In a notable contribution to the memorial volume to Sir Rupert Cross Dr. Andrew Ashworth has coined the phrase “representative labelling” as a desideratum in criminal cases. “The label applied to an offence ought fairly to represent the offender's wrongdoing.” I understand this to mean not merely that the name of the abstract offence but the particulars stated in the conviction should convey the degree of the offender's moral guilt, or at least should not be positively misleading as to that guilt, the chief reason being that on a later occasion the conviction may be on the back of the indictment before the judge or be read out in court and thus affect the future sentence. It is true that if the offender receives a lenient sentence this may be an indication to the later court that the particular offence was not as serious as the words of the conviction may suggest; but fair labelling would help to minimise the possibility of misunderstanding. In any case, a man may feel a sense of injustice if the terms of the conviction do not represent his real guilt.

An inaugural lecture is the occasion when the University of Cambridge can look its gift horse in the mouth, weighing the new professor in the balance against his or her distinguished predecessors. The Rouse Ball Professorship of English Law has been held in the past by a long series of distinguished scholars, from Sir Percy Winfield to my immediate predecessor, Sir Jack Beatson whom we are delighted to welcome back today. Their work has influenced generations of lawyers. They certainly influenced me. Before I encountered Criminal Law: The General Part, a great little volume by Professor Glanville Williams, Learning the Law, was my “Guide, Philosopher and Friend” (as it still says on the cover of the latest edition, now edited by my colleague Professor Tony Smith) as I approached the study of law. Another Rouse Ball Professor, the late Sir William Wade, had a formative effect on my understanding of land law and administrative law both through his famous books, Megarry and Wade on the Law of Real Property (now edited by a former Fellow of Downing College, Dr. Charles Harpum) and Administrative Law (now in the hands of my colleague Dr. Christopher Forsyth), not to mention the lectures that I attended as an undergraduate in (softly be it said) the University of Oxford.

The role of English courts in reviewing the substance of administrative decisions (as opposed to the procedure by which such decisions are made) has traditionally been confined by the Wednesbury doctrine, which permits judicial intervention only if the decision is unreasonable or aberrant. The European Court of Human Rights, however, adopts a more intrusive approach to substantive review which is founded on the principle of proportionality. This article examines the likely implications of the Human Rights Act 1998 for substantive review in the English courts. Two specific issues, concerning the scope of the proportionality test in English administrative law, are considered. First, is the proportionality principle’s impact likely to be felt beyond the human rights context such that it may, in time, wholly displace the Wednesbury doctrine? Secondly, given that intending claimants under the Human Rights Act must satisfy a stricter test of standing than claimants for judicial review, must litigants who wish to question the legality of administrative action on human rights grounds but who are unable to satisfy the Act’s standing requirement rely on the orthodox principle of Wednesbury review, rather than on the more incisive proportionality test?

Anti-discrimination complaints by religious employees have constructed seemingly intractable conflicts. The United Kingdom courts have resolved these disputes by diluting individual religious liberty, particularly when determining questions of disadvantage and proportionality under indirect discrimination. This article explores an alternative UK anti-discrimination claim route for religious employees, namely an employer duty of reasonable accommodation. A comparative analysis outlines the corresponding Canadian duty. This model is applied to UK employment cases featuring indirect religious discrimination, specifically those claims which formed the recent applications in Eweida and Others v UK. It is suggested that adoption of the Canadian model be considered: its nuanced approach to proportionality is particularly instructive. Whilst such a UK duty could prove controversial, it would cohere with both normative theory in law and religion and conceptual understanding of anti-discrimination law. Moreover, reasonable accommodation's individualised focus should be acclaimed; it need not compromise collective notions of religious liberty.

I feel honoured to be your guest here, and am pleased to have this opportunity to lecture on my academic passion—“The Formal Character of Law”. Law has several fundamental characteristics. My main thesis is that formality is one of these. I define a “formal” feature of law as one that is in some way independent of the substantive content of the law. For example, the definitiveness of a legal rule is a formal feature of the rule's configuration, and is independent of the substantive content of the rule. Formal configuration is one thing, and substantive content another. But as we will see, there are different ways in which a formal feature may be independent of substantive content, and there are still other, related, senses of formal.

If Jurisprudence strikes the law student as a miry bog, the analysis of a legal right ought, at least, to provide a path through the marshland. The disparate rumours of such a path may have a greater tendency to lead him into the middle of the bog than bring him safely to the other side.

Many years after launching Leviathan and towards the end of his life Thomas Hobbes composed A Dialogue between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common Laws of England in which he set out his final thoughts on fundamental matters of law, legislation and sovereignty. This work was published for the first time in 1681, two years after the author's death, and though it represents Hobbes's final thoughts on these questions it has received but slight study compared with his other works. Leviathan and other earlier works must, no doubt, take first place in interest for the political scientist. The Dialogue, on the other hand, is a work of a jurisprudential slant and is as deserving of the attention of lawyers as it has been largely neglected by them. To this neglect there is one important exception. Sir Matthew Hale rejoined in argument to Hobbes's thesis. His argument remained unpublished till modern times, and even the enormous modern literature on Hobbes's writings has generally preserved a silence upon Hale's Reflections. One modern author indeed remarks briefly that “Hale's short treatise is the most brilliant contemporary reply to Hobbes's theory of positive law,” but the remark is not developed. The prevalent opinion may be represented by Holdsworth's view, and this supposes that Hale failed to grasp Hobbes's idea of sovereignty and that Hale's criticism therefore missed its mark. It seems timely to re-examine the received opinion (if Holdsworth's may be so called) for more than one reason.

In the course of the recent revival of the study of Comparative Law, repeated attempts have been made to define the nature and province of this branch of the law. Some writers maintain that Comparative Law represents a method of study rather than a department of legal science. They point to the fact that the technique of comparing different legal systems can be employed in almost every branch of the law and that Comparative Law, unlike the branches of positive law, does not fulfil a definite function in the life of society. In particular, writers on jurisprudence and history such as J. Bryce, Holland and Professor Jenks are inclined to subscribe to this view. Among the jurists who have made a special study of Comparative Law, Professor Gutteridge and Professor Kaden are strongly in favour of this view. Professor Gutteridge says: ‘The comparative method lends itself to the study of any branch of legal learning.’ According to Professor Kaden, it is the province of Comparative Law to disclose the points of agreement and difference in the solution which is provided by several legal systems for the same legal problem. The learned writer denies, however, that it is the function of Comparative Law to found a system of legal abstractions on the results of factual comparison. On the other hand, a number of students of Comparative Law consider their subject as a special branch of the science of law. Professor Saleilles, Professor Lambert and Professor Rabel support this view.

This paper was prompted by the feeling that the differences between the systems under comparison are not as great as they are commonly believed to be and by the knowledge that lawyers in each of these countries tend to have a vague if not distorted picture of each other's laws. The way I have tried to approach my subject has been through the use of statistics so, before I say anything about the differences between the systems, real or apparent, let me make some cautionary remarks.

This article considers some of the challenges which lie ahead for the Court of Justice of the EU in the field of remedies against the EU institutions following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. It examines the evolving role of EU remedies and, in particular, recent decisions of the General Court applying the new standing rules in Article 263(4) TFEU.

It is fitting for a lecturer to pay his tribute to the man under whose auspices, so to speak, he lectures. That sometimes is a difficult matter, requiring the closing of an eye to many things, but in this case I am happily absolved from any such necessity, for there can be no doubt that Maitland was a man of genius. I hardly need say this in Cambridge, or in any other place where scholars come together, for his reputation has been long and securely established. It is now more than half a century since his death, and longer since his books were written, yet they are today more widely read than ever. The intensive researches of the last fifty years have made only the smallest alterations in the conclusions they reached. He himself was perhaps not quite as sure of them as we are. The most honest of men, he was always careful to reveal his doubts, and it is to a subject on which he had many doubts that I address myself today. I shall talk about the ownership and heritability of land in the twelfth century, in other words, about the emergence of the fee simple as an estate in land. I shall begin by setting before you Maitland's own account.

In 2007 the European Commission produced a Staff Working Paper seeking consultation on the development of auditors' liability in Europe. The present article represents the views of the Working Group on the subject set up by the Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law in Hamburg.

This paper addresses one aspect of the European Court of Justice’s troubled case-law on the direct effect of Community directives: the so-called “incidental effect” of unimplemented directives against private parties, and its uncomfortable relationship to the basic framework of legal principles so forcefully affirmed by the Court in Faccini Dori [1994] E.C.R. I-3325. It is argued that the judgments in question can perhaps best be understood as some form of “disguised” vertical direct effect, but that any such solution merely reinforces the unsatisfactory policy quandary which besets this area of Community law.