The French inter-war steel cartels were characterized by contemporaries as powerful trusts, restricting output and raising steel prices. The cartels were cited as a cause for the length of the French depression, the low productivity of the 1930s, and the rapid rise in steel prices after 1936. This paper shows that the formation and development of the French steel cartels was problematic and argues that the French industry was not structurally conducive to widespread collusion and was further harmed by governmental policies. Steel cartels were unable to police their arrangements effectively among members and were unable to stop outsiders from undercutting prices. It is not at all clear that firms in the cartel achieved higher profits. The increase in prices that did occur after 1936 was not due to firms colluding and profiting from the increased demand for steel due to the anticipation of Nazi aggression; rather, these price increases occurred because of input price increases caused by government action that raised the costs of production.

This article analyzes the creation of the Fundo Crescinco, a mutual fund that Nelson Rockefeller started in Brazil in the 1950s as part of a larger effort to continue, using private means, the Good Neighbor policy of Franklin D. Roosevelt. Fundo Crescinco reflected both the liberal assumptions of many academicians of that era about the importance of the middle class to economic development and the concerns of business people about placating Latin American nationalism. The fund's history provides insight into the complex and often contradictory nature of U.S.-Latin American relations following the Second World War, and it demonstrates the limits of entrepreneurship as an extension of diplomacy.

Intimate cooperation between American investment bankers and the diplomats of the Department of State occurred in the early 1920s because both groups shared similar goals and interests in Mexico. The resulting exercise in dollar diplomacy achieved some immediate ends but proved very short-sighted and self-defeating in the end.

At the end of World War II, by far the most significant pressure for integrating the aviation industry into national defense planning came neither from the major aircraft firms nor from the military. Instead, the Truman administration played the leading role in forging an important link in what later came to be called the “military-industrial complex.” Smaller businessmen and local politicians proved constant and eager supporters of that policy.

Between 1890 and 1930, Argentina's manufacturers invested in imported machinery. Although they aligned with political allies to advance and protect their companies, their dependence on imported machinery, raw materials, fuel, and expensive skilled labor were obstacles to their success. Two factors slowed the progress of these entrepreneurs: their lack of technological capabilities and the absence of government policies to address the problems entailed in importing foreign machinery. Several political factions supported industry's efforts to reduce dependence on imported products and to diversify the economy. While these supporters hoped to promote industry through the passage of legislation to raise the tariff rate, their strategy represented a compromise that stifled the drive to innovate that is so necessary for long-run economic growth and industrial development.

The present policies and problems of government-business relations in India are examined by Professor Varshney against the background of his nation's historical experience.

This article explores the case of Deutsche Werkstätten Hellerau (DWH)—a furniture and interior manufacturer founded in 1898—through state socialism after 1945 and reprivatization in the 1990s. Our analysis suggests that the firm's survival through multiple systemic disruptions was partly due to the preservation of a unique identity despite heavy institutional pressures for conformity. DWH adopted a “mixed conformity” strategy that attempted to pitch multiple concerns (cultural-aesthetic, ideological, economic) of political authorities against one another to buffer sociopolitical pressures, thus ultimately conforming to some (identity-consistent) demands, while violating other (identity-threatening) ones. This allowed DWH to successfully navigate tensions between sociopolitical expectations and the need to preserve a collective sense of distinctiveness and continuity over time.

This article looks at the implementation of food standards of identity by the U.S Food and Drug Administration from the 1930s to the 1960s, a period in the FDA’s history wedged between the “era of adulteration” of the early twentieth century and the agency’s turn to “informational regulation” starting in the 1970s. The article describes the origin of food standards in the early twentieth century and outlines the political economy of government-mandated food standards in the 1930s. While consumer advocates believed government standards would be important to consumer empowerment because they would simplify choices at the grocery store, many in the food industry believed government standards would clash with private brands. The FDA faced challenges in defining what were “customary” standards for foods in an increasingly industrial food economy, and new diet-food marketing campaigns in the 1950s and 1960s ultimately led to the food standards system's undoing. The article concludes by looking at how FDA food standards came to be framed cynically, even though voluntary food standardization continued and the system of informative labeling that replaced FDA standards led to precisely the problem government standards were intended to solve.

Many products—from consumer electronics to children's toys—bear the CE mark, the symbol of conformity to the “essential requirements” of European standards. This article traces the development of CE marking from its origins in the European Community's (EC) efforts to relaunch the Single European Market in the mid-1980s to its full implementation in the mid-1990s across the European Economic Area (EEA). It focuses in particular on the reforms made to the “New Approach to Technical Harmonization” and the “Global Approach to Testing and Certification” and examines the ways business groups responded to the creation of common systems for assessing conformité européenne. This history offers an expansive view of regional market integration and a new perspective on the dynamic between companies and regulators in the European business environment.

The production of jewelry offers a lens through which to examine the nature of creativity in a capitalist economy. The fashioning of decorative goods for wider sections of society in the second half of the nineteenth century allowed manufacturers to expand the size of their businesses, but only by sustaining strong connections with consumers and keeping track of buyers' changing desires. The outcomes of decisions affecting their enterprises were determined by the degree to which producers understood what their customers wanted. Entrepreneurial activity was critical to the formation of strategies for coping with the problem of scarce or imperfect information and limited market power. These strategies induced a process of creative destruction, whereby old ways of making things changed, and technology, labor, skills, and capital were recombined.

This article explores the tendering process for the construction of the Tanzam oil pipeline during the mid-1960s. In addressing aspects of the political response to British investment overseas and the history of the British company Lonrho, it argues that the British government's determination to concentrate financial investments at home affected its ability to project its presence through supporting business overseas. In addition, the article suggests that the Zambian government demonstrated autonomy in awarding the tender.

This is an important book. For business historians writing about the late nineteenth century to the present, it offers a kaleidoscope of ways to study the history of the forms and organizational structures of modern big business. Its handle for doing so is the business group. The book is a sequel to Asli Colpan, Takashi Hikino, and James Lincoln's edited, pathbreaking Oxford University Press volume published in 2010 and entitled The Oxford Handbook of Business Groups. The latter opened up new horizons.

The Dutch company Philips succeeded in producing transistors early on. By the early 1950s, it had acquired a strong position in the European semiconductor market. However, by the end of the 1950s, it was being surpassed by competitors. In response to the developments in solid state electronics, Philips' management adjusted the company's research, development, and production capabilities, enabling the firm to bring point-contact and layer transistors onto the market and to develop its own high-frequency transistor. When demand for industrial transistors increased, Philips was unprepared, leaving it without an entrée to this new market. The company's exclusive contracts with IBM not only failed to produce the expected results; they also limited its ability to establish ties with other computer companies and most important it illustrated Philips' choice not to produce computers. Therefore, Philips did not build knowledge and expertise in the computer field. Philips' organizational structure hampered both its innovative capacity in the field of applications and its ability to adjust transistor requirements to suit customer needs. Thus, by the early 1960s, Philips found itself in a weakened position in the increasingly competitive transistor market.

Using data from nineteenth-century New England, Dr. Siegenthaler isolates a value for the most important function which drygoods marketing agencies performed for the mills they represented. His conclusions cast new light on the key role played by fashion considerations in decision making within the textile industry.

Low second-class postage made it easy for national magazines and regional newspapers to reach their readers in the late nineteenth century. But the Post Office and some members of Congress questioned the wisdom of a policy that enabled advertising-filled publications to circulate at subsidized rates. This article traces the efforts to reform the postal policy governing periodicals, which became enmeshed in Progressive Era debates about the value of mass culture and government's role in promoting it.

One of the aims of the States has continually been to provide a favorable legal framework for the work of responsible entrepreneurs and corporations issuing stock and to protect them both against illegitimate competition. This paper illustrates this relationship of government and business through a general survey of State administrative practices in executing corporate securities legislation and a closer study of the single State of California.

Mr. Smith explores the troubled history of the Brazilian state-owned oil company, Petrobrás, pointing out the difficulties of achieving economic development through such institutions when domestic politics strongly influence the companies' economic decisions.

The history of Supreme Life Insurance Company, now the third largest black insurance firm in the United States, is representative of its industry as a whole. In this first study of an individual Negro life insurance firm, Professor Puth suggests that Supreme Life may also serve as a barometer of future trends as black firms compete with larger white companies now being drawn into the formerly segregated market by falling mortality rates and rising incomes among Negroes.