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Accurate perceptions do not need complete information to reflect reality
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 March 2017
Abstract
Social reality of a group emerges from interpersonal perceptions and beliefs put to action under a host of environmental conditions. By extending the study of fast-and-frugal heuristics, we view social perceptions as judgment tools and assert that perceptions are ecologically rational to the degree that they adapt to the social reality. We maintain that the veracity of both stereotypes and base rates, as judgment tools, can be determined solely by accuracy research.
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Target article
Précis of Social Perception and Social Reality: Why accuracy dominates bias and self-fulfilling prophecy
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Author response
Accuracy, bias, self-fulfilling prophecies, and scientific self-correction