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Chinese Military Modernization: The Western Arms Connection

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 February 2009

Douglas T. Stuart  and
William T. Tow
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Extract

During the period 1952–57 the United States attempted to convince other western states to maintain a “China differential” in their trade with communist states. Washington argued that special export controls should be imposed against the People's Republic of China because Beijing represented a unique threat to the west as a whole and because economic warfare would contribute to the ultimate collapse of Mao Zedong's regime. It became increasingly more difficult for the U.S. to sponsor such a policy in multilateral western forums such as COCOM (the Consultative Group-Co-ordinating Committee) during this five-year period. The opposition to the China differential was organized by Great Britain, which argued that the existing system of joint export controls could not be maintained if members attempted to distinguish between communist states on political grounds. Great Britain also questioned the underlying premise of Washington's argument: that east-west trade could be manipulated for political and strategic purposes. The China differential was formally rejected by most of America's allies in 1957, and Chinese trade with West Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom increased by 338 per cent, 95 per cent, 214 per cent, and 153 per cent respectively from 1956 to 1958.

Type
Research Article
Information
The China Quarterly , Volume 90 , June 1982 , pp. 253 - 270
Copyright
Copyright © The China Quarterly 1982

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References

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11. On 20 September 1981, China launched three satellites into orbit which were probably designed to test China's ability to detect and analyse missile firings from satellite observations. Sophisticated computer technology acquired from the United States or other western sources over the next two to three years could help the PRC to acquire continuous tracking coverage of the whole Soviet Union as well as the Indian and Pacific Ocean areas where Soviet submarines are stationed. See the International Herald Tribune, 21 09 1981, p. 1.Google Scholar

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13. As reported by Gelb, Leslie H., “U.S. studies role of arms in relations with China,” International Herald Tribune, 6/7 06 1981, p. 1.Google Scholar

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*Ed. Note: Marconi Avionics has announced the signing of a contract worth £14m. for the sale of electronic equipment to China. (The Observer, 28 03, 1982, p. 4)Google Scholar

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30. One such mission was led by Osamu Nagano, advisor to Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries who subsequently reponed that the Chinese were eager to import Western application satellite technology. See The Japan Economic Journal, 11 12 1979.Google Scholar

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32. Estimates cited in China News Analysis (Hong Kong), No. 1203 (27 03 1981), pp. 1–2.Google Scholar

33. For background on China's economic problems which has led to its development programmes retraction, see excerpts from an address delivered by Vice Minister of Foreign Trade Jia Shi in Brussels before a conference of European Economic Community officials in Economic Reporter (Hong Kong), No. 4, (04 1981), pp. 13–15Google Scholar. Also reports in Xinhua, 9 07 1981Google Scholar; Newsweek, 16 11 1981, p. 39Google Scholar, and Walker, Tony's concise outline of austerity measures appearing in the Financial Times, 2 03 1981, p. 1Google Scholar. For reports on China's natural disasters' economic impact on its economy, consult the International Herald Tribune, 27 04 1981, p. 2Google Scholar; the Financial Times, 6 05 1981, p. 1Google Scholar; and esp. Marshall, June's report in the Bangkok Post, 25 09 1981, p. 8.Google Scholar

34. During 1980, a reported 400,000 rear service troops out of a total manpower of some 3·6 million were demobilized. “Seems the PLA Has Got Over Its Morale Crisis,” Far Eastern Economic Review 113, No. 40 (25 09 1981), p. 55Google Scholar. In late September 1981, Deng Xiaoping and his chief of staff for the PLA, Yang Dezhi, commanded one of the largest PLA war games since the communist regime came to power involving up to 200,000 troops and held to demonstrate that military modernization requires not only sophisticated weapons but different strategic concepts and operational tactics than those employed by the PLA under Mao Zedong and used with questionable results during the February 1979 Sino-Vietnamese conflict. For extensive reports, see The Japan Times, 28 09 1981, p. 1Google Scholar and the International Herald Tribune, 28 09 1981, p. 7.Google Scholar

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46. See the Mershon Centre Quarterly Report, U.S. Military Sales and Technology Transfers to China: The Policy Implications (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, Spring 1981), pp. 4–5Google Scholar. According to one estimate, the overall cost for a major PRC modernization campaign would be in the area of $300 billion, Buchan, David and MacDougall, Colina, “How the U.S. could rearm Peking's military machine,” Financial Times, 23 06 1981, p. 4.Google Scholar

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55. See statements by Presidential Adviser Ray Cline in Asiaweek, 6, No. 49 (12 12 1980)Google Scholar prior to Reagan's inauguration, and more recent comments by White House spokesman Larry Speakes in The Asian Wall Street Journal, Friday, 24 07 1981, p. 4.Google Scholar

56. Beijing Review, No. 25, 22 06 1981, pp. 11–12.Google Scholar

57. Whymant, Robert, “China steps up its advances toward an unwilling Taiwan,” The Guardian, 1 06 1981.Google Scholar

58. Carson, John, “The American trade embargo,” p. 66Google Scholar, and International Herald Tribune, 9 11 1981, p. 1Google Scholar. A more complete account of the Siberian pipeline deal is presented in the Financial Times, 16 12 1980, p. 18.Google Scholar

59. This opinion was evident during author interviews at the German Foreign Ministry in Bonn on 28 September 1981.

60. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Technology and East-West Trade (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1979)Google Scholar; see also, McIntyre, John and Cupitt, Richard, “East-west strategic trade control: crumbling consensus?,” Survey, Vol. 25, No. 2 (111), Spring 1980, pp. 81–108Google Scholar and Yergin, Angela Stent, East-West Technology Transfer: European Perspectives, The Washington Papers, No. 75 (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1980)Google Scholar. Based upon extensive interviewing and research in Germany, Great Britain, and France, Yergin concludes that “COCOM must continue to treat all Communist countries more or less equally … lessening the degree of export controls over trade with Peking … will cause dissension within the organization.” Ibid., pp. 84–85.

61. The risk of COCOM “collapsing of its own weight” is discussed by Graham Allison in testimony before the House Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade (Washington, D.D.: USGPO, 1976), p. 46; cited in McIntyre, and Cupitt, , op. cit. p. 108.Google Scholar

62. For a typical Soviet warning to West European states on playing the China Arms Card, see Yurkov, S., “China and Western Europe,” Far Eastern Affairs, No. 4 (1979), pp. 94–95, 87.Google Scholar

* The authors are grateful to Dr. David Lampton for his comments regarding the prospects for basing, training and intelligence sharing arrangements.