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Needs and Rights

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 April 2010

L. Duane Willard
L. Duane Willard
Affiliation:
University of Nebraska at Omaha
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Extract

It is not difficult to sympathize with the strong impulse among philosophers to attempt to explain, justify, and even define moral concepts in factual terms. For without some kind of grounding in the facts of human nature, we may be quite perplexed concerning what relevance moral concepts have to our actual decisions, actions, and social relationships. Put another way, without grounding moral concepts in facts we may be quite puzzled as to the connections between principles and practice, between the ideal and the actual. The history of ethical theory contains several serious efforts by various philosophers to provide factual grounding for moral concepts, efforts which we cannot here take up.

Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 26 , Issue 1 , Spring 1987 , pp. 43 - 54
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 1987

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References

1 For example: Handy, Rollo, “A Need Definition of 'Value'”, The Philosophical Quarterly 10 (1960), 156–163;CrossRefGoogle ScholarMcCall, Storrs, “Human Needs and the Quality of Life”, in King-Farlow, John and Shea, William R., eds., Values and the Quality of Life (New York: Science History Publications, 1976)Google Scholar; Nielsen, Kai, “Morality and Needs”, in MacIntosh, J. J. and Coval, S., eds., The Business of Reason (New York: Humanities Press, 1969)Google Scholar; Peffer, Rodney, “A Defense of Rights to Well-being”, Philosophy and Public-Affairs 8 (1978), 65–87;Google ScholarTranøy, K. E., “'Ought' Implies 'Can': A Bridge from Fact to Norm?”, Part 2, Ratio 17 (1975), 147–175;Google Scholar and, Wollheim, Richard, “Needs, Desires and Moral Turpitude”, in Peters, R. S., ed., Nature and Conduct (London: Macmillan Press, 1975)Google Scholar.

2 Ingram, Peter, “Natural Rights: A Reappraisal”, Journal of Value Inquiry 15 (1981), 3–18.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

3 Ibid., 13.

4 Ibid., 15.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid., 10–11.

7 Ibid., 13.

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15 Ibid., 5.

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