No CrossRef data available.
Article contents
Challenges of meta-learning and rational analysis in large worlds
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 23 September 2024
Abstract
We challenge Binz et al.'s claim of meta-learned model superiority over Bayesian inference for large world problems. While comparing Bayesian priors to model-training decisions, we question meta-learning feature exclusivity. We assert no special justification for rational Bayesian solutions to large world problems, advocating exploring diverse theoretical frameworks beyond rational analysis of cognition for research advancement.
- Type
- Open Peer Commentary
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © The Author(s), 2024. Published by Cambridge University Press
References
Anderson, J. R. (1991). Is human cognition adaptive? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 14(3), 471–485.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Beaumont, M. A. (2010). Approximate Bayesian computation in evolution and ecology. Annual Review of Ecology, Evolution, and Systematics, 41, 379–406.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Binmore, K. (2007). Rational decisions in large worlds. Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, 86, 25–41.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cranmer, K., Brehmer, J., & Louppe, G. (2020). The frontier of simulation-based inference. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 117(48), 30055–30062.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Dimitrakakis, C., & Ortner, R. (2022). Decision making under uncertainty and reinforcement learning: Theory and algorithms (Vol. 223). Springer Nature.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Friston, K. J., Da Costa, L., Sajid, N., Heins, C., Ueltzhöffer, K., Pavliotis, G. A., & Parr, T. (2023). The free energy principle made simpler but not too simple. Physics Reports, 1024, 1–29.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Friston, K. J., & Stephan, K. E. (2007). Free-energy and the brain. Synthese, 159, 417–458.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Grant, E., Finn, C., Levine, S., Darrell, T., & Griffiths, T. (2018). Recasting gradient-based meta-learning as hierarchical Bayes. arXiv preprint arXiv:1801.08930.Google Scholar
Griffiths, T. L., Callaway, F., Chang, M. B., Grant, E., Krueger, P. M., & Lieder, F. (2019). Doing more with less: Meta-reasoning and meta-learning in humans and machines. Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences, 29, 24–30.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kemp, C., Perfors, A., & Tenenbaum, J. B. (2007). Learning overhypotheses with hierarchical Bayesian models. Developmental Science, 10(3), 307–321.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Kochenderfer, M. J. (2015). Decision making under uncertainty: Theory and application. MIT press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Li, M. Y., Callaway, F., Thompson, W. D., Adams, R. P., & Griffiths, T. L. (2023). Learning to learn functions. Cognitive Science, 47(4), e13262.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Lucas, C. G., Griffiths, T. L., Williams, J. J., & Kalish, M. L. (2015). A rational model of function learning. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 22(5), 1193–1215.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Papamakarios, G., Nalisnick, E., Rezende, D. J., Mohamed, S., & Lakshminarayanan, B. (2021). Normalizing flows for probabilistic modeling and inference. The Journal of Machine Learning Research, 22(1), 2617–2680.Google Scholar
Target article
Meta-learned models of cognition
Related commentaries (22)
Bayes beyond the predictive distribution
Challenges of meta-learning and rational analysis in large worlds
Combining meta-learned models with process models of cognition
Integrative learning in the lens of meta-learned models of cognition: Impacts on animal and human learning outcomes
Is human compositionality meta-learned?
Learning and memory are inextricable
Linking meta-learning to meta-structure
Meta-learned models as tools to test theories of cognitive development
Meta-learned models beyond and beneath the cognitive
Meta-learning and the evolution of cognition
Meta-learning as a bridge between neural networks and symbolic Bayesian models
Meta-learning goes hand-in-hand with metacognition
Meta-learning in active inference
Meta-learning modeling and the role of affective-homeostatic states in human cognition
Meta-learning: Bayesian or quantum?
Probabilistic programming versus meta-learning as models of cognition
Quantum Markov blankets for meta-learned classical inferential paradoxes with suboptimal free energy
Quo vadis, planning?
The added value of affective processes for models of human cognition and learning
The hard problem of meta-learning is what-to-learn
The meta-learning toolkit needs stronger constraints
The reinforcement metalearner as a biologically plausible meta-learning framework
Author response
Meta-learning: Data, architecture, and both