In an article in the Canadian Bar Review on the recent case of Bourhill v. Young Dr. Cecil Wright says that this is ‘one of the most important decisions in the law of tort which has appeared since Donoghue v. Stevenson.’ But, as he points out thereafter, it is difficult to determine from the speeches of the law lords exactly what principles it has established concerning the ‘ambit of risk’ or the extent of liability for nervous shock. That this doubt is fully justified is shown by the fact that Professor Winfield in his Text-book of the Law of Tort deals with the case in the section entitled ‘Remoteness of consequence (or damage)’ while Dr. Stallybrass suggests that it is primarily authority on the problem of negligence. Perhaps this difference of opinion reflects a certain degree of uncertainty in the judgments themselves, for their Lordships, although reaching the same conclusion, do not seem to have been in complete agreement concerning the grounds on which they did so.

The Report of the Committee on Ministers' Powers has now been available for more than a year, and the Committee's recommendations as to how far steps should be taken to secure the sovereignty of Parliament and the supremacy of law in the sphere of delegated legislation and judicial or quasijudicial powers exercised by Ministers of the Crown are well known. The Report has been reviewed and criticized by (inter alios) Dr. W. A. Robson, one of the principal witnesses before the Committee, and Mr. W. I. Jennings. Both of these writers are teachers of law, and their observations should be carefully studied.

Propositions about law result from thought about law, which is the business of jurisprudence. We shall be concerned with those propositions in which jurisprudence formulates its most general conclusions. Such propositions are expressed in statements or sentences of the general grammatical form ‘Law is “so and so”’, or more briefly, ‘Law is “X”’. By propositions about law we shall mean propositions, statements or sentences in this form. Similarity in form does not, however, necessarily imply similarity of logical function, any more than the use of the same word, ‘law’, is a guarantee that the same ‘thing’ or ‘entity’ is being referred to. Our propositions may in fact have etymological, defining, explanatory and/or emotive functions. To distinguish and to clarify these functions is the purpose of this article.

All who belong to the small class of persons interested in medieval legal procedure will wish to express their thanks for, and admiration of, the latest contribution made to our knowledge of the subject by the distinguished literary partnership of Mr. H. G. Richardson and Dr. G. O. Sayles. It appears in Volume 60 of the Selden Society publications (dated 1941, but issued last year) entitled, ‘Select Cases of Procedure without Writ under Henry III.’ It is, we are told, an instalment prefatory to another volume which will carry the story beyond the year 1272.

The series to which the four volumes that are the subject of this article belong began in 1928, and appeared regularly until their production was held up by the recent war. The publication of the 1940 volume was delayed until 1943. Within the last year, activities have been renewed with such success that the volumes for 1942, 1943, 1944 and 1945 have been forwarded to us. The Foreword of Dean Arthur T. Vanderbilt gives impressive imformation about the magnitude of the task. He tells us that in 1942 American reported decisions filled seventy-four books totalling 76,362 pages, and that, although the sittings of most of the legislatures were suspended in that year, enactments nevertheless occupied 8,939 pages. Thus, great as is the burden on the editors of our Annual Survey of English Law (which Dean Vanderbilt courteously mentions as the source of inspiration of the American Annual Survey), it is light compared with that upon the shoulders of those who have to deal with legislation and judicial decisions in over fifty jurisdictions. The aim of each volume of the American Survey is modestly described as merely to present in orderly fashion the significant trends in the more important branches of the law through the year.' This underrates the scope of the work, for it is gratifying to both practitioners and teachers of law to find included in it chapters on ‘Jurisprudence,’ ‘Legal Education, Bar Organization and Economics,’ and ‘Administration of Justice—The Courts and Law Reform.’ Moreover, account is also taken of outstanding literature in the shape of textbooks and articles in law journals.