Between 1964 and 1971 China carried out a massive programme of investment in the remote regions of south-western and western China. This development programme – called “the Third Front” – envisaged the creation of a huge self-sufficient industrial base area to serve as a strategic reserve in the event of China being drawn into war. Reflecting its primarily military orientation, the programme was considered top secret for many years; recent Chinese articles have discussed the huge costs and legacy of problems associated with the programme, but these discussions have been oblique and anecdotal, and no systematic appraisal has ever been published.2 Since Chinese analysts have avoided discussion of the Third Front, western accounts of China's development have also given it inadequate emphasis, and it has not been incorporated into our understanding of China during the 1960s and 1970s. It is common to assume that the “Cultural Revolution decade” was dominated by domestic political conflict, and characterized by an economic system made dysfunctional by excessive politicization, fragmented control, and an emphasis on small-scale locally self-sufficient development. The Third Front, however, was a purposive, large-scale, centrally-directed programme of development carried out in response to a perceived external threat with the broad support of China's national leaders. Moreover, this programme was immensely costly, having a negative impact on China's economic development that was certainly more far-reaching than the disruption of the Cultural Revolution.

A recent body of literature with the paradigm of market preserving federalism at its core contends that China is a de facto federalist state. With the autonomy and tax rights of local governments entrenched in the reform era, local governments have allegedly become decentralized engines of growth. Scrutinizing the underlying premises of the above paradigm, this article arrives at a picture of China's local governments as less autonomous and the system of vertical bureaucratic control as more potent than that painted by the above paradigm. Emerging from our findings is an alternative interpretation of China's central–local fiscal relations that may help us understand such recent phenomena as the proliferation of arbitrary charges.

China's recent upsurge in graduate unemployment has specific causes relating to economic development, education policy-making, and reforms in the economy as well as in higher education. With a focus on graduate unemployment, this study looks at the historical and socio-economic conditions for China's move to raise the level of participation in higher education, the rationale behind the 1999 decision to accelerate the pace of expansion in the tertiary education sector, and the impact of this rapid expansion on society, and on graduate employment in particular. Martin Trow's theory is adopted as a theoretical framework within which the dilemmas and challenges of China's mass higher education movement are analysed. Through examining the relationship between the development of higher education and economic growth, this report questions whether China's higher education sector should have expanded and continue to expand on such a large scale.

Until the Cultural Revolution, the predominant western view of contemporary Chinese elite conflict was that it consisted of “discussion” (t'ao-lun) within a basically consensual Politburo among shifting “opinion groups” with no “organized force” behind them. The purges and accusations which began in 1965 and apparently still continue, have shaken this interpretation, and a number of scholars have advanced new analyses - sometimes explicit, sometimes implicit, sometimes of general application, sometimes applied only to a particular time span or segment of the political system. Of these new views, perhaps the most systematic - and at the same time the one which represents the least change from the pre-Cultural Revolution “opinion group” model - is the “policy making under Mao” interpretation, which sees conflict as essentially a bureaucratic decision-making process dominated by Mao.

The all-embracing discourse of population quality (suzhi) is put to work through rural primary schools in ways that help state institutions implement policies such as accelerating demographic transition, restructuring the education system, professionalizing labour markets, promoting agricultural skills training, instituting economic liberalism and carrying out patriotic education. Suzhi discourse facilitates policy implementation in four ways. First, it imbues disparate policies with seeming coherence. Secondly, by articulating a diverse set of policies through suzhi discourse, including state retreat from welfare provisioning, state institutions can be seen to be working to improve people's well-being. Thirdly, in making people responsible for raising their own quality, the need to improve suzhi is an explanation and a prescription when individuals are adversely affected by policies. Finally, suzhi discourse encourages individuals to regulate their conduct in accordance with the political drift of society. By enfolding suzhi norms into identity formation, the education system shapes each individual's ongoing process of “becoming” in ways that parallel the nation's modernization, thereby reducing the costs of policy enforcement.

The first comprehensive effort to estimate household income and its distribution in China according to standard international definitions was made for the year 1988 by an international group of economists working with members of the host institution, the Economics Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). The sample survey designed by this team produced estimates of household income that were substantially different from those of the State Statistical Bureau (SSB), based on its annual surveys, with different implications for both the average standard of living and the degree of inequality of income distribution. The study, first reported in the pages of this journal in December 1992, found that per capita household income was both substantially higher and more unequally distributed than suggested by the SSB estimates. It also provided insights into sources of inequality in China that were unobtainable from the published official data on income and its distribution.

One of the striking outcomes of China's economic reforms is the emergence of inter-regional labour markets as rural workers have poured into the nation's urban and rural economies. Policy makers in China, as elsewhere in the world, have treated the inter-regional migrant labour force with ambiguity. Migration may increase efficiency, contribute to poverty reduction and make China's economy more competitive, but leaders fear the congestion, social unrest and loss of political control which might accompany an increasingly mobile labour force.

This article analyses China's recent attempts to counter “local protectionism” and establish standardization in policy implementation and enforcement by centralizing a growing number of its regulatory bureaucracies up to the provincial level (what I refer to as “soft” centralization). In this article, I argue that Beijing's experiment with soft centralization, while successful to some extent, has nevertheless fallen short of its goals and that thus far this transformation remains imperfect and incomplete. The institutional cleavages and fragmentation that so often give rise to corruption and other pathologies of the state appear to have shifted from horizontal, geographic lines to vertical, functional ones. Moreover, the principal beneficiaries of this shift to centralized management are the provinces, not Beijing, as the institutional mechanisms of personnel and budgetary resource allocations are concentrated at the provincial level. Although this has curbed localism to a degree by transferring power from local governments to the newly centralized bureaucracies, it has also contributed to a situation in which newly strengthened provinces may play a key role in the emergence of a sort of perverse federalism.

This article examines the rationale behind municipal and local governments' pursuance of urbanization, and the political and socio-economic implications of the policy to move villagers from their farmland into apartment blocks in high-density resettlement areas, or “concentrated villages.” It provides evidence of an increasing reliance by municipal and local governments on land revenues and the financing of urban infrastructure by the governments' land-leasing income. Following their relocation to apartment blocks, villagers complain that their incomes fall but their expenditures rise. Moreover, although they cede rights to the use of their farmland to the government, they are not given access to the state-provided social welfare to which urban residents are entitled. The paltry compensation which they receive for their land is insufficient to sustain them. Displaced or landless peasants are emerging as a distinctly disadvantaged societal group, deprived of the long-term security of either farmland or social welfare. The question of whether or not rural land rights should be freely traded is not as crucial to the future livelihoods of landless peasants as allowing them access to the full range of social welfare afforded to urban residents.

Post-Mao politics in the People's Republic of China has been largely the politics of reform. Probably crucial to the success of all other reforms is the major effort to restore and develop the Party's cadre management system. Indeed, this very argument is reflected in the recent official appreciation in China of Stalin's dictum “cadres decide everything,” accompanying the recognition that the current modernization drive requires massive qualitative elite transformation and that deficiencies in the cadre system have prevented such a transformation.

This article outlines the latest reforms of China's hukou system in 1997–2002 and reports the system's functional changes and continuities. Today's hukou system still performs two leading functions: the widely discussed internal migration control with reformed mechanisms and the previously scarcely examined socio-political management of the targeted people (zhongdian renkou). An adapted and adjusted hukou system is expected to continue as a key component of China's institutional framework, playing a crucial role to determine socio-political stability, facilitate a rapid but uneven economic growth, and shape socio-economic stratification and spatial inequality in the PRC.

In China during the reform period, the multitude of conflicts between the state or its agents and peasants has become a serious concern for the Chinese government. A fundamental reason for these conflicts is the fact that peasants' basic economic or political interests have been threatened or ignored. Using the case of non-agricultural use of farmland, this study seeks to explain why the peasants' lack of resistive power appears institutionalized in China. The use of rural land often gives rise to conflicts because peasants are usually under-compensated for their land. Facing the encroachment of their interests, peasants may take ex ante preventive action and ex post measures. While ex ante action is more effective, it is not always feasible because it needs the organizing of village cadres. Hence, peasants are weak because usually action can only be taken ex post, which, more often than not, is ineffective because of the political arrangements through which the state, peasants and cadres interact.

The year 1985 marks the 20th anniversary of the publication in The China Quarterly of Ezra F. Vogel's classic article, “From friendship to comradeship: the change in personal relations in communist China.” The present article examines personal relations in China in the wake of the intervening two decades of Cultural Revolution (CR) and modernizing reforms. I will describe the major dimensions of personal relations in 1985 and offer a sociological explanation for them. My argument is that these relationships represent a re-emergence of certain traditional patterns as reshaped by both the CR and the current restructuring of state-society relations.

While it was traditionally accepted that Hongkongers shared a form of pan-Chinese cultural identification that did not contradict their local distinctiveness, over the last decade Hong Kong has seen the rise of new types of local identity discourses. Most recently, “localists” have been a vocal presence. Hong Kong has – quite unexpectedly – developed a strong claim for self-determination. But how new is “localism” with respect to the more traditional “Hong Kong identity” that appeared in the 1970s? The present study takes a two-dimensional approach to study these discourses, examining not only their framework of identification (local versus pan-Chinese) but also their mode of identification (ethno-cultural versus civic). Using three case studies, the June Fourth vigil, the 2012 anti-National Education protest and the 2014 Umbrella movement, it distinguishes between groups advocating civic identification with the local community (Scholarism, HKFS) and others highlighting ethnic identification (Chin Wan). It argues that while local and national identification were traditionally not incompatible, the civic-based identification with a local democratic community, as advocated by most participants in recent movements, is becoming increasingly incompatible with the ethnic and cultural definition of the Chinese nation that is now being promoted by the Beijing government.

This paper argues that the low-income housing programme in China has so far failed to provide adequate housing for the poor for three main reasons: the central government's failure to define a clear mission; a lack of commitment from local governments; and an exclusionary policy towards migrants. A systematic review of low-income housing policy in China shows that the central government juggles its economic and socio-political goals thereby causing constant changes in low-income housing policy. Meanwhile, the existing public finance system, the performance evaluation system and localization in policy implementation have all resulted in a lack of commitment from local governments to low-income housing. Inadequate provision is made worse by problems with allocation. Despite encouraging changes since 2010, many factors underlying the government's failures remain unchanged, thus the fate of low-income housing remains uncertain.

When residents of a few Guangxi villages decided to elect their own leaders in late 1980 and early 1981, none of them could have known they were starting a historic reform. What began as a stopgap effort to fill a political vacuum, after much debate and two decades of uneven implementation, is now enshrined in a national law. Procedures for holding elections have been spelled out and implementing regulations are being formulated at all levels. Voting is now mandatory every three years in every village, bar none.

This article examines the regulation of religion in China, in the context of changing social expectations and resulting dilemmas of regime legitimacy. The post-Mao government has permitted limited freedom of religious belief, subject to legal and regulatory restrictions on religious behaviour. However, this distinction between belief and behaviour poses challenges for the regime's efforts to maintain political control while preserving an image of tolerance aimed at building legitimacy. By examining the regulation of religion in the context of patterns of compliance and resistance in religious conduct, the article attempts to explain how efforts to control religion raise challenges for regime legitimacy.

Chinese official union's reactions to labour contentions can be explained by its double institutional identity as both a state apparatus and the labour organization. Before the reform, the union did not confront tense conflicts between its double identity, as its representation function was absorbed by the paternalist state. As the state retreats from socialist paternalism, the union finds that its double identity becomes contradictory. What role the union is apt to play in any particular dispute issue is determined by whether and to what extent its double institutional identity is in conflict. Specifically, three patterns of the union's roles can be identified: representing, mediating and pre-empting. State corporatism remains the fundamental institutional parameter that shapes the union's behaviour. A combination of state corporatism binding the union and rampant capitalist assaults on workers tends either to produce more spontaneous protests or to force workers to seek independent organizing outside the ACFTU framework.

This article examines one of the pre-eminent logics of global capital flow – the pursuit of flexible labour regimes – as a window to explore the interaction between Chinese investments and African communities. It analyses the respective “politics of casualization” in the Chambishi mine on the Zambian Copperbelt and the Tanzania–China Friendship Mill in the port city of Dar es Salaam. Both Zambian and Tanzanian workers have witnessed and resisted precipitous “informalization” of employment since the Chinese assumed full or majority ownership in the late 1990s. Wildcat strikes were staged by workers in both cases. Nevertheless, Zambian copper miners, but not Tanzanian textile workers, seem to have successfully halted this tendency of casualization. After several years of struggle, in 2007 they signed new collective agreements with the Chinese management, who agreed gradually to convert all casual and contract jobs into “permanent” pensionable ones. By explaining the divergent outcomes of these two cases of labour resistance, I hope to identify the major factors shaping the encounter between Chinese managers and African workers.

The campaign to Open Up the West that started in 2000 has been presented as a major state project of nation-building directed at the interior provincial-level jurisdictions in order to encourage endogenous economic growth, to reduce socio-economic inequalities, and to ensure social and political stability in non-Han areas of the PRC. Despite appearances to the contrary it is more of an adjustment to the PRC's regional development policy than a radical change, not least because of debate and imprecision about its goals, processes and finance. Its impact is perhaps best viewed from provincial and local perspectives. These stress not only the importance of the west's varied social and economic ecology, but also the significance of the sub-provincial as a focus for analysis.