The article addresses the public policy issues associated with former client confidentiality and law firm mergers and, in the light of these, it examines the claim, endorsed by City firms and others, that market-based solutions, such as Chinese walls, promote the interests of the profession without imperiling the interests of justice. The House of Lords' ruling in Prince Jefri Bolkiah V. KPMG and Laddie J's interpretation of it in Young V. Robson Rhodes are analysed with the aim of assessing the impact of both decisions on the above claim and their consequences for the legal profession generally.

IN Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v Serbia), the International Court of Justice (“ICJ” or “Court”) dealt with a claim by Croatia that Serbia was responsible for the commission of genocide against ethnic Croatians in contravention of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (“the Convention”), and with Serbia's counter-claim that Croatia had committed genocide against ethnic Serbs also in breach of the Convention. In its judgment of 3 February 2015, the Court dismissed both the claim and counter-claim. While many of the acts complained of constituted the actus reus of genocide, there was no evidence that they had been perpetrated with the required mens rea, namely the intention to destroy, in whole or in part, the targeted group as such.

The doctrine of benefit and burden – an indirect method for enforcing the burden of positive freehold covenants – developed as an exception the strict Austerberry rule that the burden of positive covenants cannot bind successors directly at law. Three recent Court of Appeal cases (Davies v Jones; Wilkinson v Kerdene and Elwood v Goodman) confirm the continued existence and application of the doctrine but also reveal its deficiencies and limitations. This article explores the contemporary application of the doctrine, identifies its theoretical, historical and elemental frailty and, drawing on recent reform proposals of the Law Commission, highlights the case for reform. In so doing, this article argues that a vital theoretical issue has been overlooked in the reform debate: the numerus clausus principle.

MORTGAGE Express v Lambert [2016] EWCA Civ 555 concerned a sale and leaseback. In desperate circumstances, the naïve and vulnerable A (Ms Lambert) entered into a sale and leaseback arrangement in respect of her flat. She was paid a small proportion of the value of the flat, which was then registered in the joint names of B (the buyers). B mortgaged it without disclosing to C (the mortgagee) the leaseback arrangement to A. The mortgage was registered, but no lease was. Ultimately, B defaulted on the mortgage and C sought to sell the property. The litigation concerned whether A had a right that could bind C. The Court of Appeal held that A did not and allowed the sale to proceed.

Mary Cooper was one of thousands of investors who advanced funds to Eron Mortgage Corporation, a licensed British Columbia mortgage broker specialising in large syndicated loans. When Eron went out of business it owed the investors over $180 million more than it was able to pay. Unable to recover from Eron, the investors turned their attention to Robert Hobart, the statutory official in charge of regulating mortgage brokers. The investors alleged that Eron had used their money for unauthorised purposes such as funding interest payments on non-performing mortgages. They further alleged that Hobart had been aware of these problems, all serious violations of statute, but that he had delayed in suspending Eron’s licence and had failed to notify investors that he was investigating Eron. Cooper therefore sought to bring a class action on behalf of the investors against Hobart and the provincial government.

One can conceive of more exciting presents than a part of a debt; but a creditor is sometimes moved to make such an assignment. Suppose, for example, that he is owed £100 by X and desires to transfer the right to half of it to a friend. How can he do this?

IN Hämäläinen v Finland (Application no. 37359/09), 16 July 2014, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights held that Contracting States of the Council of Europe may require the dissolution of an existing marriage before extending the right to legal gender recognition.