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Exposure, experience, and intention recognition: Take it from the bottom

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 March 2013

Mark Rollins
Mark Rollins*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Philosophy-Neuroscience-Psychology Program, Washington University, St. Louis, MO 63130. [email protected]://wustl.edu/
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Abstract

The psycho-historical account implies two ways of construing the relation of basic exposure to the artistic design stance and artistic understanding. One is empirically dubious and the other does not fit well with the account. The assumption that combining psychology with history requires identifying actual intentions is undermined by the artistic design stance.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 36 , Issue 2 , April 2013 , pp. 154 - 155
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013 

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References

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