The case study of Bresee's Department Store in Oneonta, New York, suggests that small-town department stores were not necessarily fully “modern” by the early twentieth century. This article demonstrates how modern, big-store, business methods came later and documents how earlier modes of trade, such as credit and bartering, persisted into the early twentieth century, even in non-rural, northern contexts. Preliminary findings suggest that eliminating the urban bias in much historiography by including small-town retailing practices may lead to a later periodization of American consumer society.

This article is a case study of a Chinese indigenous firm in the refrigerated egg-packing industry during the interwar period. I argue that the China Egg Produce Company (CEPC) was quick to grasp Western management in terms of vertical integration and business diversification. In addition, this firm took advantage of embedded social relations and social networks to construct a strong “internal architecture.” As a result, CEPC not only rivaled some six to eight British and American enterprises, but also took the lead in persuading them to form an international cartel during the 1930s. The data presented in this case study shows the surprising vitality and adaptability of Chinese businesses and suggests that China was in the process of developing a modern business system prior to the chaotic events of the late 1940s.

The precise nature of the relationship between the American business community and the New Deal has been a lively topic of debate in recent years. This article looks at an important figure and firm in that relationship (Thomas J. Watson of IBM) to increase our understanding of it. This article focuses chronologically on the period from the early 1930s through the mid-1950s, when New-Deal-era public policy innovations were most influential. The overall picture that emerges from this study of the U.S. business-government relationship during those years is one of business accommodation of major changes in social conditions and public policies rather than a view of business as the primary leader of change.

Management theory andtransaction cost economics provide few insights into the dynamics of multilateral negotiations. A host of factors suggest that complex transactions—especially those that involve government agencies—face a high probability of failure. Yet history records many examples of successful multiple-party transactions. Using the records of a major Australian iron ore mining venture, Hamersley Iron, this article reveals a number of the tactics that are usedto engineer an agreement when the parties concerned have conflicting objectives, different cultural affiliations, and distinctive institutional ties. The essay also exposes some of the devices that the Japanese steel industry—Hamersley’s main customer—used to secure competitive advantages in raw material procurement during the industry’s rise to international prominence.

The article addresses the question to what extent American antitrust policy in Germany and Italy during the 1950s, was a success or not. Did these nations adopt this policy, did they adapt themselves to it, or did they completely reject it? By a detailed comparison of these two big European nations, Germany and Italy—both defeated powers of the Second World War, and both therefore strongly dependent on postwar American aid—the effects of the American antitrust policy will be analyzed. Eventually, the Germans better adapted, after initial resistance of German big business, to the American plans than the Italians, however, only in an amended and softer form. The Italian resistance—but we even use the expression prolonged rejection—to the economic reforms were much stronger. The US administration envisioned a unified free European market without cartels as early as 1943, however, it would take another fifty years before these ideas would be implemented.

This article examines the role of human resources in the business strategy of Ocean Steam Ship Company (later Ocean Transport & Trading), one of the United Kingdom’s leading shipping firms. The time under review is the 1970s, a period of rapid and disruptive change for the shipping industry and of considerable difficulties for the UK economy. As a result of uncertainty over the development of the shipping industry in general, and Ocean’s business in particular, managing staff numbers and career opportunities became key elements of the company’s overall business strategy during these years. The article also examines the changing objectives of that strategy, the means by which these objectives were pursued, and the external constraints under which these objectives had to take place. It argues that Ocean found itself privileging the requirements of running a “people business” over other strategic concerns and that external constraints prevented the firm from pursuing theoretically more appropriate strategies, such as increased use of outsourcing and extricating itself from its UK-based, human resource intensive business.

In this article I examine corporative management practices in electronics firms in Boston and in Silicon Valley from the 1920s to the 1960s. Managers in several key firms developed these practices in response to political and professional ideologies and as a way to address the problems of hiring, using, and retaining a highly skilled work force. They did this independently of the welfare capitalism plans of corporations such as Eastman Kodak and before the guru theorists and work empowerment programs of the 1960s. The corporatist methods first developed in Boston and further refined in Silicon Valley later diffused to most U.S. firms in the software, computer, Internet, and biotechnology industries.

This paper analyzes the emergence of Japanese specialized industry, taking the production of Seiko watches at Hattori & Co. in the first half of the twentieth century as an example. It shows that the competitiveness of this industry, which established itself on the world market during the 1960s, was due to a process of technological hybridization between the American mass production system and the Swiss specialized production system. Starting in the 1910s and 1920s, Hattori selected a few high-precision Swiss watches and set itself the goal of producing them in mass using imported machine tools. Yet this hybrid production system ran into problems because parts were not interchangeable, as a result of which assembly continued along traditional lines until the end of the Second World War. It was only when the company hired many production engineers who had graduated from Japanese engineering faculties and when it began to work with outside research institutions, such as the Department of Precision Engineering of the University of Tokyo, that Hattori was able to implement fully a hybrid production system in the 1950s.

This paper traces the history of the Chinese fire insurance industry and Tai Ping Insurance, one of the most successful Chinese insurance companies in the early twentieth century. It provides a case study on the “indigenization” of fire insurance in China by retracing how a fledgling firm mastered selling a foreign financial product and managed to win market share in an ostensibly adverse environment. This paper argues that while Tai Ping benefited from the growing embrace of insurance by the Chinese public, its success was ultimately driven by the company’s economies of scale, cross-selling synergies, and tight connections to banking. This paper also explores the broader context in which fire insurance operated by examining how the indigenization of insurance in China unfolded, with Chinese insurers like Tai Ping mediating the introduction of a new financial product, the transfer of new institutions, and the diffusion of new knowledge regarding risk. More generally, the history of Tai Ping and the Chinese fire insurance industry addresses a research lacuna in the history of insurance beyond the developed markets in Western Europe and North America, which has typically focused more on the experiences of British and American multinational enterprises and less on that of native companies. By highlighting the degree of institutional convergence and divergence between the Chinese insurance industry and its global counterparts, this paper contributes to a more inclusive history of the internationalization of insurance.

Rapidly increasing numbers of women entered the field of real estate brokerage from the 1930s through the 1950s. “Rosie the Realtor” took advantage of the postwar building boom to create an expanding career niche, capturing residential brokerage as a female domain. In the process, she stretched gendered boundaries in the masculine world of brokerage to the breaking point. Employing a complex and internally antagonistic mix of liberal feminist and conservative ideologies, female realtors created their own professional space, expanding career opportunities for women at the same time that their economic and political practices reinforced the constraints of domesticity.

Today Philips is one of the largest foreign investors in East Asia. The foundation for the company's East Asian position was laid by investment in Taiwan in the 1960s and early 1970s, at a time when this country and the rest of the region were still largely ignored by other European investors. This article investigates the motives for Philips to play a pioneering role among European firms in large-scale investing in Taiwan. The author uses the traditional method for direct investment analysis, known as Dunning's eclectic paradigm. He also addresses shortcomings in this method regarding individual company behavior, by adding a corporate governance analysis that is based on Freeman's stakeholder theory. The resulting analysis shows that, although locational factors constituted the main precondition to direct investment by Philips, the crucial reason Philips made its early investments in Taiwan was its chief executive officer's enthusiasm for this particular project.

This paper discusses how a Norwegian entrepreneurial state has performed over more than seventy years, based on an analysis of state involvement in Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk/the Kongsberg Group from 1945 and to 2015. Mariana Mazzucato has argued that bold technological investments by the state has long-term beneficial effects. The development of the Kongsberg companies adds nuance to this picture. On the one hand, the defense company Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk failed as a company in 1987 and was unbundled into a number of new companies independent of one another. On the other hand, some of the successor companies have been very successful, both in the oil and gas sector and within defense. Taking the defense and oil and gas company the Kongsberg Group as a case, this paper argues that a new style of entrepreneurial state developed in the 1990s and that it proved very successful. The old entrepreneurial state was heavy-handed, bold, and very long-term in its aims; the new entrepreneurial state was cautious, many-headed, and worked through the management of the company. The new entrepreneurial state combined state ownership, stock listing, and procurement considerations and was supported by both the Ministry of Industry and the Ministry of Defense. This new governance structure facilitated a stable corporation that over time integrated other Norwegian maritime electronics companies, which themselves had a checkered history under the old entrepreneurial state. A new corporate governance regime emerged and managed both to protect old and established product lines and to facilitate innovation both in defense and maritime electronics.

The London Assurance (LA) was incorporated in 1720, marking a significant innovation in the marine insurance industry. Contemporaries anticipated joint-stock firms such as the LA would rapidly outcompete private underwriters, yet this outcome did not occur. The success of the private underwriters has been ascribed to their organizational form. This paper reassesses these explanations and finds that, rather than an a priori worse business model, various corporate governance challenges limited the LA’s capacity to compete. This provides a more complete explanation for the relative failure of the joint-stock marine insurance companies and has implications for understanding the evolution of the corporate form in the eighteenth century.

This research focuses on luxury and fashion industries, especially artificial flower making. This sector of small businesses was often described as totally unregulated but efficient. A very successful union (in terms of membership), nevertheless, was created in 1858. I investigate the motives of its founders and the reality of its economic influence. It acted as a service firm, allowing small businesses to lower transaction costs, and as a conciliation board. However, to understand its creation, success, and limits, other factors must be taken into account, such as political opportunities and the founders' organizational repertoire.

As the public discussion of all cancers, and of breast cancer in particular, expanded after World War II, capitalist ventures emerged to meet the demands of those affected by the disease. For women who had mastectomies this meant a greater choice of breast prostheses but also a clearer message that the scars from surgery should be hidden from public view. This work analyzes the breast prosthesis industry as a beauty business. Considering the use of breast prostheses as a contested part of cancer recovery, the article traces the evolution and expansion of the breast prosthesis industry from 1945 to 2000 and examines how the industry has responded to consumer demand, created a niche for itself within the “healing process,“ and capitalized on notions of feminine beauty.

Business history forces historians and economists to take a wider view of individuals' actions as economic agents. The risk-managing strategies of Lord Londonderry (also known as “the Money Pitt”) during the financial boom and bust of the South Sea Bubble illustrate this theme well. He dealt in staggering sums for the time but hedged his bets along at least three dimensions: the pecuniary, the personal, and the political. His skills, however, remain unappreciated because he could not manage the ultimate uncertainty always present in human affairs—when will fate bring down the final curtain on one's partners, family and friends, patrons, or one's own person?