It is incorrect to construe Hume as a Pyrrhonian sceptic. Or so I have argued elsewhere. To the contrary, Hume in fact offers a detailed defence of the thesis that the norms of scientific inference, that is, the “rules by which to judge of causes and effects”, are reasonable rules to follow in forming our beliefs. Conforming to these rules in its formation of causal beliefs is a strategy the understanding employs in order to satisfy the end of curiosity (T271). Science is reasonable because, so far as we can, within our fallible limits, discover, it is the strategy of belief formation that is the best means of achieving our end of truth, insofar as the latter is, within our fallible limits, attainable.

Unwarranted antagonism between reason and the passions is an ancient problem, dating back at least to Plato. Even philosophers who sought to give the passions their due—David Hume for example—juxtaposed reason and emotion and contrasted them as slave and master (or vice versa). The point of a so-called “cognitive” theory of emotion, simply stated, is to deny this antagonism. The most succinct (if not very informative) statement of the cognitivist view is Nietzsche's: “as if every passion did not possess its quantum of reason.” Hume's own theory anticipated such a synthesis (in his awkward analysis of “ideas” as both necessary causes and effects of emotions) while Spinoza and Hobbes clearly defended cognitive theories with the wisdom of reconciliation in mind. The aim of a cognitive theory is not to reduce volatile emotion to cool and calm belief, nor is the emphasis on emotion a romantic attempt to extol the passions and excoriate reason—though that exercise may have its place in philosophy too; it is rather to understand reason and the passions together and appreciate their shared properties, similarities and complementarity as well as their obvious differences and oppositions. So understood, cognitive theories have, generically, gained widespread acceptance; only a few reactionaries in philosophy and psychology still insist on a cognition-free concept of emotion, however backhandedly cognitive concepts might be acknowledged as presuppositions, causal preconditions or criteria for the appropriate labelling of emotion rather than as proper constituents of emotion.

In this paper I propose to examine a notion often used in assessing the morality of war: “innocence”. Assessments of innocence within this context range from Nagel's straightforward working definition of ”currently harmless”, to Richard Wasserstrom's painstakingly legalistic assessment, to Anscombe's definition and discussion of innocence and responsibility.

Perhaps the Clearest and most impressive use of the Principle of Continuity by Leibniz in the evaluation of a theory is that offered in refutation of the Cartesian laws of motion, as given in his Critical Remarks Concerning the General Part of Descartes' Principles. With regard to the Cartesian laws of impact Leibniz says:

On Article 49. Rule 4. If B, which is moving, is smaller than C, which is at rest, B will be reflected with the velocity it had before the shock while C will remain at rest.

Group rights have long been of special concern to Canadians. Quebec has maintained a distinct language and civil law system, and Canada's Aboriginal Peoples have always had (“enjoyed” is perhaps the wrong word here) different legal rights from those of other Canadians. Former Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau sought to reduce the significance of these special protections. He argued that they were the product of historical compromise and political wrangling rather than of any principled vision ofjustice. As a result, he opposed any special status for Quebec in favour of nationwide bilingualism, and sought to dismantle the reserve system for the First Nations. He sought to replace both with the idea of universal citizenship.

This paper deals with the distinction between factual and episodic memory (memory that p vs. memory of particular x). The following theses are defended, (i) Episodic memory is internally related to a particular past experience. (ii) Factual memory about x does not imply episodic memory ofx. (iii) Episodic and factual memory may carry the same kind of information about the past. Finally, (iv) episodic memories are reflexive factual memories. When I remember x in the episodic sense, I have a collection of factual memories not only about x, but equally and simultaneously about the fact that this same collection comes directly from my past experience.

S'agissant du problème lié au statut de la connaissance humaine en général, la querelle du faillibilisme et du fondationnalisme n'est pas neuve. On peut même dire qu'elle parcourt l'histoire de la philosophie depuis ses tout débuts. Dans le contexte des préoccupations propres à la pensée contemporaine, cette querelle semble cependant se cristalliser autour de la question suivante : quel statut devons-nous aujourd'hui accorder à nos énoncés philosophiques? Pouvons-nous et devons-nous encore revendiquer pour ces énoncés, traditionnellement chargés d'établir les fondements et les principes premiers, un statut ontologique, sinon transcendantal? Ou au contraire, le développement des sciences expérimentales modernes, ayant éveillé en nous de manière sans cesse plus aiguë la conscience de la précarité de nos connaissances, ne nous incite-t-il pas désormais à envisager les propositions philosophiques comme n'étant rien de plus, malgre leur prétention et leur visée, que des énoncés faillibles, relatifs à l'expérience ou à l'histoire?

A recent aspect of Canadians' concern to discover their “national identity” has been the interest of some Canadians to discover the history of philosophy in their country. Several decades ago this interest scarcely existed. If any questions about the subject had been raised, the chances are they would have elicited sceptical smiles or yawns. Many would simply have denied—and a few still deny—that there is any “Canadian philosophy” at all. Nowadays, however, the climate of opinion is more accommodating, so that those who study and write about what past philosophers in this country have done can expect to receive a serious hearing. No doubt a conclusive case for the study has yet to be stated. But the most extensive speculative statement made thus far is the book by Leslie Armour and Elizabeth Trott which I shall comment on below.

L'histoire de la philosophie voit d'abord en Hobbes un spécialiste de la philosophie politique, au point qu'on en oublie souvent l'importance du reste de son oeuvre. Sans doute, il n'est pas faux d'insister sur la contribution hobbienne à la philosophie politique. Et de l'avis de Hobbes lui-même, c'est dans ce domaine qu'il avait été particulièrement novateur. Cependant, son ambition était plus large: il voulait construire un système entier de philosophie, dont la politique ne devait représenter que la dernière partie. En effet, selon l'ordre de sa grande oeuvre, les Eléments de la philosophie, l'exposé du système total se divisait en trois grands livres: Du corps, De l'homme et Du citoyen. Apparemment, le système devait donc se composer des trois parties suivantes: une physique, une anthropologie et une science politique. En fait, le premier volume, sur le corps, comporte également la méthodologie, la logique et la philosophie première. La division en trois a pourtant sa vérité, et même une vérité troublante si l'on prend au sérieux la volonté hobbienne de constituer un système rigoureux dans lequel les sciences de l'homme et de la politique résulteraient de celle des corps en général, en ce sens du moins que les dernières sciences supposeraient les principes des premières. Car il semble que Hobbes ait admis une certaine autonomie des trois grandes parties de son système, au point que, par exemple, la politique paraît pouvoir trouver son propre fondement en elle-même, sans référence particulière aux développements de la physique.

The problem. The purpose of this paper is to provide a general discussion of Aristotle's views on scientific explanation, by which I mean a discussion of Aristotle's treatment of scientific explanation, its structure and its principles, as distinct from Aristotle's own principles of explanation. By means of this distinction I hope to be excused from a discussion of Aristotle on form and matter, potentiality and actuality, and the four causes, and to avoid so far as possible the controversy among commentators concerning the respective merits of Aristotle qua naturalist and Aristotle qua pre-Thomist Thomist. I wish to be excused from treating these problems in order to approach directly Aristotle's formal treatment of scientific explanation as given in the Posterior Analytics, but if I were to be accused of introducing a distinction between parts of the Aristotelian corpus for which there is insufficient warrant, if I were told that I am making an illegitimate abstraction from the whole of which the Posterior Analytics is but a part, I should plead not guilty.

L. W. Sumner's excellent book Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics has four central goals. He aims (1) to demonstrate the subjectivity of welfare (chaps. 1 to 3); (2) to show that the traditional subjective accounts of welfare—namely, hedonism and preference theories—are inadequate (chaps. 4 and 5); (3) to construct an alternative subjectivist account of welfare (chapter 6); and (4) to argue for the moral primacy of welfare (chap. 7). I will not comment here on Sumner's treatment of the subjectivity of welfare, as I have had my say on this topic elsewhere. In fact, my space here will only permit me to discuss the second and fourth goals of the book. Even with this narrow focus, I will be forced to leave unexplored a wealth of truly lovely work which passes by us on the road to these central conclusions.

The purpose of this paper is to show that we should dispense with the concept of immediate awareness, when it takes for its object the existence and nature of our sensations and images.

The question of whether we are immediately aware of the existence and nature of our sensations and images cannot be answered in a reasonable manner unless we have a firm grip on the concept of immediate awareness. Philosophers who have employed it have usually employed it in such a way that the word “immediate” in the corresponding phrase “immediate awareness” describes both the nature of the awareness and how it came to have that nature. When it describes the nature of the awareness “immediate” means “incorrigible”.

My objective here is to sketch a proposal against the many who insist on reading Rorty as arguing within traditional philosophy, in spite of his contentions to the contrary. I want to suggest that Rorty should be read as importantly outside the philosophical tradition and as an external critic. My proposal turns on roughing out how Rorty's brand of prag- matism differs from more familiar sorts.