To take stock of the human toll resulting from racial inequality in the United States, we estimate the number of excess deaths that accumulated among African Americans over the twentieth century as a result of the enduring racial gap in mortality rates. We assemble a wide array of demographic and vital statistics data for all years since 1900 to calculate the number of Black deaths in each half-decade that occurred in excess of what would be projected if Blacks had experienced the same gender- and age-specific mortality rates as Whites. We estimate that there were almost 7.7 million excess deaths among African Americans from 1900 through 1999. Those deaths comprised over 40% of all African American deaths over the century.

Excess deaths were highest in the early decades (peaking in 1925–1934), but the only period of sustained decline was 1935–1949. Subsequent reductions in excess deaths were relatively modest and unstable, and in the last decade of the century the percentage of Blacks’ deaths that were excess returned to levels as high as in the first decade. That trajectory is less positive than the trajectory for the racial gap in life expectancy over the century.

Excess deaths fell disproportionately among the young in the early twentieth century, but in the succeeding decades they progressively hit harder among older African Americans, many of them in the prime of life when their economic and social pursuits were vital to their families and communities. Excess deaths were also especially heavy among Black women for most of the century.

We conclude by discussing the social and policy implications of the excess deaths. We assess trends in the early twenty-first century as we consider the political challenges involved in tackling the continuing excess death toll.

Much of the pivotal debate concerning the validity of affirmative action is situated in a legal context of defending or challenging claims that there may be broad societal gains from increased diversity. Race-conscious affirmative action policies originally advanced legal sanctions to promote racial equity in the United States. Today, increasingly detached from its historical context, defense or rejection of affirmative action is otherwise upheld to achieve diversity. A “diversity” rationale for affirmative action calls for increasing tolerance of the “other,” reducing negative stereotypes, and moderating prejudice as goals—all objectives that deviate from the former aim of race-targeted inclusion intended to resolve racial discrimination in employment and college admissions. Diversity policy provides a tapered defense for affirmative action, one detached from principles of justice and equity. The current article suggests that, despite the fact that the ostensible benefits of “racial inclusion as diversity” may be the remaining legal prop for affirmative action in the U.S., there is a need to consider whether diversity intrinsically can engender the benefits that affirmative action policy seeks to provide.

School reform policies, such as the closure of “low-performing” schools and the competitive introduction of school choice and charters, were presented to communities of color as the fix to educational inequities and the lifeline needed for urban Black students to have a chance at a quality education and social mobility. The ways in which reforms have under-delivered on this promise, and in some cases exacerbated negative academic outcomes, particularly for Black boys, are documented. Yet, research on the experience of Black adolescent girls is sparse. We explore ways that policies aimed at delivering a school choice environment have affected daily life for Black adolescent girls. We examine this issue in the context of the Detroit metropolitan area with Black adolescent girls, reflecting on their high school education experiences that spanned a time-period of rapid transitions in the schooling environment (2014–2016) prompted by a series of school reforms in Michigan. Through in-depth interviews we found that girls sought to invest in their high school education as a path to college; yet the very reforms advanced as ways to clear this path hindered their ability to spend time on the human and social capital activities believed to be important to their academic success and social mobility. Our findings suggest advantages for those students with proximal access to high quality neighborhood schools cannot be replicated in a choice environment. There may also be health consequences of the coping strategies girls are compelled to employ to carry on under adverse educational circumstances.

A notable increase in immigration into the United States over the past half century, coupled with its recent geographic dispersion into new communities nationwide, has fueled contact among a wider set of individuals and groups than ever before. Past research has helped us understand Whites’ and Blacks’ attitudes toward immigrants and immigration, and even how contact between Blacks and Whites have shaped their attitudes toward one another. Nevertheless, how contact between Blacks and Whites may correspond with attitudes toward immigrants is not as well understood. Drawing on an original representative survey, we examine U.S.-born Whites’ and Blacks’ attitudes toward Mexican and South Asian Indian immigrants within the context of ongoing relations between the former two U.S.-born communities. Informed by research on the secondary transfer effect (STE), we model how the frequency of contact between U.S.-born Whites and Blacks predicts each group’s receptivity toward two differentially positioned immigrant groups, first-generation Mexicans and South Asian Indians. Multivariate analysis indicates that, among Whites, more frequent contact with Blacks is positively associated with greater receptivity toward both immigrant outgroups, even after controlling for Whites’ individual perceptions of threat, their direct contact with the two immigrant groups, and the perceived quality of such contact. Among Blacks, however, we find less consistent evidence that frequent contact with Whites is associated with attitudes toward either immigrant group. While varied literatures across multiple disciplines have suggested that interracial relations among the U.S.-born may be associated with receptivity toward immigrant newcomers, our results uniquely highlight the importance of considering how U.S.-born groups are positioned in relation to immigrants and to each other when examining such effects.

Research demonstrates the importance of noncognitive skills for educational achievement and attainment. Scholars argue that gender differences in noncognitive skills contribute to the gender gap in education. However, the intersection of student race/ethnicity and gender remains underexplored. Studies that examine how noncognitive skills affect gender or racial disparities in teachers’ perceptions of academic skills often assume that children’s noncognitive skills have the same benefit for all children. This is questionable given that research suggests that racial biases affect teachers’ perceptions of children’s noncognitive skills. Using national data, our paper examines how first-grade teachers’ ratings of approaches to learning affect their ratings of children’s academic skills. We also test if teachers’ ratings of children’s noncognitive skills have similar benefits across racial/ethnic and gender categories. We use two unidimensional approaches and an intersectional approach to gauge whether an intersectional approach gives us additional leverage that the unidimensional approaches obscure. The two unidimensional approaches reveal important results that suggest that children are differentially penalized by race/ethnicity or gender. Our race/ethnicity findings suggest that, in comparison to White children with identical noncognitive skills and test scores, teachers penalize Black children in math and advantage Asian children in literacy. Findings from our gender analyses suggest that teachers penalize girls in both math and literacy. Our intersectional findings indicate that an intersectional approach gives us additional leverage obscured by both unidimensional approaches. First, we find that Black girls and Black boys are differentially penalized in math. Secondly, for teachers’ ratings of literacy, our results suggest that teachers penalize Asian girls but not Asian boys in comparison to White boys. We discuss the implications of our study for understanding the complex relationship between noncognitive skills and social stratification.

In recent decades, dramatic developments in genetics research have begun to transform not only the practice of medicine but also conceptions of the social world. In the media, in popular culture, and in everyday conversation, Americans routinely link genetics to individual behavior and social outcomes. At the same time, some social researchers contend that biological definitions of race have lost ground in the United States over the last fifty years. At the crossroads of two trends—on one hand, the post-World War II recoil from biological accounts of racial difference, and on the other, the growing admiration for the advances of genetic science—the American public’s conception of race is a phenomenon that merits greater attention from sociologists than it has received to date. However, survey data on racial attitudes has proven to be significantly affected by social desirability bias. While a number of studies have attempted to measure social desirability bias with regard to racial attitudes, most have focused on racial policy preferences rather than genetic accounts of racial inequality. We employ a list experiment to create an unobtrusive measure of support for a biologistic understanding of racial inequality. We show that one in five non-Black Americans attribute income inequality between Black and White people to unspecified genetic differences between the two groups. We also find that this number is substantially underestimated when using a direct question. The magnitude of social desirability effects varies, and is most pronounced among women, older people, and the highly-educated.

Little has been written about the Hispanic Americans who voted for Donald Trump. Despite his comments about Mexicans and immigrants, data suggest that Trump performed as well or better than Mitt Romney among Hispanic voters. Using the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study, this paper examines Hispanic support for Trump by looking at traditional predictors of vote choice such as party identification and ideology, as well as a novel measure of racism: denial of racism. This paper finds that, like non-Hispanic Whites, Hispanics higher in denial of racism were more likely to vote Trump in 2016, as well as for Romney in the 2012 election. In addition, denial of racism is the strongest predictor of support for Trump among Hispanics, above even party identification and ideology. This suggests that while Trump’s rhetoric may not appeal to most Hispanic voters, it strongly appeals to those that hold disproportionately high levels of denial of racism. I offer some theoretical reasons for these findings and discuss the role that denial of racism plays in predicting voting behavior.

Political science research has repeatedly identified a strong correlation between high socio-economic status and political participation, but this finding has not been as robust for racial and ethnic minorities. As a response, the literature on minority political participation has produced a series of different models for different groups by adding group-specific variables to the standard SES model. In assigning a single model per group, however, the literature tends to overlook intra-group differences as well as inter-group commonalities, thereby effectively reifying the concept of race and ethnicity. Using survey data from Los Angeles, this article develops a different approach aimed at detecting intra-group differences as well as inter-group commonalities through a recognition of political “styles.” First, using latent class analysis (LCA), I identify a set of recurring configurations of individual dispositions (education, political knowledge…) and political acts (voting, protest…) that define different political styles. Then I examine the distribution of these political styles across racial and ethnic groups. The results reveal three novel findings that were invisible in the previous studies: 1) all groups feature a considerable degree of intra-group difference in political styles; 2) each group retains other political styles that cannot be captured by a single model; and 3) there are commonalities of political styles that cut across racial and ethnic boundaries. Overall, this article presents a model for quantitative analysis of race and ethnicity that simultaneously captures intra-group differences and inter-group commonalities.

Does political distrust generate a desire to engage in the political process or does it foster demobilization? Utilizing a theoretical framework rooted in government experiences and a mixed-methods research design, this article highlights the racially contingent meaning of political distrust to show that both relationships exist. For Whites, distrust is tied to a perception of tax dollars being poorly spent, leading to increased political involvement as Whites to try to gain control over “their” investment in government. For People of Color, distrust of government is grounded in a fear of the criminal justice system, and thus drives disengagement by motivating a desire for invisibility in relation to the state. Ultimately, this finding highlights a previously unseen racial heterogeneity in the political consequences of distrust. Further, it demonstrates how the state perpetuates racially patterned political inequality in a time when many of the formal laws engendering this dynamic have fallen away.

In 1982, President Ronald Reagan’s administration initiated a dramatic policy shift towards a new housing voucher program, which simultaneously resulted in a near-halt in public and project-based assisted housing funding. When analyzing this historic policy shift, many affordable housing scholars have overemphasized race-absent narratives about fiscal austerity to explain the Reagan administration’s policy rejection of public housing and embrace of housing vouchers. To present a more comprehensive and intersectional history of the Reagan administration’s transition to housing vouchers, I employ an alternative methodological lens that I call Black feminist critical policy studies. This paper traces how the Office of Management and Budget and Housing and Urban Development officials relied on obscured racial and gender bias in their debate informing Reagan's alternative housing voucher program. By revealing the social bias endemic in the Reagan administration’s housing debate, this article illustrates that housing vouchers were not simply a neutral, cost-efficient policy tool but helped ensure low-income black mothers’ continued subjection to anti-welfare backlash, housing discrimination, and paternal supervision.

Using the praxis and persecution of William Edward Burghardt Du Bois as a case study, this article analyzes the ways in which anticommunism became a tool of investigating, policing, discrediting, and ultimately curtailing what I call “Radical Black Peace Activism.” During the Cold War, the U.S. state apparatus treated this form of activism as an anti-American, foreign-inspired threat to national security attributable to the Communist “peace offensive.” Radical Black Peace Activists linked the end of global conflict, disarmament, and non-proliferation with antiracism, anticolonialism, anti-imperialism, and socialism. They argued that progress and justice could only be realized through international cooperation and peaceful coexistence. In other words, they demanded a new world order that would displace the United States, and its relentless militarism, as the world’s police. The investigation, indictment, and defamation of W. E. B. Du Bois, which coincided with the intensification of the Korean War, is illustrative of how Radical Black Peace Activism was treated as a form of Soviet-backed subversion. Through anticommunism, the U.S. state apparatus deemed the use of anti-Black and antiradical repression imperative to its security, stability, and status as the global defender of freedom and democracy.

Arkansas was a demographic frontier after the U.S. Civil War. Despite marked agricultural land deforestation and development after the 1870s, it remained agrarian well into the twentieth century. We fuse life course and racial state frameworks to examine Black and White women’s settlement in Arkansas over the post-Civil War period (1880-1910). A racial state empowers residents and enacts policies based on race rather than equal citizenship rights. We highlight three institutional domains shaped by racial state policies: productive economies (subsistence, mixed commercialism, and plantation production); stratification on an agricultural ladder (from sharecropping to forms of tenancy to farm ownership); and rules of raced (and gendered) social control. We examine women’s settlement patterns and related outcomes in an institutional context at different life course stages using mixed methods: women’s oral histories and Census data analysis. We find that by 1880 White women and families, less attracted by forces of marketization, had largely migrated to subsistence and mixed commercial subregions. Black women and families, generally desiring to rise on the agricultural ladder to farm ownership, largely migrated to the rich lands found in plantation production counties. Black women in Arkansas could rise but, by 1910, new racial state (Jim Crow) policies more severely limited travel, material resources, and education for tenant farm families, predominantly Black, in the plantation subregion. Commensurate with this, Black women in the plantation subregion had experienced less status mobility on the agricultural ladder, with reduced living standards, by later life.

This article examines the exclusion of Afro-Mauritians (or Creoles) in Mauritian multiculturalism. Although Creoles represent nearly thirty percent of the population, they are the only major group not officially recognized in the Mauritian Constitution (unlike Hindus, Muslims, and the Chinese) and they experience uniquely high levels of socioeconomic and political marginalization despite the country’s decades-long policy of official multiculturalism. While scholarship on multiculturalism and nation-building in plural societies might explain the exclusion of Creoles as a breakdown in the forging of political community in postcolonial Mauritius, I build on these theories by focusing on the tension between diaspora and nativity evident in Mauritian public discourse. Using the politics of language policy as a case study, I examine why the Kreol language in Mauritius—the ancestral language of Creoles and mother tongue of the majority of Mauritians—was consistently rejected for inclusion in language policy until recently (unlike Hindi, Urdu, and other ethnic languages). In my analysis of public policy discourse, I map how Creole ethnic activists negotiated Kreol’s inclusion in multiculturalism and highlight their constraints. This analysis shows that through multiculturalism, non-Creole political actors have created ethnic categories of inclusion while reciprocally denoting racially-excluded others defined by their lack of diasporic cultural value. I argue that groups claiming diasporic cultural connections are privileged as “ethnics” deemed worthy of multicultural inclusion, while those with ancestral connections more natively-bound to the local territory (such as Creoles, as a post-slavery population) are deemed problematic, culturally dis-recognized, and racialized as “the Other” because their nativity gives them a platform from which to lay territorial counter-claims to the nation.

Race theorists have been unable to reach a consensus regarding the basic historical question, “is ‘race’ modern?” I argue that this is partly because the question itself is ambiguous. There is not really one question that race scholars are answering, but at least six. First, is the concept of race modern? Second, is there a modern concept of race that is distinct from earlier race concepts? Third, are “races” themselves modern? Fourth, are racialized groups modern? Fifth, are the means and methods associated with racialization modern? And sixth, are the meanings attached to racialized traits modern? Because these questions have different answers, the debate about the historical origins of “race” cannot be resolved unless they are distinguished. I will explain the ways in which “race” is and is not modern by answering these questions, thereby offering a resolution to a seemingly intractable problem.