On a very natural conception of sets, every set has an absolute complement. The ordinary cumulative hierarchy dismisses this idea outright. But we can rectify this, whilst retaining classical logic. Indeed, we can develop a boolean algebra of sets arranged in well-ordered levels. I show this by presenting Boolean Level Theory, which fuses ordinary Level Theory (from Part 1) with ideas due to Thomas Forster, Alonzo Church, and Urs Oswald. BLT neatly implement Conway’s games and surreal numbers; and a natural extension of BLT is definitionally equivalent with ZF.

We survey recent advances on the interface between computability theory and algorithmic randomness, with special attention on measures of relative complexity. We focus on (weak) reducibilities that measure (a) the initial segment complexity of reals and (b) the power of reals to compress strings, when they are used as oracles. The results are put into context and several connections are made with various central issues in modern algorithmic randomness and computability.

In an article published in 1974, Menas conjectured that any stationary subset of can be split in many pairwise disjoint stationary subsets. Even though the conjecture was shown long ago by Baumgartner and Taylor to be consistently false, it is still haunting papers on . In which situations does it hold? How much of it can be proven in ZFC? We start with an abridged history of the conjecture, then we formulate a new version of it, and finally we keep weakening this new assertion until, building on the work of Usuba, we hit something we can prove.

We give an exposition of results of Baldwin–Shelah [2] on saturatedfree algebras, at the level of generality of complete first order theoriesT with a saturated model M which is in thealgebraic closure of an indiscernible set. We then make some new observationswhen M is a saturated free algebra, analogous to (moredifficult) results for the free group, such as a description of forking.

Goodstein’s principle is arguably the first purely number-theoretic statement known to be independent of Peano arithmetic. It involves sequences of natural numbers which at first appear to diverge, but eventually decrease to zero. These sequences are defined relative to a notation system based on exponentiation for the natural numbers. In this article, we provide a self-contained and modern analysis of Goodstein’s principle, obtaining some variations and improvements. We explore notions of optimality for notation systems and apply them to the classical Goodstein process and to a weaker variant based on multiplication rather than exponentiation. In particular, we introduce the notion of base-change maximality, and show how it leads to far-reaching extensions of Goodstein’s result. We moreover show that by varying the initial base of the Goodstein process, one readily obtains independence results for each of the fragments $\mathsf {I}\Sigma _n$ of Peano arithmetic.

We use Herbrand’s theorem to give a new proof that Euclid’s parallel axiom is not derivable from the other axioms of first-order Euclidean geometry. Previous proofs involve constructing models of non-Euclidean geometry. This proof uses a very old and basic theorem of logic together with some simple properties of ruler-and-compass constructions to give a short, simple, and intuitively appealing proof.

The connections between mathematical logic and combinatorics have a rich history. This paper focuses on one aspect of this relationship: understanding the strength, measured using the tools of computability theory and reverse mathematics, of various partition theorems. To set the stage, recall two of the most fundamental combinatorial principles, König's Lemma and Ramsey's Theorem. We denote the set of natural numbers by ω and the set of finite sequences of natural numbers by ω<ω. We also identify each n ∈ ω with its set of predecessors, so n = {0, 1, 2, …, n − 1}.

The aim of this paper is to describe (without proofs) an analogue of the theory of nontrivial torsion-free divisible abelian groups for metabelian groups. We obtain illustrations for “old-fashioned” model theoretic algebra and “new” examples in the theory of stable groups. We begin this paper with general considerations about model theory. In the second section we present our results and we give the structure of the rest of the paper. Most parts of this paper use only basic concepts from model theory and group theory (see [14] and especially Chapters IV, V, VI and VIII for model theory, and see for example [23] and especially Chapters II and V for group theory). However, in Section 5, we need some somewhat elaborate notions from stability theory. One can find the beginnings of this theory in [14], and we refer the reader to [16] or [21] for stability theory and to [22] for stable groups.

§1. Some model theoretic considerations. Denote by the theory of torsion-free abelian groups in the language of groups ℒgp. A finitely generated group G satisfies iff G is isomorphic to a finite direct power of ℤ. It follows that axiomatizes the universal theory of free abelian groups and that the theory of nontrivial torsion-free abelian groups is complete for the universal sentences. Denote by the theory of nontrivial divisible torsion-free abelian groups.

Julius König is famous for his mistaken attempt to demonstrate that the continuum hypothesis was false. It is also known that the only positive result that could have survived from his proof is the paradox which bears his name. Less famous is his 1914 book Neue Grundlagen der Logik, Arithmetik und Mengenlehre. Still, it contains original contributions to logic, like the concept of metatheory and the solution of paradoxes based on the refusal of the law of bivalence. We are going to discover them by analysing the content of the book.

This paper discusses certain problems arising within the treatment of the senses of functions in Alonzo Church's Logic of Sense and Denotation. Church understands such senses themselves to be “sense-functions,” functions from sense to sense. However, the conditions he lays out under which a sense-function is to be regarded as a sense presenting another function as denotation allow for certain undesirable results given certain unusual or “deviant” sense-functions. Certain absurdities result, e.g., an argument can be found for equating any two senses of the same type. An alternative treatment of the senses of functions is discussed, and is thought to do better justice to Frege's original theory.

We raise an issue of circularity in the argument for the completeness of first-order logic. An analysis of the problem sheds light on the development of mathematics, and suggests other possible directions for foundational research.