A sustained challenge to the view that artworks are physical objects relates to the alleged inability of physical objects to possess representational properties, which some artworks clearly do possess. I argue that the challenge is subject to confusions about representational properties and aesthetic experience. I show that a challenge to artwork-object identity put forward by Danto is vulnerable to a similar criticism. I conclude by noting that the identity of artworks and physical objects is consistent with the insight that attending exclusively to the object's individual physical properties may prevent us from grasping the nature of the work.

When we reconstruct Fichte's philosophy of nature of the Jena period, we notice striking similarities between the conception of organism in the Doctrine of Science and Schelling's corresponding developments in his early Naturphilosophie. Even though both thinkers agree to consider organic nature within the framework of transcendental idealism, it is nevertheless possible at this stage to discover slight differences in their interpretation which announce their future disagreement on the status of a philosophy of nature. If, for instance, organism for both Fichte and Schelling can be considered as an analogon of the absolute, much depends on whether they conceive this analogy from a practical or theoretical point of view.

The moral responsibility of pharmaceutical companies is often invoked when discussing the difficulties faced by developing countries regarding their access to medication. In this article, I wish to criticize one strategy of attributing responsibility to pharmaceuticals, according to which moral responsibility originates from the analogy between enterprise and individual moral agent. I will propose an alternative strategy linking responsibility to the functions of the enterprise using a distinction between the organizational and occupational functions of a pharmaceutical company. Despite its interest, the mitigated success of this proposition will bring me to reconsider the overall relevance of attributing, in such a targeted manner, moral responsibility to pharmaceuticals.

This article proposes an interpretation of the chapters of the Nicomachean Ethics concerning exchange and friendship. Rejecting approaches where Aristotle anticipates modern labour or need-based theories of value, the article claims that those notions of labour and need are required for a satisfactory interpretation of the most obscure passages of Book V. Finally, Aristotle's texts on exchange and friendship are related in such a way that the latter, since it is free from any political considerations, allows us to better understand the philosopher's view on exchange.

The nature of the One poses a formidable problem. At the source of procession there is, on the one hand, a discontinuity between the First and derived hypostases, since the One is anything but what it gives, since it is beyond its gifts as absolute transcendence and absolute otherness, and since it forever remains the same in its venerable immobility. But, on the other hand, there is a continuity from the Principle to its begotten, inasmuch as its derived energy is like its image, like a trace ensuring the erotic-dynamic process which is transmitted to lower beings in return for their conversion toward the Highest. Confronting the problem of that apparently irreconcilable duality is the search to determine why the One overflows, what is the nature of that overflowing, and how that overflowing might be at the foundation of procession.

The recent publication of a third anthology of Donald Davidson's articles, and anticipated publication of two more, encourages a consideration of themes binding together Davidson's lifetime of research. One such theme is the principle of charity (PC). In light of the mileage Davidson gets out of PC, I propose a careful examination of PC itself. In Part 1, 1 consider some ways in which Davidson articulates PC. In Part 2, 1 show that the articulation that Davidson requires in his work on epistemology is untenable given what Davidson says in his work on semantics. I conclude that Davidson can use PC only in his work on semantics or not at all.

I clarify in what sense one might want to claim that thought or language are public. I distinguish among four forms that each of these claims might take, and two general ways of establishing them that might be contemplated. The first infers the public character of thought from the public character of language, and the second infers the latter from the former. I show that neither of these stategies seems to be able to dispense with the claim that thought and language are interdependent, and that the second strategy raises more difficulties than the first. I then examine the reasoning by which Davidson means to establish that thought depends on language. I claim that this reasoning is not conclusive, and that it can be adapted in such a way as to establish a version of the thesis that thought is public which does not presuppose that language is public, and a version of the thesis that language is public which does not imply that thought depends on language. I conclude with the suggestion that despite appearances to the contrary Davidson's doctrine is defensible only if it implies at least the conceivability of intentional systems that would lack language altogether.

A quick survey of the literature reveals that authors disagree as to which sentiments are moral and which are not, they disagee as to how to distinguish between moral and other sentiments, and finally that often the same author will claim a sentiment is moral at some times but not at others. These difficulties arise, I argue, from an underlying concept of emotion that I call atomism. Viewing emotions as means of coordination among agents, rather than as psychic atoms, suggests a radically different approach to the question of morality and affects, one where emotions pave the way for normative expectations.

What did Wittgenstein mean when he remarked, “I am not a religious man but I cannot help but see every problem from a religious point of view”? Malcolm's thesis is that it points to analogies between Wittgenstein's philosophical outlook and a religious view of life. In opposition, Peter Winch argues that Wittgenstein's remark need not be understood as referring to exclusively philosophical problems; rather, Wittgenstein was expressing his own quasi-religious perspective on life and emphasizing the spiritual importance of philosophical clarity. In contrast to Malcolm and Winch, I argue that the remark is best taken to mean roughly: “I am not a religious person myself, but when I reflect philosophically on what it means for a person to face certain types of problems, for example, moral dilemmas or other difficult decisions in life, it is important to acknowledge the diversity of possible perspectives from which these problems can be seen; in so doing, I cannot help but imagine how such problems would appear from the perspective of a religious person.”

That the cogito is the first truth discovered amidst the universal doubt achieved in Descartes' Meditation I is not what ensures its primacy as a metaphysical principle, i.e., its epistemic priority over scientific knowledge. This primacy depends rather on two conditions which Descartes sets forth in a letter to Clerselier. Meditation II contains the demonstration of the cogito's conformity to each of these conditions, and hence of its primacy over knowledge of nature. It seems, however, that the cogito enjoys this primacy over truths of mathematics and of metaphysics (including the principle of non-contradiction) as well.

In 1983, in an open letter to the journal Nature, Karl Popper and David Miller set forth a particularly strong critical argument which sought to demonstrate the impossibility of inductive probability. Since its publication the argument has faced many criticisms and we argue in this article that they do not reach their objectives. We will first reconstruct the demonstration made by Popper and Miller in their initial article and then try to evaluate the main arguments against it. Although it is possible to conceptualize logically the idea of induction, it is shown that it is not possible on traditional Bayesian grounds.

In a recent article, D. H. Finkelstein offers a new proposal about the distinction between conscious and unconscious belief. On his proposal, someone's belief is conscious if he has an ability to express it simply by self-ascribing it; and someone's belief is unconscious if he lacks such an ability. In this article, I argue that his proposal is inadequate, and then offer a somewhat different proposal. On my proposal, someone's belief is conscious if he has self-ascribed this belief without recourse to any evidence about his behaviour, and someone's belief is unconscious; if it is not conscious.