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Rationalization is rare, reasoning is pervasive

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 April 2020

Audun Dahl Open the ORCID record for Audun Dahl [Opens in a new window]  and
Talia Waltzer
Audun Dahl
Affiliation:
Psychology Department, University of California, Santa Cruz, CA95064. [email protected]@ucsc.eduhttps://esil.ucsc.edu/people/audun-dahl/https://sites.google.com/site/taliawaltzer/
Talia Waltzer
Affiliation:
Psychology Department, University of California, Santa Cruz, CA95064. [email protected]@ucsc.eduhttps://esil.ucsc.edu/people/audun-dahl/https://sites.google.com/site/taliawaltzer/
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Abstract

If rationalization were ubiquitous, it would undermine a fundamental premise of human discourse. A review of key evidence indicates that rationalization is rare and confined to choices among comparable options. In contrast, reasoning is pervasive in human decision making. Within the constraints of reasoning, rationalization may operate in ambiguous situations. Studying these processes requires careful definitions and operationalizations.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 43 , 2020 , e33
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press

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