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The title of this essay refers to the titles of three recent works by Professors of Jurisprudence. It is proposed to use these works to illustrate the problem of Jurisprudence in discovering its own appropriate concepts and making sense of its literature.

Jurisprudence, it may be assumed, is what Professors of Jurisprudence write. They write it presumably for the edification of students in the Faculties to which they are attached, to help them to see the coherence and the relevance of the more specialised studies in which they are engaged. These Faculties are Faculties of Law. But what is law? The diverse strange and even paradoxical ways in which this question has been answered by serious thinkers, says Professor Hart in his opening paragraph, constitute “a situation not paralleled in any other subject systematically studied as a separate academic discipline.” If we say, then, that Professors of Jurisprudence write about law, our statement may fail to convey any exact or agreed information. Even if it may correctly be assumed that Professors of Jurisprudence use the word ‘law’ to refer to their basic subject-matter, it cannot be assumed that the precise identity of this subject-matter is universally or even generally agreed. Consider some of the identifications of law quoted by Professor Hart—‘ What officials do about disputes is… the law itself’; ‘The prophecies of what the courts will do… are what I mean by the law’; Statutes are ‘sources of Law… not parts of the Law itself’; ‘Constitutional law is positive morality merely’; ‘One shall not steal; if somebody steals he shall be punished… If at all existent, the first norm is contained in the second norm which is the only genuine norm… Law is the primary norm which stipulates the sanction.’

FHR bought a long lease for €211.5 million. Cedar Capital conducted the negotiations on FHR's behalf, but also received a €10 million commission from the vendor. On becoming aware of this commission, FHR sought to recover it from Cedar Capital. As its negotiating agent, Cedar Capital owed fiduciary duties to FHR, and had not obtained FHR's fully informed consent to the commission. Cedar Capital therefore had to account to FHR for the commission. However, applying the Court of Appeal's decision in Sinclair Investments (UK) Ltd. v Versailles Trade Finance Ltd. [2011] EWCA Civ 347, [2012] Ch. 453, Simon J. held that the remedy was purely personal; FHR could not assert a proprietary constructive trust over the €10 million: FHR European Ventures LLP v Mankarious [2011] EWHC 2999 (Ch). The Court of Appeal allowed an appeal as to remedy, distinguishing the facts from those in Sinclair v Versailles, but also casting some doubt on the correctness of that decision: [2013] EWCA Civ 17, [2014] Ch. 1. The Supreme Court was thus required to pass judgment on the voluminous debate as to whether English law should follow Lister & Co. v Stubbs (1890) 45 Ch.D. 1, or Attorney-General for Hong Kong v Reid [1994] 1 A.C. 324.

The Charter Rolls of the thirteenth century are not solely concerned with Royal grants. They contain a large number of conveyances made by the King's subjects. These conveyances, or charters, owe their preservation here, as a rule, to the fact that they were submitted to the King for his inspection and confirmation. Many of them are quite complicated examples of conveyancing, replete with descriptions of the land concerned, of the estate granted, and of the services or consideration reserved by the grantor. But perhaps their most striking feature is the list of witnesses with which each charter concludes.

There is no novelty in the idea that technology presents a continuing challenge to Society in terms of the decisions which must be taken over the use and control of new developments and, indirectly, to the legal system which must acquire and apply the techniques of control desired by Society. However, there is novelty in the sheer pace at which technology is presenting this challenge to international society in relation to the exploitation of the resources of the sea. Within little more than a decade after the great U.N. Geneva Conferences on the Law of the Sea of 1958 and 1960—which introduced substantial codification—a general demand for revision of the law has led to plans for a new Conference on the Law of the Sea in 1973. The scope of the proposed conference is extremely wide and it is the purpose of this article to examine only one of the proposed topics, namely, the “international sea-bed area.” This is a topic which is currently exciting interest throughout the world, in Parliaments, Foreign Offices, Universities, learned societies, conferences, oil companies and even the popular press (the order does not indicate a hierarchy of influence). Behind this interest there lies, of course, money and—possibly a countervailing pressure—the increasing concern with the protection of the maritime environment in addition to the normal considerations of prestige, military security and national interest which condition any State's approach to questions of maritime jurisdiction. In order to appreciate the extent of this interest some brief mention should be made of the resources currently estimated to lie in or on the sea-bed outside national jurisdiction.

In Case C-453/99 Courage Ltd. v. Crehan (judgment of 20 September 2001, not yet reported), the European Court of Justice has been confronted once more with the difficult task of reconciling the effectiveness of Community rights with national rules on remedies. By virtue of a series of agreements between Inntrepreneur Estates Ltd. (IEL), a company which owned public house estates, and Courage Ltd., a brewery with a 19% share of the United Kingdom market in sales of beer, all IEL tenants were required to purchase the whole of their beer requirements exclusively from Courage Ltd. In 1993, Courage Ltd. brought an action for the recovery from Mr. Crehan, a tenant of IEL, of a sum of more than £15,000 for unpaid deliveries of beer. Mr. Crehan contended that the exclusive purchasing obligation was anti-competitive because Courage Ltd. sold its beers to independent tenants of public houses at substantially lower prices than those imposed on IEL tenants. He claimed that the beer tie was therefore contrary to Article 81(1) EC and sought damages for loss caused to him by the imposition of the beer tie. Carnwath J. dismissed the counter-claim and found in favour of Courage Ltd. (Courage Ltd. v. Crehan [1998] E.G.C.S. 171). Mr. Crehan appealed.

If Hohfeld's analysis of fundamental legal conceptions is valid it promises to afford a very simple means of confirming or refuting Maine's thesis that social progress has hitherto been from status to contract. Anthropology may elucidate the issues of human development thereby put at stake. Legal theory may corroborate or contradict the outcome of testing Maine with Hohfeld. Beyond that, however, the process of verification depends neither on empirical data nor speculative thought. Instead of social science or legal philosophy, it is the outcome of abstract logic. On this account Maine's thesis that status has hitherto given way to contract among the progressive societies is at risk of being dismissed as a logical fallacy.