Recent studies on neural pathways in a broad spectrum of vertebrates suggest that, in addition to migration and an increase in the number of certain select neurons, a significant aspect of neural evolution is a “parcellation” (segregation-isolation) process that involves the loss of selected connections by the new aggregates. A similar process occurs during ontogenetic development. These findings suggest that in many neuronal systems axons do not invade unknown territories during evolutionary or ontogenetic development but follow in their ancestors' paths to their ancestral targets; if the connection is later lost, it reflects the specialization of the circuitry.

The pattern of interspecific variability suggests (1) that overlap of circuits is a more common feature in primitive (generalized) than in specialized brain organizations and (2) that most projections, such as the retinal, thalamotelencephalic, corticotectal, and tectal efferent ones, were bilateral in the primitive condition. Specialization of these systems in some vertebrate groups has involved the selective loss of connections, resulting in greater isolation of functions. The parcellation process may also play an important role in cell diversification.

The parcellation process as described here is thought to be one of several underlying mechanisms of evolutionary and ontogenetic differentiation.

Redundancy of the motor control system is an important feature that gives the central control structures options for solving everyday motor problems. The choice of particular control patterns is based on priorities (coordinative rules) that are presently unknown. Motor patterns observed in unimpaired young adults reflect these priorities. We hypothesize that under certain atypical conditions, which may include disorders in perception of the environment and in decision making, structural or biochemical changes within the central nervous system (CNS), and/or structural changes of the effectors, the central nervous system may reconsider its priorities. A new set of priorities will reflect the current state of the system and may lead to different patterns of voluntary movement. Under such conditions, changed motor patterns should be considered not pathological but rather adaptive to a primary disorder and may even be viewed as optimal for a given state of the system of movement production. Therapeutic approaches should not be directed toward restoring the motor patterns to as close to “normal” as possible but rather toward resolving the original underlying problem. We illustrate this approach using, as examples, movements in amputees, in patients with Parkinson's disease, in patients with dystonia, and in persons with Down syndrome.

Human ethology is defined as the biology of human behavior. The methods it employs and the questions it poses are elaborations of those generally used in the various fields of biology, but especially adapted to the study of man. Observation and experimentation in the natural and seminatural setting as well as the comparative method derived from morphology play important roles in human ethology, and the exploration of phylogenetic adaptations constitutes one of its focal interests. On the basis of observations on experientially deprived and nondeprived children, comparative primate and animal behavior studies, and cross-cultural investigations, certain universal phylogenetic adaptations (in terms of fixed action patterns, innate releasing mechanisms, releasers, innate motivating mechanisms, and innate learning dispositions) have been found to occur. However, human ethology does not restrict itself to the investigation of phylogenetic adaptations. The question as to how a behavior pattern contributes to survival can be posed with respect to cultural patterns as well. Similar selection pressures have shaped both culturally and phylogenetically evolved patterns. Through cross-cultural studies a number of universal social interaction strategies have been discovered.

Folk psychology, the naive understanding of mental state concepts, requires a model of how people ascribe mental states to themselves. Competent speakers associate a distinctive memory representation (a category representation, CR) with each mentalistic word in their lexicon. A decision to ascribe such a word to oneself depends on matching to the CR an instance representation (IR) of one's current state. As in visual object recognition, evidence about a CR's content includes the IRs that are or are not available to trigger a match. This poses serious problems for functionalism, the theory-of-mind approach to the meaning of mental terms. A simple functionalist model is inadequate because (1) the relational and subjunctive (what would have happened) information it requires concerning target states is not generally available and (2) it could lead to combinatorial explosion. A modified functionalist model can appeal to qualitative (phenomenological) properties, but the earlier problems still reappear. Qualitative properties are important for sensations, propositional attitudes, and their contents, providing a model that need not refer to functional (causal-relational) properties at all. The introspectionist character of the proposed model does not imply that ascribing mental states to oneself is infallible or complete; nor is the model refuted by empirical research on introspective reports. Empirical research on “theory of mind” does not support any strict version of functionalism but only an understanding of mentalistic words that may depend on phenomenological or experiential qualities.

This article sketches a subtheory of human intelligence based on the component construct. Components differ in their levels of generality and in their functions. Metacomponents are higher-order control process used for planning how a problem should be solved, for making decisions regarding alternative courses of action during problem solving, and for monitoring solution processes. Performance components are processes used in the execution of a problem-solving strategy. Acquisition components are processes used in learning new information. Retention components are processes used in retrieving previously stored knowledge. Transfer components are used in generalization, that is, in carrying over knowledge from one task or task context to another. A mechanism for the interaction among components of different kinds and multiple components of the same kind can account for certain interesting aspects of laboratory and everyday problem solving. A brief historical overview of alternative basic units for understanding intelligence is followed by a detailed description of one of these units, the component and by a differentiation among various kinds of components. Examples of each kind of component are given, and the use of each of these components in a problem-solving situation is illustrated. Then, a system of interrelations among the various kinds of components is described. Finally, the functions of components in human intelligence are assessed by considering how the proposed subtheory can account for various empirical phenomena in the literature on human intelligence.

Progress in psychological science can be limited by a number of factors, not least of which are the starting assumptions of scientists themselves. We believe that some influential accounts of autism rest on a questionable assumption that many of its behavioral characteristics indicate a lack of social interest – an assumption that is flatly contradicted by the testimony of many autistic people themselves. In this article, we challenge this assumption by describing alternative explanations for four such behaviors: (a) low levels of eye contact, (b) infrequent pointing, (c) motor stereotypies, and (d) echolalia. The assumption that autistic people's unusual behaviors indicate diminished social motivation has had profound and often negative effects on the ways they are studied and treated. We argue that understanding and supporting autistic individuals will require interrogating this assumption, taking autistic testimony seriously, considering alternative explanations for unusual behaviors, and investigating unconventional – even idiosyncratic – ways in which autistic individuals may express their social interest. These steps are crucial, we believe, for creating a more accurate, humane, and useful science of autism.

Although the black and white populations in the United States differ, on average, by about one standard deviation (equivalent to 15 IQ points) on current IQ tests, they differ by various amounts on different tests. The present study examines the nature of the highly variable black–white difference across diverse tests and indicates the major systematic source of this between-population variation, namely, Spearman's g. Charles Spearman originally suggested in 1927 that the varying magnitude of the mean difference between black and white populations on a variety of mental tests is directly related to the size of the test's loading on g, the general factor common to all complex tests of mental ability. Eleven large-scale studies, each comprising anywhere from 6 to 13 diverse tests, show a significant and substantial correlation between tests' g loadings and the mean black–white difference (expressed in standard score units) on the various tests. Hence, in accord with Spearman's hypothesis, the average black–white difference on diverse mental tests may be interpreted as chiefly a difference in g, rather than as a difference in the more specific sources of test score variance associated with any particular informational content, scholastic knowledge, specific acquired skill, or type of test. The results of recent chronometric studies of relatively simple cognitive tasks suggest that the g factor is related, at least in part, to the speed and efficiency of certain basic information-processing capacities. The consistent relationship of these processing variables to g and to Spearman's hypothesis suggests the hypothesis that the differences between black and white populations in the rate of information processing may account for a part of the average black–white difference on standard IQ tests and their educational and occupational correlates.

One of the most popular and influential theories of word processing, dual-route theory, proposes that there are two functionally independent means of processing words, one involving access to lexical knowledge and the other involving nonlexical grapheme-to-phoneme conversion. Three topics germane to this theory are the processing of nonwords, spelling regularity effects, and the manner in which reading may be impaired following selective damage to either route. This paper evaluates evidence on these topics, and in each case the claims of the theory for an independent nonlexical processing route are called into question. This conclusion is further supported by a discussion of the linguistic constraints that limit any nonlexical grapheme—phoneme conversion process. Some alternative approaches to visual word processing, which share the assumption that lexical knowledge can guide the assembly of phonological information, are discussed. It is argued that these approaches should direct future research.

Can the output of human cognition be predicted from the assumption that it is an optimal response to the information-processing demands of the environment? A methodology called rational analysis is described for deriving predictions about cognitive phenomena using optimization assumptions. The predictions flow from the statistical structure of the environment and not the assumed structure of the mind. Bayesian inference is used, assuming that people start with a weak prior model of the world which they integrate with experience to develop stronger models of specific aspects of the world. Cognitive performance maximizes the difference between the expected gain and cost of mental effort. (1) Memory performance can be predicted on the assumption that retrieval seeks a maximal trade-off between the probability of finding the relevant memories and the effort required to do so; in (2) categorization performance there is a similar trade-off between accuracy in predicting object features and the cost of hypothesis formation; in (3) casual inference the trade-off is between accuracy in predicting future events and the cost of hypothesis formation; and in (4) problem solving it is between the probability of achieving goals and the cost of both external and mental problem-solving search. The implemention of these rational prescriptions in neurally plausible architecture is also discussed.

It has often been suggested that people's ordinary capacities for understanding the world make use of much the same methods one might find in a formal scientific investigation. A series of recent experimental results offer a challenge to this widely-held view, suggesting that people's moral judgments can actually influence the intuitions they hold both in folk psychology and in causal cognition. The present target article distinguishes two basic approaches to explaining such effects. One approach would be to say that the relevant competencies are entirely non-moral but that some additional factor (conversational pragmatics, performance error, etc.) then interferes and allows people's moral judgments to affect their intuitions. Another approach would be to say that moral considerations truly do figure in workings of the competencies themselves. I argue that the data available now favor the second of these approaches over the first.

This book proposes a theory of human cognitive evolution, drawing from paleontology, linguistics, anthropology, cognitive science, and especially neuropsychology. The properties of humankind's brain, culture, and cognition have coevolved in a tight iterative loop; the main event in human evolution has occurred at the cognitive level, however, mediating change at the anatomical and cultural levels. During the past two million years humans have passed through three major cognitive transitions, each of which has left the human mind with a new way of representing reality and a new form of culture. Modern humans consequently have three systems of memory representation that were not available to our closest primate relatives: mimetic skill, language, and external symbols. These three systems are supported by new types of “hard” storage devices, two of which (mimetic and linguistic) are biological, one technological. Full symbolic literacy consists of a complex of skills for interacting with the external memory system. The independence of these three uniquely human ways of representing knowledge is suggested in the way the mind breaks down after brain injury and confirmed by various other lines of evidence. Each of the three systems is based on an inventive capacity, and the products of those capacities – such as languages, symbols, gestures, social rituals, and images – continue to be invented and vetted in the social arena. Cognitive evolution is not yet complete: the externalization of memory has altered the actual memory architecture within which humans think. This is changing the role of biological memory and the way in which the human brain deploys its resources; it is also changing the form of modern culture.

The posterior parietal cortex (PPC) is the most likely site where egocentric spatial relationships are represented in the brain. PPC cells receive visual, auditory, somaesthetic, and vestibular sensory inputs; oculomotor, head, limb, and body motor signals; and strong motivational projections from the limbic system. Their discharge increases not only when an animal moves towards a sensory target, but also when it directs its attention to it. PPC lesions have the opposite effect: sensory inattention and neglect. The PPC does not seem to contain a “map” of the location of objects in space but a distributed neural network for transforming one set of sensory vectors into other sensory reference frames or into various motor coordinate systems. Which set of transformation rules is used probably depends on attention, which selectively enhances the synapses needed for making a particular sensory comparison or aiming a particular movement.

Long-term potentiation (LTP) is operationally defined as a long-lasting increase in synaptic efficacy following high-frequency stimulation of afferent fibers. Since the first full description of the phenomenon in 1973, exploration of the mechanisms underlying LTP induction has been one of the most active areas of research in neuroscience. Of principal interest to those who study LTP, particularly in the mammalian hippocampus, is its presumed role in the establishment of stable memories, a role consistent with “Hebbian” descriptions of memory formation. Other characteristics of LTP, including its rapid induction, persistence, and correlation with natural brain rhythms, provide circumstantial support for this connection to memory storage. Nonetheless, there is little empirical evidence that directly links LTP to the storage of memories. In this target article we review a range of cellular and behavioral characteristics of LTP and evaluate whether they are consistent with the purported role of hippocampal LTP in memory formation. We suggest that much of the present focus on LTP reflects a preconception that LTP is a learning mechanism, although the empirical evidence often suggests that LTP is unsuitable for such a role. As an alternative to serving as a memory storage device, we propose that LTP may serve as a neural equivalent to an arousal or attention device in the brain. Accordingly, LTP may increase in a nonspecific way the effective salience of discrete external stimuli and may thereby facilitate the induction of memories at distant synapses. Other hypotheses regarding the functional utility of this intensely studied mechanism are conceivable; the intent of this target article is not to promote a single hypothesis but rather to stimulate discussion about the neural mechanisms underlying memory storage and to appraise whether LTP can be considered a viable candidate for such a mechanism.

How should biological behaviour be modelled? A relatively new approach is to investigate problems in neuroethology by building physical robot models of biological sensorimotor systems. The explication and justification of this approach are here placed within a framework for describing and comparing models in the behavioural and biological sciences. First, simulation models – the representation of a hypothesis about a target system – are distinguished from several other relationships also termed “modelling” in discussions of scientific explanation. Seven dimensions on which simulation models can differ are defined and distinctions between them discussed:

1. Relevance: whether the model tests and generates hypotheses applicable to biology.

2. Level: the elemental units of the model in the hierarchy from atoms to societies.

3. Generality: the range of biological systems the model can represent.

4. Abstraction: the complexity, relative to the target, or amount of detail included in the model.

5. Structural accuracy: how well the model represents the actual mechanisms underlying the behaviour.

6. Performance match: to what extent the model behaviour matches the target behaviour.

7. Medium: the physical basis by which the model is implemented.

No specific position in the space of models thus defined is the only correct one, but a good modelling methodology should be explicit about its position and the justification for that position. It is argued that in building robot models biological relevance is more effective than loose biological inspiration; multiple levels can be integrated; that generality cannot be assumed but might emerge from studying specific instances; abstraction is better done by simplification than idealisation; accuracy can be approached through iterations of complete systems; that the model should be able to match and predict target behaviour; and that a physical medium can have significant advantages. These arguments reflect the view that biological behaviour needs to be studied and modelled in context, that is, in terms of the real problems faced by real animals in real environments.

Socioeconomic differences in behaviour are pervasive and well documented, but their causes are not yet well understood. Here, we make the case that a cluster of behaviours is associated with lower socioeconomic status (SES), which we call “the behavioural constellation of deprivation.” We propose that the relatively limited control associated with lower SES curtails the extent to which people can expect to realise deferred rewards, leading to more present-oriented behaviour in a range of domains. We illustrate this idea using the specific factor of extrinsic mortality risk, an important factor in evolutionary theoretical models. We emphasise the idea that the present-oriented behaviours of the constellation are a contextually appropriate response to structural and ecological factors rather than a pathology or a failure of willpower. We highlight some principles from evolutionary theoretical models that can deepen our understanding of how socioeconomic inequalities can become amplified and embedded. These principles are that (1) small initial disparities can lead to larger eventual inequalities, (2) feedback loops can embed early-life circumstances, (3) constraints can breed further constraints, and (4) feedback loops can operate over generations. We discuss some of the mechanisms by which SES may influence behaviour. We then review how the contextually appropriate response perspective that we have outlined fits with other findings about control and temporal discounting. Finally, we discuss the implications of this interpretation for research and policy.

The Strange Situation procedure was developed by Ainsworth two decades agoas a means of assessing the security of infant-parent attachment. Users of the procedureclaim that it provides a way of determining whether the infant has developed species-appropriate adaptive behavior as a result of rearing in an evolutionary appropriate context, characterized by a sensitively responsive parent. Only when the parent behaves in the sensitive, species-appropriate fashion is the baby said to behave in the adaptive or secure fashion. Furthermore, when infants are observed repeatedly in the Strange Situation,the pattern of behavior is said to be highly similar, and this pattern is said to predict the infants' future behavior in a diverse array of contexts. After an exhaustive review of the literature, it is shown that these popular claims are empirically unsupported in their strong form, and that the interpretations in terms of biological adaptationare misguided. There is little reliable evidence about the specific dimensions of parental behavior that affect Strange Situation behavior, although there does appear to be some relationship between these constructs. Temporal stability in security of attachment ishigh only when there is stability in family and caretaking circumstances. Likewise, patterns of Strange Situation behavior only have substantial predictive validity in similarly stable families. Implications for future research and theorizing — particularly as they relate to the use of evolutionary biology in psychological theory — are discussed.

How does subjective magnitude, S. increase as physical magnitude or intensity, I, increases? Direct ratings (magnitude scales; partition or category scales) can be fitted by the power function, S = aIb, in which S equals I raised to a power or exponent, b, and multiplied by a measure constant, a. The exponent is typically about twice as large for the magnitude scale (Stevens) as for the corresponding partition or category scale, but the higher exponent may be explained by the overly expansive way people use numbers in making magnitude estimations. The partition or category scale and the adjusted (for the use of number) magnitude scale for a given modality or condition generally agree with the neurelectric scale and the summated just noticeable difference (jnd) scale. A unified psychophysical law is proposed in which each jnd has the same subjective magnitude for a given modality or condition, subjective magnitude increases as approximately a power function of physical magnitude with the exponent ranging from near 0 to 1 (compressive function), and subjective magnitude depends primarily on peripheral sensory processes, that is, no nonlinear central transformations occur. An undue reliance on Weber's law blinded Fechner to the fact that the true psychophysical scale is approximately a power function. Rejecting Weber's law, which is not valid, means that we no longer have to choose between letting the summated jnd scale be a logarithmic function (Fechner's law) and introducing a nonlinear central transformation to make it into a power function (Brentano–Ekman-Teghtsoonian's law). Fechner and Stevens erred equally about the true psychophysical power function, whose exponent lies halfway between that of Fechner (an exponent approaching zero) and that of Stevens. To be reconciled, Fechnerians must give up the assumptions that Webers law is valid and that the jnd has the same subjective magnitude across modalities and conditions; Stevensians must give up the assumption that the unadjusted (for the use of number) magnitude scale is a direct measure of subjective magnitude.

There is some complementarity of models for the origin of the electroencephalogram (EEG) and neural network models for information storage in brainlike systems. From the EEG models of Freeman, of Nunez, and of the authors' group we argue that the wavelike processes revealed in the EEG exhibit linear and near-equilibrium dynamics at macroscopic scale, despite extremely nonlinear – probably chaotic – dynamics at microscopic scale. Simulations of cortical neuronal interactions at global and microscopic scales are then presented. The simulations depend on anatomical and physiological estimates of synaptic densities, coupling symmetries, synaptic gain, dendritic time constants, and axonal delays. It is shown that the frequency content, wave velocities, frequency/wavenumber spectra and response to cortical activation of the electrocorticogram (ECoG) can be reproduced by a “lumped” simulation treating small cortical areas as single-function units. The corresponding cellular neural network simulation has properties that include those of attractor neural networks proposed by Amit and by Parisi. Within the simulations at both scales, sharp transitions occur between low and high cell firing rates. These transitions may form a basis for neural interactions across scale. To maintain overall cortical dynamics in the normal low firing-rate range, interactions between the cortex and the subcortical systems are required to prevent runaway global excitation. Thus, the interaction of cortex and subcortex via corticostriatal and related pathways may partly regulate global dynamics by a principle analogous to adiabatic control of artificial neural networks.

Much clinical and ethnographic evidence suggests that humans, like many other organisms, are selected to avoid close inbreeding because of the fitness costs of inbreeding depression. The proximate mechanism of human inbreeding avoidance seems to be precultural, and to involve the interaction of genetic predispositions and environmental conditions. As first suggested by E. Westermarck, and supported by evidence from Israeli kibbutzim, Chinese sim-pua marriage, and much convergent ethnographic and clinical evidence, humans negatively imprint on intimate associates during a critical period of early childhood (between ages 2 and 6).

There is also much evidence that, like other social animals, humans do not seek to maximize outbreeding, but rather to maintain an optimal balance between outbreeding and inbreeding. Close inbreeding reduces fitness through inbreeding depression, but some inbreeding brings the benefits of nepotism. For simple, stateless, horticultural societies, the optimal balance seems to be achieved by a combination of precultural inbreeding avoidance of relatives with an r ≤·25 and cultural rules of preferential marriage with kin with r ≥·25. Adjustment of the coefficient of inbreeding to other ecological settings seems to be largely cultural. An interactive model of “culture in nature” is presented, in which culture is seen as coevolving with genes to produce the maxiniization of individual inclusive fitness.

When experimenters require their subjects to perform some readily recorded response to gain access to discriminative stimuli but do not permit this behavior to alter the schedule of reinforcement, the response is classified, by analogy, as an “observing” response. Observing responses have been used not only to analyze discrimination learning but also to substantiate the concept of conditioned reinforcement and to measure the reinforcing effect of stimuli serving other behavioral functions. A controversy, however, centers around the puzzling question of how observing can be sustained when the resulting stimuli are not associated with any increase in the frequency of primary reinforcement. Two possible answers have been advanced: (a) that differential preparatory responses to these stimuli as conditional stimuli make both the receipt and the nonreceipt of unconditional stimuli more reinforcing; and (b) that information concerning biologically significant events is inherently reinforcing. It appears, however, that the stimulus associated with the less desirable outcome is not reinforcing. The maintenance of observing can be reconciled with the traditional theory that the acquisition of reinforcing properties proceeds according to the same rules as those for Pavlovian conditioning if it is recognized that the subject is selective in what it observes and procures a greater than proportionate exposure to the stimulus associated with the more desirable outcome. As a result of this selection, the overall frequency of primary reinforcement increases in the presence of the observed stimuli and declines in the presence of the nondifferential stimuli that prevail when the subject is not observing.