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Shallow versus deep genetic causes

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 September 2023

Adam C. Smith  and
Stephen M. Downes Open the ORCID record for Stephen M. Downes [Opens in a new window]
Adam C. Smith
Affiliation:
Philosophy Department, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, UT, USA [email protected]; [email protected]
Stephen M. Downes
Affiliation:
Philosophy Department, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, UT, USA [email protected]; [email protected]
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Abstract

We argue that Madole & Harden's distinction between shallow versus deep genetic causes can bring some clarity to causal claims arising from genome-wide association studies (GWASs). However, the authors argue that GWAS only finds shallow genetic causes, making GWAS commensurate with the environmental studies they hope to supplant. We also assess whether their distinction applies best to explanations or causes.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 46 , 2023 , e201
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press

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