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The rationale of rationalization

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 April 2020

Walter Veit Open the ORCID record for Walter Veit [Opens in a new window] ,
Joe Dewhurst ,
Krzysztof Dołęga ,
Max Jones ,
Shaun Stanley ,
Keith Frankish  and
Daniel C. Dennett
Walter Veit
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Bristol, Bristol, BS8 1TH, United Kingdom. [email protected]@[email protected]://walterveit.com/http://www.maxjonesphilosophy.com/
Joe Dewhurst
Affiliation:
MCMP, LMU Munich, 80539Munich, Germany. [email protected]://joedewhurst.weebly.com/
Krzysztof Dołęga
Affiliation:
Institut für Philosophie 2, Ruhr-University Bochum, Universitätsstraße 150, 44801Bochum. [email protected]://www.krysdolega.xyz/
Max Jones
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Bristol, Bristol, BS8 1TH, United Kingdom. [email protected]@[email protected]://walterveit.com/http://www.maxjonesphilosophy.com/
Shaun Stanley
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Bristol, Bristol, BS8 1TH, United Kingdom. [email protected]@[email protected]://walterveit.com/http://www.maxjonesphilosophy.com/
Keith Frankish
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Sheffield, Western Bank, SheffieldS10 2TN, United Kingdom. [email protected]://www.keithfrankish.com/
Daniel C. Dennett
Affiliation:
Center for Cognitive Studies, Tufts University, Medford, MA02155. [email protected]://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/dennett/
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Abstract

While we agree in broad strokes with the characterisation of rationalization as a “useful fiction,” we think that Fiery Cushman's claim remains ambiguous in two crucial respects: (1) the reality of beliefs and desires, that is, the fictional status of folk-psychological entities and (2) the degree to which they should be understood as useful. Our aim is to clarify both points and explicate the rationale of rationalization.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 43 , 2020 , e53
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press

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