contractual transfer restrictions would be effectively enforced on the blockchain state.Footnote 200 For example, the Aragon DAO code is conceived with an “Aragon Network Jurisdiction,” a multilevel arbitration system handling claims between DAOs and their members.Footnote 201

In that sense, the COALA DAO Model Law requires DAOs to “refer to or provide a Dispute Resolution Mechanism that the DAO, Members and Participants will be bound by.”Footnote 202 A clause submitting all disputes to an ad hoc arbitration mechanism could then be inserted in the DAO articles to which all token holders agree. However, putting in place a single global agreement catering for all disputes between all participants under the significant power of arbitrators could be “legally challenging” but furthermost “inconsistent with the key tenets of decentralised governance.”Footnote 203

V. Conclusion

There are three key observations in this article. First, DAO tokens can be recognised as objects of property rights which can facilitate the secondary trading market, thereby scaling up both DAOs and the DAO market. Whether treated as a new third category or residual things in action, the goal is to provide legal certainty in the transfer of such tokens. However, a proper legal framework would fully ensure that the transferee receives a valid proprietary title enforceable by law. Secondly, in company law, articles of association can limit the transferability of shares, a practice recognised and enforced by the law. Policymakers and legislators should consider whether a similar organisational law is needed for DAOs, which can take into account the protection of a DAO as an entity and DAO members. Thirdly, blockchain technology, particularly code-as-law, is a game changer. It automates and restricts token transfer transactions irreversibly. It not only impacts the functionality of legal contracts, but also alters or even removes the traditional role of the judiciary and its remedial powers. Hence, on-chain remedies may be necessary to enforce legal rights and obligations in the digital sphere. Smart contracts could comprise both legally organised soft fork features along with dispute resolution mechanisms to reverse or unlock token transactions, in accordance not only with the code but also with the law.

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58 Law Commission, (Law Com No 412, 2023) para 6.25.

59 Ibid, para 6.28–6.29.

60 D’Aloia (n 29) [205].

61 Law Commission, (Law Com No 412, 2023) para 6.23.

62 Ibid, para 3.12.

63 Mustapha Mekki, “Actifs Numériques” Répertoire de Droit Commercial (Dalloz edn, 2024) para 74.

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67 Novruz Aliyez, “Les Jetons Participatifs: Contribution au Droit de la Finance Participative” (2024) 66 Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Financier 2.

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71 UK Jurisdiction Taskforce (n 59) para 45.

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73 Ibid.

74 Hin Liu, “Transferring Legal Title to a Digital Asset: Shared and Limited Control Arrangements (Part 2)” (2024) 4 JIBFL 251.

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76 Coalition of Automated Legal Applications (COALA), Model Law for Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) (2021) Art. 7(2).

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94 Maudouit-Ridde (n 87).

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96 Law Commission, Decentralised Autonomous Organisations (DAOs) Call for Evidence (Law Com 2022) para 5.74.

97 Ibid, para 2.28.

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101 Law Commission, “DAOs Call for Evidence” (n 98) para 5.9.

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105 Ibid.

107 Terry Chung, Sandip Nair, Uttara Ravi and Pranav Kajgaonkar, “Proof of Participation Voting for On-Chain Governance” (2021) <https://timroughgarden.github.io/fob21/reports/r7.pdf> (last accessed 12 May 2024).

108 Ibid.

109 COALA (n 78) Art 6.

110 Law Commission, (Law Com No 412, 2023) para 6.11.

111 COALA (n 78) : “Functional equivalence is characterized when a technological solution not provided for by law fulfills the same function as the legal requirement. The normative objective or purpose of a legal standard must be identified, and it must be demonstrated that this objective or purpose can be achieved both by the statutory requirement and by a technological solution.”

112 Centre de Droit Bancaire et Financier, “Lexique de la Blockchain, Decentralized Autonomous Organisation” (University of Geneva, 2022) <https://cdbf.ch/lexique/organisation-autonome-decentralisee-dao/> (last accessed 15 July 2024).

113 COALA (n 78) Art 4.

114 Law Commission, (Law Com No 256, 2022) para 10.103.

115 Chung, Nair, Ravi and Kajgaonkar (n 109).

116 Guillaume and Riva (n 80).

117 Law Commission, ‘DAOs Call for Evidence’ (n 98) para 5.74.

118 Braton Seymour Service Co Ltd v Oxborough [1992] BCC [475] (Steyn LJ).

119 Re Bede Steam Shipping Co Ltd [1917] 1 Ch [126] (Eve LJ).

120 COALA (n 78): “It allows for the establishment of equivalence between the function of a legal rule and the function of a technology.”

121 Haut Comité Juridique de la Place Financière de Paris (HCJP), “Rapport sur la Réception des Organisations Autonomes Décentralisés (ou ‘ DAO ‘) en Droit Français” (31 May 2024) para 31.

122 COALA (n 78) Art 3(5) and 4(1)(f).

123 Weston Case (1868) L.R. 4 Ch. App. 20; Bordland’s Trustee v Steel Bros & Co Ltd [1901] 1 Ch. 279; Lindlar’s Case [1910] 1 Ch. 312, CA 316; Delavenne v Broadhurst [1931] 1 Ch 234 (ChD) [237]–[238] (Bennett J); Stothers v William Steward (Holdings) Ltd [1982] 1 WLR 589.

124 Printing and Numerical Registering Co v Sampson (1875) 19 Eq 462.

125 In French law, inalienability clauses on transfer of property must be temporary and justified by a serious and legitime interest, see French Civil Code, Art 900-1.

126 COALA (n 78) commentary Art 4.

127 Companies Act 2006, s 544(1).

128 See DUNA Wyoming Unincorporated Nonprofit DAO’s. 24LSO-0104 Bill SF0050 (17-32-120); W.S. 17-31 Decentralized Autonomous Organization Supplement 2022 (17-31-104).

129 Such as inalienability clauses, pre-emption rights clauses, agreement clauses, drag along and tag along clauses or exclusion clauses.

130 Buterin, “Soulbound” (n 102).

131 Ibid.

132 Weyl, Ohlhaver and Buterin (n 100).

133 Hugo May, “Convex(Curve) = Curve + ” (Medium, 21 Octover 2021) <https://medium.com/coinmonks/convex-curve-curve-d7e28cd6c1d9> (last accessed 29 June 2024).

134 Buterin, “Moving Beyond Coin Voting Governance” (n 51).

135 Chung, Nair, Ravi and Kajgaonkar (n 109).

136 Buterin, “Moving Beyond Coin Voting Governance” (n 51).

137 Buterin, “Soulbound” (n 102).

138 Jean Noël Colin, “Du Bitcoin aux DAO: les Fondations Techniques de la Blockchain” in Hervé Jacquemin, Andra Cotiga-Raccah and Yves Poullet (eds), Les Blockchains et les Smart Contracts à l’Épreuve du Droit (n° 49, Collection du CRIDS 2020) 11.

139 Szabo, “Smart Contracts: Building Blocks for Digital Markets” (n 88).

140 Larry A. Di Matteo and Cristina Poncibo, “Quandary of Smart Contracts and Remedies: the Role of Contract Law and Self-help Remedies” (2018) 26(6) European Review of Private Law 805, 818.

141 Nick Szabo, “Formalizing and Securing Relationships on Public Networks” (1997) 2(9) First Monday; Law Commission, “DAOs Call for Evidence” (n 98) para 5.30.

142 Robert Herian, “Smart Contracts: a Remedial Analysis” (2021) 30(1) Information & Communications Technology Law 17, 19.

143 Joseph Lee and Rougang Li, “Law and Regulation for Decentralised Autonomous Organisations (DAOs)” [2023] <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4455052> (last accessed 20 June 2024).

144 Claire Leveneur, Les Smart Contracts. Étude de Droit des Contrats à l’Aune de la Blockchain (Dalloz, “Nouvelle Bibliothèque de Thèses,” vol. 236, 2024) 621; Florian Gamper, “A Non-Contractual Approach to Smart Contracts” (2023) 31(3) Int J Law Info Tech 231, 235.

145 John Lee, “Smart Contracts and the Limits of the ‘Rule of Code’” (2022) 10 JIBFL 692, 694.

146 Guillaume and Riva (n 80).

147 See Vitalik Buterin’s tweet on 13 October 2018 (https://twitter.com/VitalikButerin/status/1051160932699770882?s=20) calling them “persistent scripts.”

148 Lee (n 147) 692.

149 Harry Surden, “Computable Contracts” (2012) 46 UCDL Rev 629, 658.

150 Gabriel Olivier Benjamin Jaccard, “Smart Contracts and the Role of Law” (2017) 8 Jusletter IT 7.

151 Gamper (n 146) 233.

152 Ciarán McGonagle et Finn Casey Fierro, “For Whom the Code Tolls: an Integrated, Modular Architecture for Smart Derivatives Contracts” (2024) 1 JIBFL 41.

153 Arizona House Bill 2417 of 29 March 2017; New York Assembly Bill 8780 of 27 November 2017; Tennessee House Bill 1507 of 26 March 2018.

154 Illinois House Bill 3575 of 23 August 2019.

155 Law Commission, Smart Legal Contracts Advice to Government (Law Com No 401, 2021) para 1.26.

156 Law Commission, “DAOs Call for Evidence” (n 98) para 5.55.

157 Charles Kerrigan, “Laws and Legal Principles Relating to Blockchain and Distributed Ledger Technologies: a Taxonomy” (2019) 5 JIBFL 307, 308.

158 Primavera De Philippi et al., “The Alegality of Blockain Technology” (2022) 41(3) Policy and Society 358, 365.

159 Companies Act 2006, s 33(1).

160 Charles Kerrigan, “The Point of DAOs; and of Crypto Lawyers” (2022) 11 JIBFL 739, 741.

161 Ibid.

162 Lee and Li (n 145).

163 Kerrigan (n 162) 739.

164 Law Commission, “Decentralised Autonomous Organisations (DAOs)” (n 46) paras 3.73 and 4.20.

165 Hugo Bordet, “DAO: une Nouvelle Forme d’Activisme Pour les Associations?” (2022) 670 Juris associations 27, 29.

166 Maltese Bill No C 689, Innovative Technology Arrangements and Services Act (2018); Vermont, An Act Relating to Blockchain Business Development, 2018, No 205, (S.269); Wyoming Act No 73 (SF0038), Wyoming Decentralized Autonomous Organization Supplement, SF0038, No 73; Marshall Islands, 2022 Amendment Non-Profit Entities Act; Tennessee, Public Chapter No 852/Senate Bill No 2854/House Bill No 264.

167 Guillaume and Riva (n 80).

168 Law Commission, “Decentralised Autonomous Organisations (DAOs)” (n 46) para 5.51.

169 See DAOlink in Olivier Martin, “DAO : un Nouveau Mode de Gouvernance Associative?” (2022) 670 Juris Associations 20.

170 Katrin Schuler, Ann Sofie Cloots and Fabian Schär, “On DeFi and On-Chain CeFi: How (Not) to Regulate Decentralized Finance” (2024) 00 Journal of Financial Regulation 1, 6.

171 Lee (n 147) 693.

172 Lawrence Lessig, “Code is Law – On Liberty in Cyberspace” (2000) Harvard Magazine 1.1.00.

173 Ibid.

174 Barban et al. (n 5).

175 Ibid.

176 Liu (n 76).

177 HCJP (n 123).

178 CA 2006, s 171(a); Tett v Phoenix Property & Investment Co Ltd [1986] B.C.L.C. 149.

179 French Commercial Code, Art. L. 227-15 applicable to simplified joint stock companies.

180 Lee (n 147) 693.

181 Gamper (n 146) 234.

182 Agata Ferreira, “Regulating Smart Contracts: Legal Revolution or Simply Evolution?” (2021) 45 Telecommun. Policy 3.

183 Maya Chilaeva and Pia Dutton, “Smart Contracts: Can They Be Aligned With Traditional Principles or Are Bespoke Norms Necessary?” (2018) 8 JIBFL 479, 481.

184 Gamper (n 146) 234.

185 Mustapha Mekki, “Les Mystères de la Blockchain” (2017) 37 Recueil Dalloz 2160.

186 Mustapha Mekki, “Le Contrat, Objet des Smart Contracts (Partie 1)” (2018) 7–8 Dalloz IP/IT 409.

187 Llewellin v. Grossman (1950) 83 Ll.L.Rep. 462; Woodlands v. Hind [1955] 1 W.L.R. 688.

188 AA v Persons Unknown (n 26) [61] (Bryan J).

189 Armstrong DLW GmbH (n 17).

190 Kerrigan (n 159) 310.

191 Nik Yeo and Aaron Taylor, “Avoiding blockchain contracts” (2019) 9 JIBFL 586.

192 Law Commission, (Law Com No 256, 2022) para 19.40.

193 Chilaeva and Dutton (n 185) 482.

194 Ian Grigg, “The Ricardian Contract” (San Diego, IEEE International Workshop on Electronic Contracting, 2004) <https://iang.org/papers/ricardian_contract.html> (last accessed 19 July 2024).

195 Chilaeva and Dutton (n 185) 483.

196 Sam Brown, “Arbitration of cryptoasset and smart contract disputes: arbitration unchained?” (Thomson Reuters Practical Law UK 2023).

197 Ibid.

198 Mekki, “Le Contrat, Objet des Smart Contracts (Partie 1)” (n 188) 417.

199 Bill Marino and Ari Juels, “Setting Standards for Altering and Undoing Smart Contracts” in Jose Julio Alferes et alter (eds) Rule Technologies. Research, Tools, and Applications (vol 9718, Springer 2016); Hossein Nabilou, “Bitcoin Governance as a Decentralized Financial Market Infrastructure” (2021) 4(2) Stan. J. of Blockchain L. & Pol. 1.

200 Chilaeva and Dutton (n 185) 483.

201 Aragon, “Aragon Network Jurisdiction Part 1: Decentralized Court” (5 May 2020) <Aragon Network Jurisdiction Part 1: Decentralized Court> accessed July 2.

202 COALA (n 78) Art 4.

203 Brown (n 198).