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Coordination, conflict, and externalization

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 May 2018

Justin P. Bruner
Justin P. Bruner*
Affiliation:
School of Politics and International Relations, The Australian National University, Acton, Australian Capital Territory 2602, Australia. [email protected]://sites.google.com/site/justinbrunerphil/home
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Abstract

I argue that the set of moralized norms and beliefs is more expansive than Stanford appears to suggest. In particular, I contend that norms governing behavior in conflictual coordination problems are likely to be moralized.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 41 , 2018 , e99
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018 

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References

Maynard Smith, J. (1982) Evolution and the theory of games. Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar