We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content.
Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)
References
Appiah, Anthony1986For Truth in Semantics. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.Google Scholar
Brandom, Robert1976 “Truth and Assertibility.” Journal of Philosophy, 73: 137–49.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Byrne, Darragh2004 “Compositionality and the Manifestation Challenge.” Synthese, (forthcoming).Google Scholar
Dummett, Michael1973a Frege: Philosophy of Language. London: Duckworth.Google Scholar
Dummett, Michael1973b “The Philosophical Basis of Intuitionistic Logic.” Reprinted in his Truth and Other Enigmas. London: Duckworth, pp. 215–48.Google Scholar
Dummett, Michael1976 “What Is a Theory of Meaning? (II).” In Truth and Meaning: Essays in Semantics. Edited by Evans, G. and McDowell, J.. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 67–137.Google Scholar
Dummett, Michael1978 Preface to Truth and Other Enigmas. London: Duckworth, pp. ix–li.Google Scholar
Edgington, Dorothy1985 “Verificationism and Manifestations of Meaning.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 59, pp. 153–73.Google Scholar
Gardiner, Mark Quentin 2000Semantic Challenges to Realism: Dummett and Putnam. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Putnam, Hilary1975 “The Meaning of ‘Meaning.’” Reprinted in his Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers. Vol. 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 215–71.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Putnam, Hilary1981Reason, Truth and History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wright, Crispin1987a “Truth Conditions and Criteria.” In his Realism, Meaning and Truth. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 47–69. Originally published in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 50 (1976).Google Scholar
Wright, Crispin1987b “Can a Davidsonian Meaning-Theory Be Construed in Terms of Assertibility?” In his Realism, Meaning and Truth. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 287–316.Google Scholar
Wright, Crispin1987c Introductory Essay to his Realism, Meaning and Truth. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 1–46.Google Scholar
Wright, Crispin1992Truth and Objectivity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar