Few laymen know that the expression ‘the pleadings’ in an action denotes the written allegations of fact which each party is required to communicate to his opponent before trial, in order that each may know what contentions he will have to meet, if possible, by evidence, and that an issue, or issues, of fact or of law may emerge. This unexpected meaning comes down in direct descent from the Middle Ages, when opposing counsel strove in Court to extract an issue from the conflicting pleas (placita) submitted by them orally.

Thirteenth century.

During the earlier part of this country proof was formal and the function of the Court was to declare which of the parties must go to proof and how. In certain classes of cases proof by battle was appropriate, in others proof by oath—either the oath of the party, supported by oath-helpers, or the oath of witnesses.

Lacking both the history and the inspiration of predecessors I shall begin, as Professor Stein did, with the conversation between Goethe and Eckermann in which Goethe is said to have likened the Roman civil law to a duck; “sometimes it is visible swimming prominently on the surface of the water; at other times it is hidden diving among the depths; but always it is there”.

Until recently, it was widely accepted that a recipient of company distributions such as dividends paid in breach of the requirements of the Companies Act 1985 (“the Act”) could only be made to repay such distributions if he knew of the illegality. Whether one looked to the Act (to wit, section 277) or beyond (to the “knowing receipt”-type liability encountered in Precision Dippings Ltd. v. Precision Dippings Marketing Ltd.), liability required knowledge. In Bairstow v. Queen’s Moat House plc, however, there appears to be the faintest of suggestions that this position may be open for re-examination. This is reinforced by Lord Nicholls’ recent speech in Criterion Properties Plc v. Stratford UK Properties LLC.

One of the most useful and most-used powers that criminal courts1 have is the power to bind people over to be of good behaviour or to keep the peace. Magistrates form the view that a person (“the principal”), who might be a person of previously unblemished reputation, is likely to breach the peace or commit criminal offences. They require him to enter into a recognisance, in form a voluntary covenant or agreement, to keep the peace, or to be of good behaviour, sometimes in a set sum (say £100) for a set period. If he refuses, he can be imprisoned, regardless of the seriousness or triviality, lawfulness or unlawfulness, of the behaviour that originally brought him to court, perhaps as a witness. He may also be required to find sureties, other people who are prepared to promise that they will forfeit a sum of money (say £50 each) if their principal fails to behave. If the principal misbehaves, debts to the Crown arise of £100 from the principal and £50 from each surety. The mechanics are therefore rather similar to bail. Binding over operates today in two ways. First, it can be used after conviction for an offence as an alternative to sentence. The accused enters into a recognisance to keep the peace or be of good behaviour. If he breaches his undertaking, he can be summoned back to court to be sentenced for the original offence. Secondly, it can be used after conviction for an offence as an alternative to sentence. The accused enters into a recognisance to keep the peace or be of good behaviour. If he breaches his undertaking, he can be summoned back to court to be sentenced for the original offence. Secondly, it can be used as a preventive measure to deal with people who are before the court but have not been convicted. This latter use provides a flexible way to deal with cases arising out of disputes between neighbours and minor public order problems without the need for a full hearing. It saves time and money.

In all common law crimes, other than common nuisance, it appears that some culpable mental element, or mens rea, is required. The mental element is ‘culpable’ in the sense that the actus is only criminal when it is coupled with a realization of the probable consequences of the act or omission. In statutory offences this rule does not hold good; the actus may be prohibited in such language that a person may be liable for doing an act whether or not he did, or could, have foreseen the consequences. Such offences create what is commonly called Absolute Liability. Unfortunately our judges have used the expression mens rea in different senses. In this paper I use mens rea in its common law sense, and discuss at the end a meaning of mens rea that is now becoming common.