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Linguistic meanings in mind
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 September 2023
Abstract
The target article focuses on evidence from nonlinguistic faculties to defend the claim that cognition generally traffics in language-of-thought (LoT)-type representations. This focus creates needed space to discuss the mounting accumulation of nonclassical evidence for LoT, but it also misses relevant work in linguistics that directly offers a perspective on specific hypotheses about candidate LoT representations.
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- Open Peer Commentary
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- Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press
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Target article
The best game in town: The reemergence of the language-of-thought hypothesis across the cognitive sciences
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Author response
The language-of-thought hypothesis as a working hypothesis in cognitive science