Despite much attention, aboriginal governments in Canada have not yet been the focus of comprehensive, sustained and focussed research on the part of the academic and aboriginal communities. In this article 14 areas which require study are cited under three major headings: aboriginal communities and their governments, the components of governance and the wider policy environment. These clusters of research subjects are related in a systematic fashion. A selection of the literature is placed in context and practical suggestions for fostering co-operative approaches to research are suggested. Throughout, it is argued that a critical focus for such efforts on the part of political scientists, other scholars and analysts should be placed on the needs, experiences and goals of aboriginal peoples and their governments.

Three concerns have motivated scholars to examine what is often called the “dilemma” between sexual equality and cultural autonomy. First, by far the majority of the world's women fail to enjoy the legal , political, social and economic status enjoyed by men and, moreover, one of the main explanations for their relatively deprived state is found in the cultural traditions and practices that govern their lives . Second, even though sexism is ubiquitous, the existence of gender inequality within minority groups renders vulnerable the claims of groups to cultural autonomy, especially claims made by groups that are marginalized or fragile. And, third, all scholars who tread in this mine field of issues must come to terms with the most vexing methodological challenges in the social sciences and humanities, namely how to avoid the excesses of, on the one hand, universalism and essentialism and, on the other hand, relativism and social constructivism. Feminist theory provides one of the most interesting and lively venues for the exploration of these challenges, and the debates seem to reach a particularly intriguing pitch when the putative conflict between gender and culture is discussed.

Le français en Amérique du Nord: état présent, Sous la direction de Albert Valdman, Julie Auger et Deborah Piston-Hatlen, Québec : Presses de l'Université Laval, 2005, 583 p.

Ce volume est le résultat du colloque “ Le français aux États-Unis ”, organisé à la suite de plusieurs initiatives du Programme de linguistique française d'Indiana University dans le domaine de l'étude du français hors de France et des créoles à base lexicale française.

As a recent instance of transnational cooperation and governance, encompassing a novel combination of international and supranational legal properties, the International Criminal Court provides an instructive forum for considering increasingly complex sovereignty. This paper considers why Canada and the United States have pursued such divergent policies toward the Court. I argue that these postures are informed by their subjective conceptions of state sovereignty, a reflection of varying interests, values and capacities. As such, this case study illuminates factors that may influence patterns and limitations of transnational cooperation by states.

Résumé. Avec une méthodologie double, nous portons notre attention sur un groupe très peu étudié : les jeunes non-engagés. Grâce à des entrevues, nous distinguons quatre types de non-engagés: les critiques, ceux qui manquent de ressources politiques, les occupés, et ceux en attente de mobilisation. Les critiques ne représentent qu'une minorité des non-engagés, alors que les jeunes manquant de ressources sont plus nombreux. Cette étude démontre qu'une grande proportion de jeunes présente un potentiel d'engagement futur et que c'est principalement des barrières temporaires qui réduisent leur niveau d'engagement. L'analyse quantitative dévoile des variations d'attitudes, de profils démographiques et de volontés d'engagement entre types de non-engagés. Les non-engagés ne sont donc pas un groupe homogène.

Abstract. With a two-pronged methodology, this article takes a closer look at an understudied group: the disengaged youth. Using interviews, we discern four different types within this disengaged group: the criticals, those lacking political resources, the busy and those waiting for mobilization. The ‘criticals’ constitute only a minority of the disengaged group, while the young people who lack political resources are more common. Most importantly, a great proportion of young people show a certain potential for engagement. The quantitative analysis reveals that these types resemble distinct attitudinal and demographic profiles, and differ in their future willingness to participate. Thus the non-engaged are not a monolithic group.

Résumé. L'apparence des politiciens, leur représentation visuelle pendant un débat télévisé a-t-elle un impact sur l'évaluation que font d'eux les électeurs? Le contexte d'écoute joue-t-il sur l'identification du gagnant de la confrontation? Le niveau de sophistication politique et la fermeté de l'identité partisane de l'électeur limitent-ils l'effet de la représentation visuelle des politiciens dans son évaluation de leurs performances oratoires? S'inspirant du débat théorique qui secoue la discipline depuis la diffusion du premier débat Kennedy-Nixon en 1960, cet article présente les données tirées d'une expérience menée auprès d'électeurs québécois lors de la diffusion du débat francophone de l'élection fédérale canadienne de 2000. L'analyse démontre que la représentation visuelle des politiciens et le contexte d'écoute du débat amènent les participants à évaluer différemment la performance des politiciens et agissent également sur la capacité des électeurs à identifier clairement le vainqueur du débat télévisé. Les données indiquent de plus que la fermeté de l'identité partisane agit comme rempart aux effets de la représentation visuelle sur l'évaluation des politiciens par les téléspectateurs, alors que le niveau de sophistication des électeurs, contrairement aux attentes théoriques, ne joue pas ce rôle. Tout comme le contenu de leurs interventions verbales, les composantes de la représentation visuelle des acteurs politiques représentent des pistes d'information qui alimentent également la réflexion des électeurs lors de l'écoute d'un débat télévisé.

Abstract. Does a politician's appearance, visual representation, during a televised debate influence voters' evaluations of her performance? Does the listening context of the debate impact a voter's capacity to identify a clear winner? Are political sophistication and partisanship strong barriers to the potential effects of politicians' images on voters' evaluations of their performance? Adding a Canadian perspective to the ongoing theoretical debate on the actual impact of leaders' visual representation in televised debates on voter preferences, launched in 1960 by preliminary assesments of the first Kennedy-Nixon debate, this article presents data collected during an experiment conducted with a sample of Québec voters during the broadcast of the French language leaders' debate of the 2000 Canadian federal election. The study shows that the leaders' visual representation during the debate and the listening context of the event bring voters to evaluate politicians participating in the broadcast differently and play on voters' capacity to easily identify a clear winner of the televised confrontation. Furthermore, our analysis indicates that partisanship is a strong barrier to the effect of visual representation in voters' evaluations of the leaders but that political sophistication, contrary to theoretical expectations, is not. Like verbal arguments brought forward by the politicians in a televised debate, their visual representation also carries information cues that help define voters' evaluations of the leaders participating in the broadcast.

Disaffection of youth from politics is a well-documented phenomenon in many countries. In this article, we consider whether the social networks of young people have the same influence on political engagement as they have been found to have for older adults. We use a single dataset to test the effects of discussion and disagreement on the political engagement of young people (30 and under) and older adults. We find that social network discussion has a stronger effect on the engagement of young people but that disagreement has no clear differential effect.

We present the results of a 2014 survey of Canadian parliamentarians, journalists and bloggers in which respondents were asked to rank competing definitions of open government. Overall, respondents preferred to define open government in terms of access to information and sources. However, controlling for age, ideology and language, we also found that respondents in the different positions ranked definitions of open government differently. Journalists are more likely than any other group to define open government in terms of access to information and sources. In contrast, parliamentarians who were members of a governing party were as likely to choose definitions of open government that emphasized public participation as they were to choose definitions that emphasized access to information. Opposition parliamentarians share more similarities with government parliamentarians than with journalists. These results suggest that key actors in the Canadian policy landscape define open government in ways that are consistent with their institutional interests. We suggest that these results reflect ways in which open government operates more like a buzzword, which helps explain the common pattern whereby opposition parties make promises to be more open and, after taking power, operate in less open ways. Moreover, these results raise questions about the extent to which open government can actually operate as an organizing principle.

Environment and heredity affect the development of the nation as much as they affect the development of the individual; and Canadian history is written, for the most part, around the conflicting forces of British inheritance and American propinquity. An excellent example of the latter is found in the low condition of Canadian political morality which was most conspicuous during the first fifty years of responsible government. While this was unmistakably national in many of its manifestations, its rise and continuance were due in no small measure to the proximity of the United States; and the temptation for the Canadian politician to emulate in a modest way the methods of a Tweed, a Croker, or a Philadelphia Gas Ring, proved in a deplorable number of instances to be irresistible. The prevalence of bribery at elections (particularly before the introduction of the ballot in 1874), the strengthening of the party position by the award of contracts and the appointment of supporters to office, the series of questionable “deals” and practices of which the Pacific Scandal was the most notorious—these were evidences of native sins which had received American inspiration and encouragement and which corrupted extensively Canadian political life.

Contemporary political science is increasingly interested in the problem of empirical measurement and at various times researchers need scales to measure political attitudes and behaviour. In this process the Canadian political scientist is faced with two alternatives: (1) he can develop new scales, or (2) he can use existing measures from the literature which in most cases mean using scales empirically developed and used in the United States.

Montesquieu may be a better guide to understanding the nature of the Canadian state, past and present, than Hobbes or Locke of any of the other political philosophers of the past. This article argues that Montesquieu's doctrine has two major components–a discussion of the mixed constitution, blending monarchical, aristocratic and democratic features, and the separation of powers that distinguishes among executive, legislative and judicial. Each of these components can be used to illuminate the operation of state power at the central level in this country, the first the long period between 1867 and the Second World War, the second the post-Second World War period, and more especially the situation that has arisen with the passage of the Constitution Act, 1982.

It is far from easy to decide, at any given moment, whether the state of a particular branch of intellectual inquiry is to be described as healthy or unhealthy, as full of promise or stagnant and moribund. The criteria of advance are not clear and personal bias may distort judgment. Development seems to take place not in a smooth upward trend but in a series of discontinuous steps. What seems at first sight to be a period of inactivity or even decline may on a longer view turn out to be merely a necessary pause preparatory to further growth. Anyone undertaking to appraise the present state of an intellectual discipline such as economic history must therefore be aware that his task is a hazardous one.

There is no scarcity of evidence to suggest that economic history is at present in critical condition, at least in the United States. Traditionally tied to both history and economics and called upon to meet the expectations of each, it has always led a somewhat precarious existence. At least since the First World War its relationship to economic theory, always debatable, has become tenuous, until today it is a common experience to find in the same university department economic historians who know little economic theory and find no use for what they do know, and economic theorists who know little history and have no interest in learning more. This alienation has proceeded far beyond the normal differences of emphasis that might be expected to exist between specialists in the inductive and the deductive methods. Economic theory today, in most of its branches, neither draws on economic history for its data nor goes to economic history for empirical verification. Economic history, for its part, commonly uses only the crudest of the tools in the economist's tool-box, and displays almost complete indifference to the refinements in analytical methods that occupy the theorist's working time. The consequences of this divorce have been unfortunate for economic history. Some would say they have been unfortunate for economic theory also.

This article offers one possible answer to the question “What is the future of feminist political science?” by outlining and defending an expansionist agenda that is centred on challenging the male-female binary that has been upheld and replicated in the discipline to date. Such an approach draws heavily on the insights of intersectional analyses, transgender, queer and gender-fluid articulations of identity and requires that the field of political science investigate the varied and complex gendered experiences of “men.” Overall, this article argues that such as expansionist agenda is key to responding to the interrelated challenges presented by the perceived “crisis” of feminism and the ongoing “masculinity” of the discipline of political science.

There is little doubt that the Bank of Canada and Canadian monetary policy have been subjected to more public criticism since 1954 than at any other time since the Bank began operations in 1935. The force and the persistence of the criticism may in part be explained by a coincidence of events which included a move toward severe monetary restraint, a change of governor at the Bank of Canada, two national elections, and a change in government. Public criticism has for the most part concerned itself with the degree of monetary restraint or monetary ease in the economy generally and in specific sectors, with the timing of changes in policy and with the appropriateness of policy in the light of economic conditions. This paper will let those matters rest. Rather it will try to determine whether in a more fundamental sense the Bank's operations are in some respects open to criticism.

There would appear to be four important aspects to the Bank of Canada's approach to central banking: the Bank's interpretation of its role in the allocation of capital; its conception of the mechanism by which monetary policy becomes effective and of the bounds within which monetary management must operate; its method of making quantitative monetary controls more effective; and its emphasis on the use of moral suasion. The third section will include an examination of the new Bank Rate.

Monopolistic firms pay higher wages than competitive firms, according to J. W. Garbarino and J. K. Galbraith. Some writers believe that monopolistic firms balance the interests of employees, consumers, suppliers, and stockholders rather than maximize profits, a belief which suggests that they are generous employers rather than competitive firms who must strive for high profits. A few economists, in the taxonomic tradition, have suggested the possibility of high wages under monopoly, without expressing any opinion on the matter. The usual belief that monopolists take from the poor and give to the rich thus may be wrong. A finding that monopolists pay high wages also would imply that, for them, profit maximization takes second place to goals associated with public responsibility.

In the main stream of neo-classical theory is the opposite view that wages are low under monopoly. The exposition by Mrs. Joan Robinson assumes an upward-sloping supply curve of labour not only to each industry but also to each firm. Labour economists in recent years have followed Mrs. Robinson in stressing the prevalence of monopsony. It may be shown that product monopolists are likely to have more monopsony power than competitive firms, so, according to neo-classical theory, monopolists transfer income from the poor to the rich through low wages as well as through high prices.

I propose to test the proposition that monopoly raises wages and the opposite—that it lowers them—by comparing average annual earnings in Canadian monopolistic industries with those in matched United States industries which are competitive, or less monopolistic. The theories together with the evidence on which they are based will be presented first.