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Products Liability: Consumer Protection in America

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 January 2009

P. N. Legh-Jones
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Extract

The Law Commission is currently scrutinising the legal liability of manufacturers and sellers of consumer goods under the English law of sale, and it may possibly recommend reform of the existing law to provide greater protection for consumers. A convenient means of assessing the effect and scope of such proposals will be to compare them with the doctrines of current American “products liability law.” These doctrines have subjected sellers of consumer products in America to a strict liability towards their consumers in respect of defective products. This article is intended to be a survey and analysis of the different causes of action provided by American law. It will be necessary to distinguish the different features and origins of each doctrine since the principles of products liability law have been evolved from case to case by the American state courts in a manner which calls to mind the remark of Holmes that “it is the merit of the common law that it decides the cases first and determines the principle afterwards.”

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The Cambridge Law Journal , Volume 27 , Issue 1 , April 1969 , pp. 54 - 80
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Copyright © Cambridge Law Journal and Contributors 1969

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References

1 In “Codes and the Arrangement of the Law” (1870) 5 Am.L.Rev. 1 at p. 1.

2 [1932] A.C. 562.

3 The military metaphor appears to have originated in Cardozo J.'s judgment in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170 at p. 180; 174 N.E. 441 at p. 445 (1931). It was adopted by Dean Prosser as the title for his celebrated article, “The Assault upon the Citadel,” 69 Yale L.J. 1099 (1960). The sequel is described in “The Fall of the Citadel,” 50 Minn.L.Rev. 791 (1966). The writer has derived great assistance from both these articles. Another useful review of the case law is by Professor Jaeger in “Privity of Warranty, Has the Tocsin Sounded?” 1 Duquesne U.L.Rev. 1 (1963).

4 The Code has now been enacted in all American states.

5 s. 2–313 (1) (a), (b).

6 Miller v. Preitz, 422 Pa. 383; 221 A. 2d 320 (1966). According to this widely used jargon, the manufactured product descends down the “chain of distribution” from the maker through various middlemen (wholesalers, distributors, etc.) to the retailer who sells to the public. “Vertical privity” is the privity of contract which each of these persons has with his predecessor and successor in the chain. “Horizontal privity” is the ensuing privity of contract between the retailer and the first domestic consumer who buys from him, and then between that consumer and any sub-consumer, if such there be.

7 409 Pa. 610; 187 A. 2d 575 (1963).

8 Va. Commercial Code, 8.2–318.

9 Wyo.Stat., 34–2–318.

10 U.C.C. Comment 2 to s. 2–313 and Comment 3 to s. 2–318 (1962 Official Text).

11 See, e.g., Henry v. John W. Eshelman and Sons, 209 A. 2d 46 (Super.Ct.R.I., 1965), especially at pp. 48–49Google Scholar (conservative court); Picker X-Ray Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 185 A. 2d 919 (D.C.Munic.Ct.App., 1962) at pp. 922–923Google Scholar, (progressive court).

12 168 Wash. 456, 12 P. 2d 409 (1932); 15 P. 2d 1118 (1932) (rehearing); 179 Wash. 123, 35 P. 2d 1090 (1934) (second appeal).

13 Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244; 147 N.E. 2d 612 (1958); Markovich v. McKesson and Robbins, Inc., 106 Ohio App. 265; 149 N.E. 2d 181 (1958).

14 e.g., Gherna v. Ford, 246 Cal.App. 2d 721; 55 Cal.Rptr. 94 (1966), car “designed to give the performance required by the most exacting motoring enthusiast,” construed as warranting that car's transmission could withstand very hard driving; Worley v. Proctor and Gamble Mfg. Co., 241 Mo.App. 1114; 253 S.W. 2d 532 (1952), detergent “kind to the hands,” construed to mean that it contained nothing to make the product unsafe for its user.

15 e.g., Bahlman v. Hudson Motor Car Co., 290 Mich. 683; 288 N.W. 309 (1939).

16 e.g., Markovich v. McKesson and Robbins, note 13, supra.

17 e.g., Hamon v. Digliani, 148 Conn. 710, 174 A. 2d 294 (Sup.Ct. Errors, 1961Google Scholar ).

18 Santor v. Kharagheusian, 44 N.J. 52, 207 A. 2d 305 (1965)Google Scholar; Worley v. Proctor and Gamble, see 253 S.W. 2d 532 (1952) at p. 538.Google Scholar

19 Seely v. White, 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P. 2d 145, 45 Cal.Rptr. 17 (1965Google Scholar ).

20 217 Cal.App. 2d 492; 32 Cal.Rptr. 144 (1963).

21 The elements of a collateral contract in English law have been listed by Edmund-Davies, J. in Wells v. Buckland Sand [1965] 2Google Scholar Q.B. 170. And see Shanklin Pier v. Detel Products [1951] 2Google Scholar K.B. 854.

22 [1893] 2 Q.B. 484 (C.A.) and see Diamond (1963) 26 M.L.R. 66 at p. 70.

23 The historical authority generally relied on is Ames, in “History of Assumpsit,” 2 Harv.L.Rev. 1 (1888) at p. 8, where he traces it back to a citation in Fitz.Ab.Monst. de Faits, pl. 160 (1383). There was in fact a case in the K.B. at least as early as 1307, Ferrers v. Dodford—see 58 Scl.Soc. 179. See also Stevens, in (1964) 27 M.L.R. 121 at pp. 161–166.

24 69 Yale L.J. 1099 (1960) at p. 1126.

25 See, for instance, Hamon v. Digliani, 174 A. 2d 294 (Conn., 1961) at p. 296Google Scholar; Rogers v. Toni, etc., 147 N.E. 2d 612 (Ohio, 1958), at p. 615.Google Scholar The most detailed judicial analysis is by Fuld, J., in Randy Knitwear v. American Cyanamid Co., 226 N.Y.S. 2d 363 at p. 366Google Scholar; 11 N.Y. 2d 5 at p. 11 (N.Y.C.A. 1962).

26 Note 20, supra.

27 Note 20, supra.

28 Newbigging v. Adam (1886) 34 Ch.D. 582 (C.A.); Whittingham v. Seale-Hayne (1900) 16Google Scholar T.L.R. 181.

29 (1889) 14 App.Cas. 337.

30 Baxter v. Ford, 179 Wash. 123, 35 P. 2d 1090 (1934).Google Scholar

31 The most dramatic picture of the difficulties facing the modern shopper in, for instance, a supermarket, “bewitched, bewildered and bedeviled by the glittering packaging in riotous color,” is given in Hamon v. Digliani, 174 A. 2d 294 (1961) at p. 296.Google Scholar The A.L.I. has indicated its agreement with this policy analysis by adopting the express warranty doctrine as s. 402B of the Second Restatement of Torts. S. 402B, however, covers only physical injury to the consumer. Tentative Draft 552D adopts the same liability in respect of commercial or pecuniary loss—see Ford Motor Co. v. Lonon, 398 S.W. 2d 240 (Tenn.) 1966.Google Scholar

32 ss. 15 (1), 15 (2).

33 ss. 14 (2), 14 (1).

34 s. 2–314 (merchantability); s. 2–315 (fitness for the purpose).

35 Uniform Sales Act, s. 71, and Uniform Commercial Code, s. 2–316, permit the exclusion of liability for breach of implied warranty.

36 See Frumer, and Friedman, , Products Liability, Vol. 2Google Scholar, 19A.

37 For comparisons of the two doctrines see: Shanker, “Strict Tort Theory of Products Liability and the Uniform Commercial Code,” 17 W.Res.L.Rev. 5 (1965); McCurdy, “Warranty Privity in Sale of Goods,” 1 Houston L.Rev. 201 (1964); Rapson, “Products Liability Under Parallel Doctrines,” 19 Rutgers L.Rev. 692 (1965).

38 See notes 67 and 68, infra.

39 This includes any drug or medicine for internal use; see Gottsdanker v. Cutter Laboratories, 6 Cal.Rptr. 320 (1960).Google Scholar

40 See, e.g., Graham v. Bottenfield's, 269 P. 2d 413 (Sup.Ct.Kan. 1954).Google Scholar

41 (1842) M. & W. 109 (Exch.).

42 (1842) M. & W. 109 at pp. 113–114.

43 See, however, Gillam, “Products Liability in a Nutshell,” 37 Ore.L.Rev. 119 (1958) at p. 133.

44 Calabresi, “Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts,” 70 Yale L.J. 499 (1961) at p. 516.

45 An interesting history is in Regier, “The Struggle for Federal Food and Drug Legislation,” 1 Law and Contemp.Prob. 3 (1933).

46 75 Wash. 622; 135 Pac. 633 (1913).

47 75 Wash. at p. 623; 135 Pac. at pp. 633–634.

48 93 Kan. 334; 144 Pac. 202 (1914).

49 106 Miss. 864; 64 So. 791 (1914).

50 (1842) M. & W. 109.

51 217 N.Y. 382; 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).

52 24 Cal. 2d 453; 150 P. 2d 436 (1944), usually cited for Traynor J.'s remarks on enterprise liability in a concurring judgment.

53 Gillam (n. 43, supra) at p. 145, note 89.

54 Wisdom v. Morris Hardware Co., 274 Pac. 1050 (Wash., 1929Google Scholar ).

55 Ward v. Trizzino, 161 N.E. 557 (Ohio, 1927) at p. 559.Google Scholar

56 Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., 93 P. 2d 799 (Cal., 1939Google Scholar ).

57 Ward v. Trizzino, note 55, supra.

58 Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons, 111 So. 305 (Miss., 1927Google Scholar ).

59 179 Wash. 123; 35 P. 2d 1090 (1934).

60 9 N.Y. 2d 195; 173 N.E. 2d 773 (1961).

61 217 N.Y. 382; 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).

62 Hertzler v. Manshum, 200 N.W. 155 (Mich., 1924).Google Scholar The muddle persists—see Spence v. Three River, etc., Co., 90 N.W. 2d 873 (Mich., 1958).Google Scholar

63 See McAlester v. Lynch, 280 P. 2d 466 (Okla., 1955) at p. 470.Google Scholar Another problem concerned the issue of whether there was a sale in law of a returnable bottle, see Mead v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 108 N.E. 2d 757 (Mass., 1952Google Scholar ).

64 32 N.J. 358; 161 A. 2d 69 (1960).

65 32 N.J. at p. 383; 161 A. 2d at p. 83. The court also refused to give effect to the standard American car manufacturer's warranty which purported to take away the purchaser's rights to sue for breach of warranty or condition.

66 e.g., Hawaii, Chapman v. Brown, 304 F. 2d 149 (1962) (federal court applying Hawaiian law); Michigan, Manzoni v. Detroit Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 109 N.W. 2d 918 (1961).

67 Va.Comm.Code, 8.2–318. The Arkansas version (Ark.Stat.Ann. 85–2–318–1 (Supp., 1965) is the same. The Wyoming version (Wyo.Stat. 34–2–318) is ambiguously worded but most probably has the same effect.

68 The Alabama version (Ala. Laws 1965, 549–2–318) and the Colorado version (Colo.Rev.Stat.Ann. 155–2–318 (1965)) cover only personal injuries. See also Frumer and Friedman, op. cit., 1967 Cum.Supp. 3–160 for admendments in Delaware, S. Carolina and S. Dakota.

69 See Emroch in 48 U.Va.L.Rev. (1962) at p. 988, and Brockett v. Harrell Bros. Inc., 143 S.E. 2d 897 (Va., 1965Google Scholar ).

70 See comments in Seely v. White, 403 P. 2d 145 (Cal., 1965)Google Scholar, and Kyker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 381 S.W. 2d 884 (Tenn., 1964Google Scholar ).

71 See the wording of the Uniform Sales Act, s. 15, and, in the Code, ss. 2–102, 2–106, 2–314 and 2–315.

72 Epstein v. Giannatasio, 197 A. 2d 342 (Conn.C.P., 1963Google Scholar ); Young v. Clairol, C.C.H.Prod.Liab.Rep. No. 5168 (E.D.Pa., 1964Google Scholar); Ptomey v. Sayers, C.C.H. Prod.Liab.Rep. No. 5305 (Del.Super.Ct., 1964Google Scholar).

73 See Gottsdanker v. Cutter Laboratories, 6 Cal.Rptr. 320 (1960)Google Scholar (polio vaccine); Russel v. Community Blood Bank, 185 So. 2d 749 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App., 1966Google Scholar ) (blood transfusion).

74 Sales Act, s. 49 (1); Code, s. 2–607.

75 Prosser, 69 Yale L.J. 1099 (1960), at p. 1130; James, 34 Texas L.Rev. 44, 192 (1955) at p. 197.

76 Atiyah, Sale of Goods, pp. 88–96 (3rd ed., 1966).

77 Sales Act, s. 71; Code, s. 2–316.

78 Similar criticisms have been made of the discretionary power given to English courts in s. 3 of the Misrepresentation Act 1967—see P. B. Fairest in [1967] C.L.J. 239 at pp. 247–248.

79 The dictum appears to originate from the judgment of Noyes, J. in Ketterer v. Armour and Co., 200 F. 322, S.D.N.Y. (1912), at p. 323.Google Scholar

80 The periodical literature is enormous. Useful surveys are in Prosser, 50 Min.L.Rev. 791 (1966); and a note in 55 (1) Georgetown L.J. 286 (1966); also Wade, 19 Sw.L.J. 513 (1965).

81 179 Wash. 123; 35 P. 2d 1090 (1934).

82 59 Cal. 2d 57; 377 P. 2d 897; 27 Cal.Rptr. 697 (1962).

83 Note 82, supra.

84 377 P. 2d at p. 900; 27 Cal.Rptr. at p. 700.

85 Restatement of Torts, Second, 1965, s. 402A.

86 Note 82, supra.

87 41 A.L.I. Annual Proceedings for 1964 (1965), pp. 350–351.Google Scholar It has, however, been said that a restatement should rest on more than prophecy—Brief Opposing Strict Liability in Tort, D.R.I. Publications (1965).Google Scholar See also, Smyser, “Products Liability and the American Law Institute: A Petition for Rehearing,” 42 U.Det.L.J. 343 (1965). New Jersey has allowed recovery for purely pecuniary loss also: Santor v. A. M. Kharagheusian, 44 N.J. 52; 207 A. 2d 305 (1965).Google Scholar

88 See the remarks of Desmond, C.J. in Goldberg v. Kollsman, 12Google Scholar N.Y. 2d 432; 191 N.E. 2d 81 (1963), to the effect that “strict liability in tort” was “a more accurate phrase” than “implied warranty”—191 N.E. 2d at p. 83.

89 Note 82, supra.

90 Garthwait v. Burgio, 216 A. 2d 189 (Conn.Sup.Ct. Errors, 1965Google Scholar ). In this decision Connecticut adopted s. 402A.

91 339 F. 2d 4 (2nd Circuit, N.Y. 1964).

92 See also Russel v. Community Blood Bank, 185 So. 2d 749 (Fla., 1966Google Scholar ) concerning blood transfusion in hospitals, and Cintrone v. Hertz, 212 A. 2d 769 (N.J., 1965Google Scholar ) concerning bailment of a rented car.

93 See, Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256; 37 Cal.Rptr. 896 (1964)Google Scholar, infra.

94 e.g., Delaney v. Towmotor Corp., 339 F. 2d 4 (N.Y., 1964).Google Scholar

95 e.g., Schipper v. Levitt and Sons, 207 A. 2d 314 (N.J., 1965Google Scholar).

96 e.g., Cintrone v. Hertz, note 92, supra.

97 Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 133 N.W. 2d 129 (Mich., 1965Google Scholar ).

98 Mitchell v. Miller, 214 A. 2d 694 (Conn.Sup.Ct. Errors, 1965Google Scholar ).

99 See judicial remarks in State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113 (Miss., 1966) at p. 119Google Scholar; Ford v. Lonon, 398 S.W. 2d 240 (Tenn., 1966) at pp. 248–249Google Scholar; Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, 27 Cal.Rptr. 697 (1962) at pp. 700–701Google Scholar.

1 See comments in State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d at p. 120; Schipper v. Levitt and Sons, 207 A. 2d at 326. “Merchantability” does not connote perfection, of course—see Courtois v. G. M. Corp., 182 A. 2d 545 (N.J., 1962).Google Scholar

2 See the judgment of Francis, J. in Santor v. Kharagheusian, 207 A. 2d 305 (N.J., 1965) at p. 311Google Scholar. Traynor, in 32 Tenn.L.Rev. 363 (1965) and Keeton, in 41 Texas L.Rev. 855 (1963) discuss the meaning of “defective.”

3 Prosser, 50 Minn.L.Rev. at p. 807.

4 See generally the very helpful article by Rheingold, “The Ethical Drug Manufacturer's liability,” 18 Rutgers L.Rev. 946 (1964), and “Public Policy Misconceived,” 13 Stanford L.Rev. 645 (1961Google Scholar).

5 413 P. 2d 400 (Ore. 1966), accord Cudmore v. Richardson–Merrill, 398 S.W. 2d 640 (Tex.Civ.App. 1965Google Scholar).

6 See Comment “k” of the Second Restatement of Torts (1965), s. 402A, which gives the Pasteur vaccine used as a cure for rabies as an example.

7 Drummond v. G.M. Corp., C.C.H.Prod.Liab.Rep. No. 5611 (Los Angeles County Court, 1965).Google Scholar

8 Evans v. G.M. Corp., 359 F. 2d 822 (7th Circuit, 1966Google Scholar ).

9 Schemel v. G.M. Corp., 261 F.Supp. 134 (S.D. Indiana, 1966Google Scholar).

10 Evans v. G.M. Corp., 359 F. 2d at p. 825.

11 Schemel v. G.M. Corp., note 9, supra.

12 There has been no cigarette case under s. 402A, but the four cases to date in contract actions are discussed in the comprehensive article by Wegman, “Cigarettes and Health, A Legal Analysis,” 51 Cornell L.Q. 678 (1966).

13 Jakubowski v. Minn. Mining Co., 199 A. 2d 826 (N.J., 1964)Google Scholar; Schipper v. Levitt, 207 A. 2d 314 (N.J., 1965), especially at p. 326.Google Scholar

14 Gardner v. Coca–Cola Bottling Co., 127 N.W. 2d 557 (Minn., 1964).Google Scholar

15 Erickson v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 50 Cal.Rptr. 143 (1966).Google Scholar

16 Drummond v. G.M. Corp., C.C.H.Prod.Liab.Rep. No. 5611 (Los Angeies County Court, 1965)Google Scholar, at ss. 7122–7124.

17 Martinez v. Nichols Conveyor Co., 52 Cal.Rptr. 842 (1966)Google Scholar; Ferraro v. Ford Motor Co., 223 A. 2d 746 (Pa., 1966).Google Scholar

18 e.g., Crane v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 32 Cal.Rptr. 754 (1963)Google Scholar; Shamrock Fuel and Oil Co. v. Tunks, 416 S.W. 2d 779 (Texas, 1967).Google Scholar The real reason behind this reluctance to admit contributory negligence as a defence probably is that it is a complete defence in most jurisdictions if established, as it was in England before 1945, and the courts are reluctant to see a plaintiff entirely defeated where a product is defective. One suspects, however, that juries take the plaintiff's conduct into account when assessing the quantum of damages. See Levine, 52 Minn.L.Rev. 627 (1967).

19 Maiorino v. Weco Products, 45 N.J. 570; 214 A. 2d 18 (1965).Google Scholar

20 This seems to be acknowledged in Brandenberg v. Weaver Mfg. Co., 272 N.E. 2d 348 (Ill.App., 1966).Google Scholar

21 See, however, Kassouf v. Lee Bros., 26 Cal.Reptr. 276 (1962).Google Scholar

22 Milling, “Henningsen and the Pre–Delivery Inspection and Conditioning Schedule,” 16 Rutgers L.R. 539 (1962).

23 189 So. 2d 113 (Miss., 1966).

24 189 So. 2d at p. 121.

25 Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256; 37 Cal.Rptr. 896 (1964)Google Scholar; Alvarez v. Felker, 41 Cal.Rptr. 514 (1965).Google Scholar See Lascher, The Road to and past Vandermark, 38 So.Cal.L.Rev. 30 (1965).

26 It has been said in Williams v. Ford Motor Co., 411 S.W. 2d 443 (Mo.App., 1966)Google Scholar that the rule from Vandermark can only be followed where the manufacturer has actually delegated a part of the manufacturing process to the dealer who acts wrongfully.

27 Note 25, supra.

28 State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, note 23, supra. See especially 189 So. 2d at p. 123.

29 Schipper v. Levitt, 207 A. 2d 314 (N.J., 1965).Google Scholar In Cintrone v. Hertz, 212 A. 2d 769 (N.J., 1965)Google Scholar it was held that a “self–drive” car company could be held liable in strict tort for hiring out a vehicle in defective condition, although it was in no sense a vendor.

30 Note 25, supra.

31 Note 25, supra.

32 37 Cal.Rptr. at p. 899. The court itself recognised that the tort liability ins. 402A was not really a liability akin to that in contractual warranty.

33 This is the argument used in Comment “c” to s. 402A.

34 This argument is used in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products by Traynor, J., 377 P. 2d at p. 901Google Scholar, and by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in Santor v. Kharagheusian, 207 A. 2d 305 (1965).Google Scholar

35 Note 25, supra. See especially 37 Cal.Rptr. at p. 900.