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Unwarranted philosophical assumptions in research on ANS

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 December 2021

John Opfer Open the ORCID record for John Opfer [Opens in a new window] ,
Richard Samuels Open the ORCID record for Richard Samuels [Opens in a new window] ,
Stewart Shapiro Open the ORCID record for Stewart Shapiro [Opens in a new window]  and
Eric Snyder Open the ORCID record for Eric Snyder [Opens in a new window]
John Opfer
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH43210, USA; [email protected] [email protected] [email protected]
Richard Samuels
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH43210, USA; [email protected] [email protected] [email protected]
Stewart Shapiro
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH43210, USA; [email protected] [email protected] [email protected]
Eric Snyder
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Ashoka University, Sonepat, Haryana131029, India. [email protected]
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Abstract

Clarke and Beck import certain assumptions about the nature of numbers. Although these are widespread within research on number cognition, they are highly contentious among philosophers of mathematics. In this commentary, we isolate and critically evaluate one core assumption: the identity thesis.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 44 , 2021 , e200
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press

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