In Book I of the Treatise of Human Nature, Hume examines the idea of necessary connection, which, he observes, forms an indispensable part of our idea of cause and effect. He concludes:

The idea of necessity arises from some impression. There is no impression convey'd by our senses, which can give rise to that idea. It must, therefore, by deriv'd from some internal impression, or impression of reflexion. There is no internal impression which has any relation to the present business, but that propensity, which custom produces, to pass from an object to the idea of its usual attendant. This therefore is the essence of necessity. Upon the whole, necessity is something, that exists in the mind, not in objects; nor is it possible for us ever to form the most distant idea of it, consider'd as a quality in bodies. Either we have no idea of necessity, or necessity is nothing but that determination of the thought to pass from causes to effects and from effects to causes, according to their experienced union.

John Stuart Mill's commitment to liberty and individual development is one of the most exoteric themes of his moral and political philosophy. But the linkages between this commitment to liberty and development and Mill's conception of utility and principles of the good are not as commonly recognized. As part of a more general transformation of his utilitarianism, Mill repudiated Bentham's principles of the good and instead adopted a more sophisticated form of hedonism. While Bentham admits only the total quantity of pleasure as contributing to value, Mill expands the circle to admit quality or kind of pleasure as well into the value reckoning. I have elsewhere interpreted and defended Mill's qualitative hedonism, and in this paper I can offer only a brief overview of that account and must largely assume its plausibility. Bentham and Mill agree that only pleasurable experiences and the absence of painful experiences have value and so both are called hedonists. But they have very different views about what properties of pleasures makes them valuable, or in other words what are the good-making properties of pleasure. Bentham thinks that only intensity and duration, or quantity, are good-making properties of pleasures, and thus he includes only these properties in measuring value. As a consequence, in the context of value measurement he is not interested in the kinds of things in which people take pleasure. But Mill is a qualitative hedonist, and thinks that the quality or kind of pleasure is also a good-making characteristic and thus should be included in value measurement. The things that are sources of pleasure matter to Mill.

Peu d'oeuvres souffrent autant que celles de Rousseau et Sartre de la réputation qui leur est faite. Prix de leur accessibilité peut-être, de l'ampleur des controverses auxquelles elles ont donné lieu, elles sem-blent irrémédiablement marquées l'une et l'autre par quelques formules censées en résumer la substance: errant seul dans les bois, Rousseau serait le champion d'un homme sauvage et bon qu'il opposerait à toutes les manifestations de la vie sociale; assis seul dans les cafés, Sartre affirmerait, de son côté, l'échec douloureux de tout rapport interpersonnel—et leurs oeuvres réspectives developperaient cette position centrale. Simplifications sans doute. Malgré tout, il n'est peut-être pas inutile d'interroger le fait qu'on ait surtout retenu cela d'oeuvres si riches, particulièrement en regard de leurs nombreux textes politiques, en tentant d'envisager ces oeuvres moins à travers l'une ou l'autre de leurs théses que selon des lignes de force plus génerales sur ce problème de l'existence sociale. Ceci peut permettre, croyons-nous, quelques mises en rapport suggestives.

Berkeley's Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge was published in 1710, when he was only twenty-five. The public silence that greeted it stunned him. Even the ridicule that he had anticipated was initially confined to private circles. No doubt this mortifying experience reinforced his belief “that whatever doctrine contradicts vulgar and settled opinion” must “be introduced with great caution into the world”. It had, indeed, been for this reason that he had “omitted all mention of the non-existence of matter in the title-page, dedication, preface, and introduction to” his performance. In this way he hoped that “the notion of [immaterialism] might steal unawares on the reader, who possibly would never have meddled with a book that he had known contained such paradoxes”.

L'envahissement de l'espace par la technique est un fait accompli. Non seulement l'espace physique et l'espace organisationnel, mais aussi l'espace du discours et celui de l'écriture sont déjà bien occupés. La technique est en effet devenue un sujet de conversation quotidien, remplit les colonnes de toutes sortes de journaux et de revues et fait l'objet d'un nombre considérable d'études monographiques. Alors pourquoi ce titre encore qui risque d'aggraver le resserrement des habitants des lieux et hâter leur étouffement?

David Raynor aborde une pluralité de thèmes chez Berkeley, qui se rapportent soit à la signification ambiguë de l'immatérialisme par rapport à la philosophie spontanée des gens ordinaires, soit au dosage savant de réalisme et d'idéalisme dans une philosophie qui élabore une critique radicale de la doctrine de l'idée-représentation. Il est intéressant de noter que Raynor ne s'en laisse pas raconter par certains interprètes classiques de la pensée berkeleyenne et qu'il sait tirer avantageusement parti d'une confrontation de Berkeley avec des rationalistes tels Male-branche ou Leibniz, mais tout aussi bien d'une mise en perspective à l'intérieur du courant empiriste à partir des réflexions de Hume et de Maupertuis.

L'objet de cet article est triple. En premier lieu, il s'agit d'etablir les limites du jugement judiciaire et de montrer que ces limites sont néces-saires à la justice telle qu'elle est entendue par les tribunaux. Ceux-ci ne peuventjuger qu'en fonction de règles de droit préexistantes et selon des procédures définies. En deuxième lieu, il s'agit de critiquer le recours abusif au jugement judiciaire. Pour éviter des débats politiques ou pour décharger le gouvernement, il arrive que l'on confie à des tribunaux ou à des instances quasi judiciaires, la tâche de trancher un litige sur la base de règies de droit insuffisantes ou trop générates. Ou bien on leur demande de résoudre des problèmes qui dépassent leurs compétences. En troisième lieu, cet article traitera de la différence entre les fonctions judiciaires dans I'Etat moderne et les fonctions analogues dans les sociétes sans Etat. Dans ces dernières, l'arbitrage joue un très large rôle, qui semble contraster avec le rôle étroit assigné aux tribunaux dans nos sociétés.

Is worrying about whether moral judgments are true or false a philosophical waste of time? It can seem to be if moral truth claims are redundant on thejudgments they claim to be true. If to claim that the judgment “x is wrong” is true is simply to judge x wrong, anyone who is prepared to make judgments can consistently make truth claims. A concern for moral truth is then merely a concern for whether anything is right or wrong, not a separable concern for whether moral judgments are true or false.

It is not difficult to sympathize with the strong impulse among philosophers to attempt to explain, justify, and even define moral concepts in factual terms. For without some kind of grounding in the facts of human nature, we may be quite perplexed concerning what relevance moral concepts have to our actual decisions, actions, and social relationships. Put another way, without grounding moral concepts in facts we may be quite puzzled as to the connections between principles and practice, between the ideal and the actual. The history of ethical theory contains several serious efforts by various philosophers to provide factual grounding for moral concepts, efforts which we cannot here take up.

It has been many years since the Classical notion of an objective, determinate account of the human good, applicable to all people, has played the central role in most moral theories. One contribution to this decline has been the Kantian belief that one cannot say what happiness is. Kant thinks that happiness is a purely empirical concept and is therefore dependent on contingent, unpredictable objects and states of affairs.

In the far-off days before the first World War, the British journal Mind was full of articles by writers who thought of themselves as “Neoidealists”. So when the enfant terrible of the groves of Academic Oxford in that generation—a “pragmatic Humanist” by the name of Ferdinand Canning Scott Schiller—played his most notorious practical joke upon his colleagues by publishing a mock-issue of the journal (under the title Mind!) he offered as a frontispiece “A portrait of the Absolute in the pink of condition”. Beneath a pale-pink semi-transparent tissue (which, except for its colour, was quite normal for the photographic plates in Victorian memoirs) one found a printed frame that embraced a perfectly blank white sheet of paper.

Today a “new” field of philosophy has emerged which can be called simply “The Philosophy of Man and Woman”. Paradoxically, it is a field of study with a long and impressive history which began when the pre-Socratic philosophers first questioned their own identity in the midst of the world. Their questions fall into four broad areas:

1. How is the male “opposite” to the female?

2. What roles do male and female play in the generation and identity of offspring?

3. Are women and men wise in the same or different ways?

4. Are women and men good in the same or different ways?

Willard thinks we should be puzzled and perplexed about the relevance of morality in deciding what to do. His puzzlement stems from not being able to see any connection between facts and values. In particular, he holds that moral rights (if there are any) cannot be based on needs because needs are not really facts and, even if they were, there seems no way to bridge the fact/value gap between needs (construed as facts) and moral rights.

Par sa recherche sur le concept philosophique de femme, Sr Prudence Allen apporte un éclairage neuf sur toute l'histoire de la philosophic Mon commentaire est basé essentiellement sur le texte ayant pour titre « Aristotelian and Cartesian Revolutions in the Philosophy of Man and Woman » sachant pertinemment que le livre The Concept of Woman traite de façon détaillée de ce qui apparaît dans l'article comme un exposé synthétique. Trois idées générales admises par Sr Prudence Allen font l'objet de notre commentaire. Ce sont I'interpretation égalita-riste des idées de Platon quant aux différences sexuelles, la neutralité du concept d'homme et 1'interpretation philosophique de la complémenta-rite des sexes comme modèle des relations égalitaires.

As one of the bare handful of scholars working on Schelling, I should heartily like to accept Professor Harris's argument, for all these black cows hang around one's neck more heavily than did the albatross on the ancient mariner's. I find myself obliged, however, to closely test his argument. I regret that, viewed in the context of the whole of the Phenomenology's Preface, Harris's argument is not fully convincing. I shall argue that, since the Preface's plain intent is to contrast the vitalism of a method of thought that is spirit's coming into its own with all styles of fixated propositional thinking, the “formalism” Hegel attacks is a loose aggregate of the philosophical styles of Fichte, Schelling, Reinhold and Bardili. Hegel is content to leave the label loose and unspecified and not to name names. It is not strictly fair to let the scope of the term resonate upon Schelling's “first scientific grasp of the idea”, at least not for an author who knew Schelling's work so well. But as Harris points out, it is not fair to Hegel for his public to read him with the sole, simplistic question of what positions he supports and what positions he rejects.

L'absence d'une analyse quelconque du concept de vérité a de quoi surprendre dans un discours qui se propose de dire à quelles conditions s'obtient cette vérité. C'est pourtant bien de cette carence que souffrent les Méditations. A l'exception d'une brève allusion, dans la Cinquième Méditation, attribuable d'ailleurs à Clerselier, et dans une traduction remaniée par lui mais non approuvée par Descartes (puisqu'elle date de 1661), le mot « vérité » n'y est défini nulle part.

One might imagine that this remark of James was too obvious to be denied, but in fact current philosophical orthodoxy runs against it. Since the renewal of interest in the emotions produced by Anthony Kenny's Action Emotion and Will in 1963, philosophers have focussed primarily on the cognitive aspects of emotions—the judgments, evaluations, beliefs, presuppositions which they contain. Bodily feelings have been, on the whole, slighted. Sometimes they are dismissed outright, as by Robert Solomon: “feelings no more constitute or define the emotion than an army of fleas constitutes a homeless dog. … Feeling is the ornamentation of emotion, not its essence.”; more often, as in Jerome Neu, given only rather slight attention because “thoughts are of greater importance than feelings (in the narrow sense of felt sensations) in the classification and discrimination of emotional states”.

What is pleasure? Don't we all know? How could so many of us pursue it so eagerly otherwise? Or how could we so readily and confidently say whether this, that and the other are pleasures? Having one's back rubbed, dancing, listening to a Bach flute sonata and eating a cheese soufflé are pleasures, while having a cold, smelling rotten eggs and reading Hegel are not. We may not be able to define pleasure, but if we can readily say what is a pleasure and what is not, must we not know what it is, just as we know what a chair is if we can correctly identify chairs, distinguishing them from stools, benches and couches?

I have only two comments to make, both of which will appear incidental at first. Their full relevance to the paper you have just read will become clear at the end, as I hope.

The first refers to Harris's remark that Jacobi, Schleiermacher and Herder “make strange bedfellows”. Actually, they do not. This is one more example, I believe, of Hegel's usual idiosyncratic yet conceptually sound classification of philosophers and philosophies. I am thinking especially of the Jacobi-Herder pair, but I suspect that what I have to say would apply to the third member of the trio as well. We must remember that, at the time of the writing of the Preface to the Phenomenology, the 1815 edition of Jacobi's dialogue David Hume on Faith, which Jacobi himself had overseen, did not exist. It is the edition that we are most likely to have read, because the wonders of photomechanical reproduction have made it easily available. Hegel, however, could only have read the dialogue in its 1787 edition, without the long new Introduction which Jacobi added in 1815 as an introduction to his collected works as well.

I appreciate very much the thoroughness with which Jocelyne St-Arnaud has analyzed the text of my paper. As she points out, the major source of difference between our approach to the authors under consideration derives from a preference for an ethical and political perspective on her side and a preference for a metaphysical perspective on mine. However, there are a few key points in interpretation that need to be addressed which go beyond this central difference in orientation.