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Green beards and signaling: Why morality is not indispensable

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 May 2018

Toby Handfield Open the ORCID record for Toby Handfield [Opens in a new window] ,
John Thrasher Open the ORCID record for John Thrasher [Opens in a new window]  and
Julian García Open the ORCID record for Julian García [Opens in a new window]
Toby Handfield
Affiliation:
School of Philosophical, Historical and International Studies (SoPHIS), Monash University, Melbourne, Victoria 3800, Australia. [email protected]@gmail.comwww.tobyhandfield.comwww.JohnJThrasher.com
John Thrasher
Affiliation:
School of Philosophical, Historical and International Studies (SoPHIS), Monash University, Melbourne, Victoria 3800, Australia. [email protected]@gmail.comwww.tobyhandfield.comwww.JohnJThrasher.com
Julian García
Affiliation:
Faculty of Information Technology, Monash University, Melbourne, Victoria 3800, Australia. [email protected]://garciajulian.com
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Abstract

We argue that although objectivist moral attitudes may facilitate cooperation, they are not necessary for the high levels of cooperation in humans. This is implied by evolutionary models that articulate a mechanism underlying Stanford's account, and is also suggested by the ability of merely conventional social norms to explain extreme human behaviors.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 41 , 2018 , e103
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018 

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