The academic achievements of William Burton Hurd (894-1950) were fittingly recognized in his election to the presidency of the Canadian Political Science Association in 1949. The meetings of the Association in 1950 will be saddened by the loss of a president and weakened by the absence of his presidential address.

He was a casualty of the turmoil of this century. Born in Brockville, a graduate of the University of Manitoba in 1913, he enlisted in spite of ill health for service in the First World War. He became an officer in the 52nd Battalion in 1915-16, in the 9th Brigade in 1916-17, and senior Y.M.C.A. officer in the second division and adjutant of the Khaki University in France in 1918-19. His services were recognized by being twice mentioned in despatches and an award of the O.B.E. (Military Division).

After the Armistice, he was appointed a Rhodes Scholar and, studying at Queens College, Oxford, took his bachelor’s degree in 1921. On his return to Canada he became professor of political economy in Brandon College in 1921 and dean of arts in 1928. It would not be too much to say that his efforts, linked to those of President Evans, kept Brandon College alive during the depression years but at a heavy cost to the health of both of them. Toward the end of the depression in 1935 he was appointed to the staff of political economy in McMaster University, an obvious promotion since at that time examinations in Brandon College were conducted by the staff of McMaster University and degrees were conferred by the latter institution. His interest in students was again recognized by his appointment as associate dean of arts in 1939. In 1946 he followed Professor H. Michell as head of the department of political economy.

Fishermen’s organizations in British Columbia present an interesting and in many ways unique case study of unionism among a distinct occupational group. The peculiar economic and social factors which have conditioned their growth were examined at some length in a previous article. A brief recapitulation may be in order at this point, as a background to the more factual history that follows.

Unionism among the fishermen of British Columbia has experienced an intense and diversified organizational growth, accompanied by frequent and at times violent industrial disputes. As may be seen from Tables I and II below, there have been at least thirty different fishermen’s organizations formed at one time or another since 1893, and members of these, as well as numerous non-union fishermen, have engaged in more than forty strikes. The fishing industry of British Columbia today is highly organized, and industrial relations are relatively stable and harmonious. The majority of fishermen now belong to one union that has collective bargaining jurisdiction over all major branches of the industry. Most of the non-union fishermen (as well as a considerable number of union members) belong to processing and marketing co-operatives.

Yet it would be difficult to imagine an occupational group less amenable to unionism. Strictly speaking, most fishermen in British Columbia are not employees or “workers” in the usual sense of the term. They are proprietors who own and operate their own capital, that is, their boats and gear. Their occupation is by nature highly migratory, individualistic, and competitive, as it is carried on in many scattered operations along thousands of miles of rugged coastline. Their employment and income are very insecure by reason of the characteristically extreme seasonal and cyclical fluctuations in the supply, demand, and prices of fish.

More than three years ago, Professor H. F. Angus published an article entitled: “The Canadian Constitution and the United Nations Charter.” In it he sought to show that the Canadian constitution, which provides for a division of legislative powers between the federal government and the governments of the provinces, will hamper the Dominion in its conduct of foreign affairs in the post-war world. In particular, he predicted that existing constitutional arrangements will obstruct Canada from fulfilling in a responsible manner certain international obligations incurred under the Charter of the United Nations. The immediate causes of this situation are threefold: the assignation by the British North America Act of topics with which international legislation may be concerned to the exclusive jurisdiction of provincial legislatures; the obsolescence of Section 132 of that Act, which governs the treaty-making powers of the Dominion government; and the juridical opinions on the ability of the Dominion government to implement international legislation which were handed down by the Privy Council and which, with the exception of the war years, have governed the situation ever since. One other factor serves to aggravate the problem: the growing importance of international legislation since 1945. Social and economic problems, no longer local or even national in scope, are now of international importance, and require international action for their solution. The recognition by the nations of the world of this fact and its implications is in part indicated by their decision to create the United Nations, its commissions, sub-commissions and affiliated agencies. It is more imperative today than ever before that members of the United Nations be both ready and able to ratify international legislation which the world organization promulgates. Canada may be ready, but she is certainly not able, to provide such implementation.

In this paper, the peculiar pattern of the 1921-9 Canadian upswing of activity is examined and its major domestic determinants indicated. In addition, various factors are examined to ascertain their relative significance in determining the size of these domestic determinants. External determinants are not discussed in this paper.

The Canadian upswing from 1921 to 1929, generally speaking, was relatively sharp. By the latter year gross national product had risen 46.9 per cent over the 1921 level; net national income increased 50.4 per cent in the same period. Despite the relatively great strength of the initial expansionary forces, however, the expansion in the years 1923 and 1924 was relatively slow. Gross national product in real terms had risen 16.9 per cent from 1921 to 1922; by 1924 it had only risen 25.9 per cent above the 1921 level. By 1929 gross national product in real terms was 34.8 per cent above the 1924 level. Generally speaking, before 1925 the development proceeded gradually; from 1925 on more violence is evidenced. Hence the problem arises of explaining this peculiar pattern of the Canadian upswing and particularly its failure to continue at its original speedy rate.

Canadian incomes rose at a relatively fast pace in 1922 mainly because of increased investment activity. The theory of the multiplier and acceleration principle would lead us to expect then that as incomes rose from the increased investment, consumption would also rise and thus encourage additional investment in the consumers’ goods sector and those industries equipping this sector.

In the past year there has developed a strong campaign for a devaluation of all currencies in terms of gold, a campaign in which the narrowly self-interested arguments of the gold producers have been augmented by the arguments of those who see a rise in the world price of gold as a painless way of solving the present international monetary disequilibrium. The obvious special pleading of the former, and the ignorance or naiveté of the monetary opinions of the latter, should have been sufficient to reveal the weaknesses of the case; but surprisingly enough the arguments for a higher price of gold have been allowed to pass practically unchallenged, with the consequent danger that by sheer reiteration the advocates of the scheme will secure an unthinking acceptance of their proposals.

The writer does not deny that a rise in the world price of gold would be of some benefit not only to the gold producers, but also to the non-American world generally; obviously any measure which increases the price which America is willing to pay for imports will provide more dollars for the rest of the world economy. But it is his contention that the arguments which have so far been advanced in support of the measure are of a dubious or fallacious nature, in large part attributable to a lack of understanding of the problems involved; that the arguments over-estimate the gains and under-estimate the difficulties that would follow a rise in the price of gold; and that consequently it would be a major error of policy for the British and other European authorities to commit themselves to a request for a higher price of gold as a substitute for more fundamental international economic reforms. These contentions are substantiated by an examination of the case for increasing the world price of gold, to which the remainder of this article is devoted.