IT is highly unlikely that those persons declared habitually vexatious litigants pursuant to statute would know to curse Alexander Chaffer for their predicament. Nevertheless, it was principally the litigation mania of Mr. Chaffers that stirred the British Parliament to enact the Vexatious Actions Act 1896. This piece of legislation empowers the law officers to apply to the High Court to have a person declared a habitually vexatious litigant, with the consequence, if an order is made by the judge, that the person cannot initiate any legal proceedings whatsoever without prior leave of the Court.

THE facts of Barclays Bank Ltd. v. Quistclose Investments Ltd. are well-known. In July 1964 Rolls Razor Ltd. declared a dividend payment that they were unable to meet. In order to meet their obligation, the company arranged to borrow the amount of the dividend, £210,000, from Quistclose Investments. The money was duly transferred into a separate account of Rolls Razor, opened specially for the purpose, held at Barclays Bank. The dividend was payable on 24 July but had not been paid when, on 27 August, Rolls Razor entered voluntary liquidation. Barclays and Quistclose both claimed the money. Barclays asserted a right of set-off against the Rolls Razor overdraft, while Quistclose claimed that the money was held in trust for them and, since Barclays were aware of this, the bank were accordingly constructive trustees of the funds.

INRegulating Contracts Hugh Collins takes up the challenge presented by 40 years of empirical studies which show that business people make little use of contract law in settling disputes, preferring instead to rely on trust and various non-legal sanctions to organise their transactions. Indeed, business parties often actively avoid the use of law because of its expense, inconvenience and tendency to harm business relationships. These findings pose a challenge to traditional doctrinal scholars. If business parties do not make much use of contract law, one has to ask what role it does play and whether the attention that is paid to it by orthodox legal scholars is misplaced. Regulating Contracts takes on this challenge directly and is the most substantial attempt made so far to explain the role of contract law in light of the questions raised as to its usefulness.

EXACTLY ninety-eight years ago today, fifteen young New Zealanders played a game of rugby against fifteen members of colleges of what I understand is known here as “the other place”. One wit said that the game was an even one because six tries were scored in the first half and seven in the second. I need not tell you that all the tries were scored by the one side or which side it was.

[A]cts of parliament that are impossible to be performed are of no validity: and if there arise out of them collaterally any absurd consequences, manifestly contradictory to common reason, they are, with regard to those collateral consequences, void. … [W]here some collateral matter arises out of the general words, and happens to be unreasonable; there the judges are in decency to conclude that this consequence was not foreseen by the parliament, and therefore they are at liberty to expound the statute by equity, and only quoad hoc disregard it.