This article develops a conceptual framework for explaining variation in the United States’ economic statecraft in the Cold War and the present day, focusing on how US officials perceived the type of geoeconomic capability that its rivals possessed and the type of national security challenge that they posed. This framework specifies four ideal-type strategies on the part of the United States: economic containment, national economic competition, technological containment, and national technological competition. Analyses of U.S. strategy toward the Soviet Union, China, and Japan support the theory. These ideal types explain why, in the rivalry with Japan in the 1980s, the United States openly engaged in competition but did not adopt containment, relying on Voluntary Export Restraints, currency devaluation agreements, and bilateral semiconductor agreements rather than placing Japan on something historically analogous to the Commerce Department's contemporary Entity List or targeting Japan with comprehensive export controls through an institution like CoCom. These ideal types (and the theory behind them) also explain why the United States has implemented containment measures against specific Chinese companies but has not pursued a systematic “decoupling” of the US and Chinese economies.

Which factors make some American multinational corporations (MNCs) take political action in response to the US–China Trade War and cause others to stay on the sidelines? We identify China-based subsidiaries of US firms to identify firms’ political actions in response to the trade war. We combine data on firms’ tariff exposure, economic actions in China, and political actions in the United States during the trade war. Together these data highlight the divergent strategies with which firms engage. Even though more than 63 percent of MNCs in our sample were adversely impacted by tariffs, only 22 percent voice opposition and 7 percent exit in response to the trade war. Our analysis reveals that US MNCs in China differ in their business models, ownership structure, experience in China, and size of capital investments. These firm-level factors determine the degree to which US MNCs are embedded in China. This in turn shapes how firms perceive political risk and choose from the menu of options to deal with the trade war. Size and age increase voice while joint-venture status decreases it.

Firms that offshore final production should oppose trade barriers “protecting” their own industry. This pits them against onshore firms, especially when comparative disadvantage is most pronounced, and so fundamentally alters trade policy coalitions. The US-China trade war's exclusion process, where US firms could request that tariffs not be applied to a product, provides a golden opportunity to test this contention. We show that coverage by a tariff in the trade war and firm characteristics associated with offshoring—size, multinationality, and heavy imports from China—interacted to generate firm requests for exclusion from the trade war's tariffs. This finding is robust to input-sourcing and fears of export retaliation as alternative explanations, and across multiple measures of firm size, tariff coverage, and exclusion requests. We therefore test a key piece of the firm-centered model of trade politics and show its value in interpreting the US-China trade war.

This article constructs a measure of geopolitical and economic tensions in US–China relations based on the sentiment expressed in major US news media and utilizes it to analyze the impact of bilateral tensions on US imports from China between 2002 and 2019. Our results suggest that bilateral tensions have had a negative effect on US imports. Additional analyses of the impact of bilateral tensions for industries with varying levels of supply chain linkages to China suggest that, contrary to expectations, they have more disproportionately affected industries highly integrated with the Chinese market. This pattern continues to hold during the trade war period. Not only were bilateral tensions associated with higher tariffs for industries with high levels of global value chain linkages to China, but the tariff hikes have also had a more sustained impact on such industries. Overall, our findings indicate that potential “sunk costs” considerations may not have been strong enough to forestall the downward trend in bilateral trade relations under both routine diplomacy and trade war conditions.

Existing theories of individual trade preferences do not satisfactorily explain how security concerns should affect American support for the US–China trade war that began in 2018. Although existing theories of public attitudes toward international trade—economic self-interest, sociotropism, partisanship, reciprocity, and xenophobia—all help to explain initial support for the trade war, these hypotheses do not adequately explain citizen attitudes in the context of an increasingly adversarial and securitized bilateral US–China relationship. In particular, they do not address how rising security tensions affect trade preferences. Using nationally representative original survey data (n = 1,016) and a nonrepresentative survey with an embedded experiment (n = 1,015), this article argues that securitization of the bilateral economic relationship has spurred threat perceptions and given rise to a Cold War narrative that has in turn caused a substantial share of Americans to become less concerned with the economic outcomes of trade and more concerned with trade's effect on security. These Americans demonstrate an instinctive “commercial peace” response, seeing trade liberalization as a potential deterrent to conflict. The results challenge conventional wisdom on political support for the trade war and add depth to existing theories of individual trade preferences regarding the interaction between economic, security, and psychological motivations.

The ongoing trade war between the United States and China represents one of the most severe deteriorations of trade cooperation in modern times. In this context, the ferocious trade rhetoric accusing China of breaking promises in trade policy is striking. A previously unexamined question in this context arises: How does this rhetoric shape individual attitudes toward bilateral trade cooperation? My analysis of original survey experiments from the United States and China (n = 4181) suggests that this type of rhetoric has important ramifications. Experimental evidence from both countries suggests that individuals react more strongly to rhetoric emphasizing negative than positive past behaviour of the trading partner. Overall, this pattern prevails independently of the identity of the trading partner. Promise-breaking trade narratives, a key contextual dimension of the US-China trade war, diminish the perceived level of trustworthiness of the other country. A conjoint analysis suggests that individuals’ trade cooperation attitudes are also shaped by rhetoric targeting issue areas beyond trade, such as military affairs and human rights. These findings highlight the importance of contextual factors accompanying the US-China trade war context. Thereby, this article emphasizes the potential for political elites to effectively leverage fundamental individual fairness principles for invigorating opposition to open trading relations.

This article examines the responses of the US Chamber of Commerce and state- and local-level chambers of commerce to Black Lives Matter (BLM). The US Chamber of Commerce's Equality of Opportunity Initiative stresses the business case for racial equity and the economic benefits that can be attained by overcoming race-related inequalities. Many chambers are adopting racially progressive positions, often at some cost to themselves. This article contributes a typology of stances and actions and draws on interviews with American business leaders to characterize American business organization responses to BLM. There is some movement beyond a progressive neoliberal vision of nondiscrimination to acknowledge that it is necessary to “level the playing field.” And the Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI) initiatives of state- and regional-level chambers suggest that they are making genuine and, in some cases, bold and meaningful attempts to advance the cause of racial equity. The evidence suggests that popular mobilization and social pressure following George Floyd's brutal murder played a critical role in enabling this progress. However, the parallels and similarities between current chamber and business DEI efforts and business stances in the tumultuous 1960s and 1970s raise the question: Can current efforts succeed where previous efforts have failed?