The late 19th century saw the spread of anti-homosexual criminal laws to British colonies. The iconic example was the Indian Penal Code of 1860, with its prohibition of ‘carnal intercourse against the order of nature,’ a rewriting of the anti-Catholic ‘buggery’ law of 1534. The language of 377 travelled around the British colonial world. France and certain other parts of Europe had decriminalized homosexual acts a century earlier, so the colonial powers of Europe spoke with different voices. Modern decriminalization is largely the product of the human rights era - sixty years since the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

A growing number of religious minorities have been prosecuted for the criminal offence of ‘insulting a religion’, specifically Islam, in Indonesia. Both local and international human rights organisations have condemned the perceived misuse of what is widely referred to in Indonesia as the ‘Blasphemy Law’. This article will analyse the application for judicial review of the Blasphemy Law, which was submitted to the Indonesian Constitutional Court in 2009. It will critique the various submissions made to the court and analyse the historic decision of the judiciary, which upheld the validity of the Blasphemy Law. In doing this, it will explore how the relationship between law and religion, particularly Islam, has been debated, negotiated and articulated in democratic Indonesia

Ever since the Constitution of Japan was enacted in 1946, conservative Japanese people must have been unhappy with it. Their past attempts to enact a new constitution or to make radical revisions have been unsuccessful, but they might finally accomplish their goal under the current Abe Cabinet. Why are conservative people unhappy with the Constitution? It is because the Constitution prevents Japan from becoming a ‘normal state’, and it is deemed not in line with ‘traditional Japanese values’. The fundamental human rights provisions are their main target. Therefore, conservative people want to restore ‘traditional Japanese values’ by amending the bill of rights of the Constitution. This article will examine the reasons why conservative people are upset with the Constitution, how they would like to amend it, and whether their arguments are persuasive. It will conclude that their arguments, just like the ‘Asian values’ theory, are hardly justifiable and could completely undermine the foundation of individual rights protection.

The idea of “human dignity” is accorded a prominent status in domestic constitutions and international human rights law. Its symbolism as a universal ground of human rights sits awkwardly with the absence of a precise definition. The concept has evolved over history and has been interpreted in various ways by people holding different worldviews. The elusive nature of human dignity creates challenges when it is evaluated across cultures. Despite its common association with the concept of liberal democracy, the idea of human worthiness is not necessarily absent in Asian societies, many of which function under alternative political systems.

A cross-cultural perspective requires putting aside ethnocentrism and exploring the convergence of views from different belief systems. Examples from Confucianism and Islam may provide insights on how human dignity is understood and realized in various Asian contexts.

Indonesia enacted a controversial ‘Omnibus Law’ on Job Creation in late 2020, and its implementing regulations followed in February 2021. This Law, and particularly the labour cluster of amendments within it, has been linked to Indonesia's recent ‘democratic decline’ or ‘illiberal turn’. Many of the amendments reduce worker protections with the aim of producing a more flexible labour market. While it is these obvious amendments in favour of employers’ interests that have attracted the most attention, a deeper analysis of the changes introduced by this Law reveals additional important factors at play. There has been a significant repositioning of labour regulations within Indonesia's hierarchy of legal instruments, as well as important responses to Constitutional Court judicial review cases. Overall, this deeper legal analysis produces mixed evidence for democratic decline in Indonesia.

This article adds nuance to the classical account depicting Thailand as a secularized country by documenting how Buddhism informs constitutional thought and practices in contemporary Thailand. Throughout the twentieth century, Buddhist discourses have been used to bypass constitutional provisions in the name of ‘dhamma’ through the reliance on the rediscovery of the doctrine of the dhammarāja (the righteous King). In the early twenty-first century, a second rebirth of the discourse of the dhammarāja led to a further devaluation of the constitution as the supreme norm. The principles of a righteous King (totsapitrājadhammā) were reconceptualized as a functional equivalent to constitutionalism – as constraining the King’s power. This article first examines how modern lawyers used Buddhism as the vehicle to import Western constitutional ideas into the Siamese polity while reconstructing them as part of a royal legacy through the doctrine of the Ten Royal Virtues. It then turns to an analysis of the ever-increasing enshrinement of Buddhism in successive Thai constitutions since 1932. It concludes with an account of the politicization of the righteous King doctrine and its impact on constitutional practices.

The right to freedom of religion is one of the fundamental rights guaranteed in Islam. This is emphasised in verse 256 of Sura al-Baqara: “Let there be no compulsion in religion”. However, the majority of classical Muslim jurists opine that the right to freedom of religion is not applicable to Muslims, that Muslims who intend to leave the Islamic faith or who have apostatised should be condemned to the death penalty. In reality, punishment for apostasy is not prescribed in the Qur'an and had not been practised by the Prophet (S.A.W.). Instead, the Prophet (S.A.W.) had imposed the death penalty upon apostates because their acts were contemptuous of, and hostile towards, Islam. Muslims who merely renounced the Islamic religion were only required to undergo a process of repentance (tawba). The right to freedom of religion is guaranteed in Article 11(1) of the Federal Constitution of Malaysia. However, as Islamic matters belong to the state jurisdictions, most provisions in relation to apostasy are under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Shari'a Courts. Apostates are subject to punishments such as fine, imprisonment and whipping. This article makes an in-depth study of the right to freedom of religion and the issue of apostasy from the Islamic law perspective, and argues that Muslims who intend to leave the Islamic faith are only required to undergo a process of repentance (tawba), and any punishment prescribed for apostasy is contrary to the right to freedom of religion.

Although Indonesia has acceded to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and freedom of religion is a mandate of the 1945 Constitution, there is a significant difference between the promise and the practice of religious liberty, especially regarding the rights of sects in Indonesia. The article explores this theme in the context of the Congregation of Ahmadiyah Indonesia, a minority Islamic sect which is not considered as an agama, or official religion, as a case study. This designation has had various discriminatory effects on its adherents, which waters down significantly the guarantee of religious freedom in Indonesia.

This article explores the implications of an absence of anti-discrimination legislation on the grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity (SOGI) in Hong Kong. Strategic litigation has played an important role in securing legal protections for the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT) community in the face of resistance from the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) government, as well as religious and parental concern groups. Despite a growing body of evidence which outlines the self-reported daily discrimination experienced by LGBT individuals, the HKSAR government has resisted calls to adopt anti-discrimination legislation on the grounds of SOGI, focusing instead on self-regulation and education. Grounded in qualitative research interviews examining the feasibility of adopting anti-discrimination legislation on the grounds of SOGI in Hong Kong, this article explores the current legal landscape for LGBT rights, resistance, and possibilities for reform.

Existing literature suggests a strong relationship between a vibrant venture capital market and an active stock market: venture capital flourishes when venture capitalists can readily exit from successful portfolio companies through IPOs, and IPOs are in turn facilitated by active and efficient stock markets. This article uses China as a case study to explore the connection between the stock market and venture capital market. Through empirical studies, this article confirms the existing literature by demonstrating a close connection between the stock market and venture capital market in China. It also refines the existing literature by finding that, for venture capital availability, laws and policies also matter in China. Strong and sustained law reforms and government policies aimed at improving the institutional structure and regulatory environment of the stock market can facilitate venture capital-backed exits, which in turn lead to an increase in new venture capital availability in China. Nonetheless, numerous IPO closures have led to freeze-ups in China’s venture capital market. Also, there remain a multiplicity of institutional impediments to the efficient operation of the stock market and the effective implementation of IPO reforms in China. These may in turn hinder the development of the Chinese venture capital industry.

In 2016, China introduced an ‘Admission of Guilt and Acceptance of Punishment’ system (known as ‘plea leniency’) premised primarily on the ideal of punishing crime efficiently while advancing the protection of human rights. In this article, I challenge this official rationale by critically examining the legitimacy of plea leniency as a rights-based approach to crime. Drawing on procedural justice theory, I use extant research data and online criminal judgments from the courts in Shanghai to unravel manifold mismatches between the plea leniency process and a procedurally just decision-making process that respects individual rights. My contention is that the operational dynamics of plea leniency is weighed heavily towards efficacy with little regard for the fundamental norms of due process and fairness in which the procedural legitimacy of this new form of summary dispositions is grounded. By tying the expedition of criminal proceedings to guilty pleas, plea leniency represents a discursive continuity of China's broader criminal justice culture, and as such, it fails in operating on a more just, respectful, and communicative basis to accommodate defendants’ interests which stand at the core of its operation.

This article offers a critical analysis of the human rights system established by ASEAN. It first investigates concrete evidence of the system’s ineffectiveness by comparing the cases of Myanmar and Thailand, which illustrate ASEAN’s failure to address human rights violations both before and after the creation of the ASEAN system. It then examines the substantive and procedural limitations of the ASEAN human rights instruments and mechanisms. Specifically, while restrictions on rights and freedoms contained in the instruments undermine the universality of human rights, ASEAN’s mechanisms lack independence and offer only weak protection mandates to address rights violations. In addition, the absence of a judicial body to hear complaints and issue binding remedies makes the system incomplete. The article recommends the creation of an ASEAN court of human rights and suggests changes to the existing instruments and mechanisms that might accommodate the new court.

This paper uses Singapore as a case study in how the international anti-trafficking movement has influenced the regulation of sex work. In doing this, it explores the various historical, geographical, and socio-legal factors which have shaped Singapore’s system of regulation. It then presents the contemporary composition of the regulation of sex work in Singapore: a system of informal rules and protections hidden in the shadow of formal legal institutions. Finally, it analyses the impact of the international anti-trafficking movement, with specific emphasis on the American Trafficking in Persons Report, on Singapore’s regulation of sex work. It suggests that the recent increase of police raids on red light districts is aimed primarily at image control, and that these raids are undermining a functioning regulatory system. It concludes by suggesting that to improve upon its existing regulatory system, Singapore should focus on eliminating sex worker stigma and improving the rights of migrant workers.

This article critiques the current Chinese corporate governance framework and the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (OECD Principles) on which the Chinese framework is largely based through detailed analysis of public disclosures by four prominent Chinese internet and communications technology (ICT) firms. These include State-controlled firms (China Telecom & China Mobile), mixed ownership (ZTE), and privately-controlled firms (Huawei Technologies). The article argues that neither Chinese nor international corporate governance norms deal adequately with the complex group structures that are so common among large Chinese firms. It also reveals deficiencies in the rules on independent directors, supervisory committees, and Chinese Communist Party committees as they are applied by Chinese ICT firms. The article concludes with reform proposals that would provide more useful information and better protection to outside investors and public stakeholders in the unique Chinese corporate environment.

After Soeharto stepped down in 1998, Indonesia began a radical decentralization program, one aspect of which was granting wide-ranging lawmaking powers to subnational governments. The national legislation establishing the decentralization framework gave power to the central government to review provincial-level laws, and, from 2014, for provincial governors to review city and county laws, and to invalidate them if they are inconsistent with national laws, morality, or public order. In 2017, the Constitutional Court declared these review mechanisms unconstitutional, deciding that these reviews should be conducted by the Supreme Court rather than the national or provincial executive governments. This decision reversed the trend of successive reforms from 2004 that had begun restoring political and legal power to the centre. It was also one of the most problematic in the Court’s history, as this article demonstrates. The legal reasoning was poor and incomplete, the Court appeared to be equally split (though the Court did not acknowledge this), and the consequences of the decision (which the Court did not appear to consider) are likely dire. The decision has caused great confusion, but despite its flaws may well lead to reforms requiring the Constitutional Court, rather than the Supreme Court, to review subnational laws.

The purpose of this article is to address the relationship between Buddhism, constitutional reform and human rights in Thailand. It poses the questions: To what extent is the Thai state Buddhist in character? How are we to describe the relationship between Buddhism and the state? Can and should human rights be supported or presented as being supported by Buddhism, or interpreted according to Buddhist ideas? The historical relationship between the state and the sangha is examined, in which the state used religion to bolster the state's legitimacy. The place of Buddhism, human rights and the Human Rights Commission under the 1997 constitutional reforms is then addressed, in the context in particular of the problem of insurgency in the Southern provinces. It is concluded that the constitution-makers rightly refused to make Buddhism the state religion but that attempts to disseminate human rights understanding in Buddhist terms are justified, provided inter-faith dialogue is part of this process.

Eschewing theoretical discussion of both “secularism” and the “Islamic state,” this article instead examines situated understandings of these ideas as they emerge in contests about the place of religion in Malaysian law, politics and society, paying particular attention to the views of Malaysian legal professionals. It examines the official positions taken by the peak professional legal organisation (the Malaysian Bar Council) speaking on behalf of its professional constituents and to a wider constituency of Malaysia citizens in order to examine how the organised Bar has used its prestige and expertise to explain and clarify the legal aspects of these issues to the general public and how it has attempted to use its privileged status to foster informed discussion about law reform.

This article compares three common law jurisdictions in Asia – Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Singapore. By studying the use of foreign citations in the reported opinions of these jurisdictions, we show that they have acquired a judicial character that is distinctively outward-looking and global. The variety and range of foreign citations suggest that the phenomenon cannot be fully explained as a matter of colonial legacy. The article further discusses the ways in which the use of foreign case citations serve as a means for legal and professional enrichment.

The 2008 Constitution of the Union of Myanmar establishes the framework for a ‘discipline-flourishing’ constitutional democracy in which the Tatmadaw, the Burmese military, retains a significant degree of power. Under this Constitution, the Union Election Commission (UEC) is vested with significant authority to supervise elections, regulate political parties and electoral campaigns, register voters, suspend elections, and to make conclusive determinations in electoral disputes. Between 2010 and 2020, the UEC oversaw three consecutive general elections and three by-elections. Following a term under the former military leadership, the country's major democratic opposition party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), won a resounding victory in the 2015 elections. In the years that followed, civilian-military relations were a source of tension, as the NLD attempted to reform the executive and legislative roles for the military guaranteed by the Constitution. These tensions became in particular tangible during the 2020 elections, which the NLD again won in a landslide victory. The military alleged the election was marred by fraud while the UEC rejected this allegation. On 1 February 2021, hours before the new parliament was to convene, the Tatmadaw staged a coup d’état. This article reviews the UEC in its constitutional and political context. It identifies its institutional features, significant points in its brief history, and the impact of UEC leadership as a contributing factor in fostering confidence in the electoral process.

This article describes the founding and evolution of a “Thai-style” NGO dedicated to consumer protection. Through a description of the NGO and the career of its founder, the article brings to light features of the evolution of NGO-based advocacy in Thailand from the student uprising in 1973 to the present. The legacy of the 1973 October Generation of activists continues to influence development of NGOs but new emphasis on rights has emerged since the era of constitutional reform in the 1990s. Many NGOs now make use of litigation to attempt to achieve social change, but litigation, like other long-standing methods of advocacy involving reliance on networks that penetrate government itself, reflect the particular opportunities and pathways for change opened by Thailand’s politics.