More than five years have passed since Mao's death and the arrest of his principal surviving supporters who helped launch and wage the Cultural Revolution. Since 1976 and particularly since late 1978, a major effort has been made to reform the Chinese policy process at the higher levels, especially in the economic realm. Drawing on impressions gained from interviews with Chinese officials in the summer of 1981, as well as a reading of the Chinese press, this article assesses the progress of the reforms. To what extent and in what direction has economic policy making evolved since 1976? What of the Maoist system remains? Further, what are the strengths and deficiencies of the new system? Does the policy process in the economic realm seem capable of directing the substantive economic reforms which the leaders have in mind? These are the questions explored in this article.

As in other South-east Asian countries, the controversy over the ethnic Chinese in Vietnam has its roots deep in the past and in essence centres on the issue of assimilation. However, unlike other countries in the region, Vietnam represents a unique case due to her geographical proximity and cultural affinity to China. Consequently, while ties between the Vietnamese Chinese and their homeland are traditionally closer than in perhaps any other case, over the centuries China has also been more inclined and has found it easier to intervene in Vietnamese affairs. In fact, even after French rule in Vietnam began, Beijing continued to seek to ensure most-favoured-nation treatment for all Chinese in Vietnam through a series of treaties and bilateral agreements, and also responded unfailingly to their pleas for help. According to the agreement signed with the French in 1946, the Chinese Government was even entitled to veto the selection of formal Chinese community leaders in Vietnam, thereby establishing a direct link between China and the Chinese in Vietnam.

Since the deaths of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai in 1976 and the ensuing concentration on the Four Modernizations, increased attention has been paid to whether, and to what extent, China will be able, or wish, to bring its military machine and its military strategy more closely in line with that of “advanced” countries. The term usually applied to this question is “military modernization.” Such a term possesses the advantage of pointing to how changes in military investments are related to the Chinese Communist Party's overall programme of general economic recovery after the Cultural Revolution and how military affairs fit into the Party's plans for the next two to three decades. Extending the meaning of the concept and relating it to the general state of China's political economy has the additional benefit of drawing attention away from exclusive emphasis on one component of Chinese military affairs, “people's war,” that overworked and by now sterile term to which both Chinese practitioners and western analysts were slave for the past four decades. “People's war” as a strategy and a useful concept continues, but it is no longer the umbrella term for understanding Chinese military issues. Indeed, it has been modified by the Chinese themselves, under the rubric” people's war under modern conditions.”

During the period 1952–57 the United States attempted to convince other western states to maintain a “China differential” in their trade with communist states. Washington argued that special export controls should be imposed against the People's Republic of China because Beijing represented a unique threat to the west as a whole and because economic warfare would contribute to the ultimate collapse of Mao Zedong's regime. It became increasingly more difficult for the U.S. to sponsor such a policy in multilateral western forums such as COCOM (the Consultative Group-Co-ordinating Committee) during this five-year period. The opposition to the China differential was organized by Great Britain, which argued that the existing system of joint export controls could not be maintained if members attempted to distinguish between communist states on political grounds. Great Britain also questioned the underlying premise of Washington's argument: that east-west trade could be manipulated for political and strategic purposes. The China differential was formally rejected by most of America's allies in 1957, and Chinese trade with West Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom increased by 338 per cent, 95 per cent, 214 per cent, and 153 per cent respectively from 1956 to 1958.

Commercial negotiations with the Chinese are conducted according to a set of rules. They are part of a large and fairly complex system which handles all China's external trading relations. The foreign businessman must have a general understanding of this system and in particular the part of it that applies to him. Above all he must realise there are virtually no short cuts and what is popularly called “the inside track,” despite some rumours to the contrary, does not exist.

It is hardly a secret that in the PRC the lack of educational opportunities beyond the secondary level has reached an acute stage due to severe shortages of facilities and instructors. While great strides have been made in the last three decades in advancing literacy and developing the educational system, the tertiary level has expanded the least in comparison. The resulting bottleneck could have dire effects, given the social consequences of creating unattainable expectations among middle school graduates.

When in 1931 the late Arthur W. Hummel published his annotated translation of Gu Jiegang's Preface to the Gushi-bian, only the first two volumes of this opus magnum in modern Chinese historiography had appeared. Yet, Hummel recognized the nascent work as “an admirable introduction to the technique and temper of Chinese scholarship” of the post-May-Fourth “Chinese Renaissance” era, and its then youthful editor as an historian who, although he had never studied abroad or with a western teacher, was able to conduct such a large-scale disputation on ancient Chinese history “in the most rigorous scientific manner” owing to his “firm grasp of the best traditions of native scholarship, together with what he had learned of western methods.” Most of the leaders of the “New Culture Movement” (yet another name for the intellectual tide around May Fourth) subsequently contributed to the Gushi-bian, the spiritus rector of which Gu remained, although he had to ask colleagues for help with the editing.