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Moral externalization is an implausible mechanism for cooperation, let alone “hypercooperation”

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 May 2018

Tim Johnson
Tim Johnson*
Affiliation:
Center for Governance and Public Policy Research & Atkinson Graduate School of Management, Willamette University, Salem, OR 97301. [email protected]
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Abstract

To facilitate cooperation, moral externalization requires truthful and meticulous information about others’ moral commitments (Stanford target article, sect. 6). By definition, this information does not exist in the low-information environments where humans display their “hypercooperativeness.” Furthermore, collecting that information – if possible – entails costs that other mechanisms for correlated interaction avoid. Hence, moral externalization is an unlikely mechanism for cooperation, let alone “hypercooperation.”

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 41 , 2018 , e106
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018 

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