Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-r5fsc Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-27T01:42:24.183Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

LEGISLATIVE SUPREMACY AND LEGISLATIVE INTENTION: INTERPRETATION, MEANING, AND AUTHORITY

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 November 2004

T.R.S. Allan
T.R.S. Allan
Affiliation:
Professor of Public Law and Jurisprudence, and Fellow of Pembroke College, University of Cambridge.
Get access

Abstract

[A]cts of parliament that are impossible to be performed are of no validity: and if there arise out of them collaterally any absurd consequences, manifestly contradictory to common reason, they are, with regard to those collateral consequences, void. … [W]here some collateral matter arises out of the general words, and happens to be unreasonable; there the judges are in decency to conclude that this consequence was not foreseen by the parliament, and therefore they are at liberty to expound the statute by equity, and only quoad hoc disregard it.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Cambridge Law Journal , Volume 63 , Issue 3 , November 2004 , pp. 685 - 711
Copyright
© Cambridge Law Journal and Contributors 2004

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)