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The Union Election Commission of Myanmar 2010–2020

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 December 2021

Catherine Renshaw  and
Michael Lidauer
Catherine Renshaw*
Affiliation:
School of Law, Western Sydney University, Penrith South, Australia
Michael Lidauer
Affiliation:
Goethe University Frankfurt, Frankfurt am Main, Germany
*
*Corresponding author. E-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

The 2008 Constitution of the Union of Myanmar establishes the framework for a ‘discipline-flourishing’ constitutional democracy in which the Tatmadaw, the Burmese military, retains a significant degree of power. Under this Constitution, the Union Election Commission (UEC) is vested with significant authority to supervise elections, regulate political parties and electoral campaigns, register voters, suspend elections, and to make conclusive determinations in electoral disputes. Between 2010 and 2020, the UEC oversaw three consecutive general elections and three by-elections. Following a term under the former military leadership, the country's major democratic opposition party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), won a resounding victory in the 2015 elections. In the years that followed, civilian-military relations were a source of tension, as the NLD attempted to reform the executive and legislative roles for the military guaranteed by the Constitution. These tensions became in particular tangible during the 2020 elections, which the NLD again won in a landslide victory. The military alleged the election was marred by fraud while the UEC rejected this allegation. On 1 February 2021, hours before the new parliament was to convene, the Tatmadaw staged a coup d’état. This article reviews the UEC in its constitutional and political context. It identifies its institutional features, significant points in its brief history, and the impact of UEC leadership as a contributing factor in fostering confidence in the electoral process.

Keywords

Constitutional Democracy
Type
Article
Information
Asian Journal of Comparative Law , Volume 16 , Supplement S1 , December 2021 , pp. S136 - S155
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the National University of Singapore

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References

1 Previous coup d’états took place in 1962 and 1988. See Callahan, Mary, Making Enemies: War and State Building in Burma (Cornell University Press 2003)Google Scholar.

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12 Political Parties Registration Law, s 12(a)(6).

13 Burma Bulletin (November 2010) 2–6, cited in Tin Maung Maung Than, ‘Myanmar's 2010 Elections: Continuity and Change’ [2011] Southeast Asian Affairs 190; see also Englehart, Neil A, ‘Two Cheers for Burma's Rigged Election’ (2012) 52(4) Asian Survey 666CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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15 For example Gail Buttorf & Dion Douglas, ‘Participation and Boycott in Authoritarian Elections’ 29(1) Journal of Theoretical Politics 79; Jennifer Gandhi, ‘The Role of Presidential Power in Authoritarian Elections’, in Tom Ginsburg & Alberto Simpser (eds), Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes (Cambridge University Press 2014); Donno, Daniela, ‘Elections and Democratization in Authoritarian Regimes’ (2013) 57(3) American Journal of Political Science 703CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Shaheen Mozaffar & Andreas Schedler, ‘The Comparative Study of Electoral Governance – Introduction’ (2002) 23(1) International Political Science Review 5.

16 For example Toby James et al, ‘Electoral Management and the Organisational Determinants of Electoral Integrity: Introduction’ (2019) 40(3) International Political Science Review 295; Helena Catt et al, Electoral Management Design (rev ed, International IDEA 2014); Rafael López-Pintor, Electoral Management Bodies as Institutions of Governance (UNDP 2000).

17 For example Toby James, Comparative Electoral Management (Routledge 2019); Norris, Pippa ‘Conclusions: The New Research Agenda on Electoral Management’ (2019) 40(3) International Political Science Review 391CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Pal, Michael, ‘Electoral Management Bodies as a Fourth Branch of Government’ (2016) 21 Review of Constitutional Studies 85Google Scholar.

18 Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, s 119.

19 Self-administered zones (one in Sagaing Region, five in Shan State) each have one designated seat among the 12 Amyotha Hluttaw seats from the respective State or Region.

20 The electoral college of the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw elects the President. Elected members of both Hluttaws and the combined group of military appointees of both houses each nominate a candidate; the candidate with the highest number of votes is elected President, and the two others become Vice Presidents.

21 Michael Lidauer & Gilles Saphy, ‘Elections and the Reform Agenda’, in Melissa Crouch & Tim Lindsey (eds), Law, Society and Transition in Myanmar (Hart 2014).

22 The numbers have slightly changed over the last decade and reflect the recent figures as provided by the Myanmar Electoral Resource and Information Network (MERIN) <https://merin.org.mm/en/union-election-commission> accessed 20 February 2021.

23 Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, s 398.

24 Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, s 398 (b)(5).

25 Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, s 120.

26 Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, s 398(b)(1) (e).

27 The list of disqualifications which apply to representatives standing for election in the Pyithu Hluttaw also apply to members of the UEC.

28 Shwe Aung, ‘Election Commission backtracks on new campaign rules’ DVB Online (2 August 2014) <https://www.dvb.no/news/election-commission-backtracks-on-new-campaign-rules-burma-myanmar/42947> accessed 22 January 2021.

29 The presidency changed during the last term. President Htin Kyaw held this office from March 2016 to March 2018. After his resignation, President Win Myint held power until he was deposed from the presidency by the Tatmadaw on 1 February 2021.

30 UEC Law, s 11.

31 Matthew Arnold, ‘Why GAD Reform matters to Myanmar’ (East Asian Forum, 24 August 2019) < https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2019/08/24/why-gad-reform-matters-to-myanmar/>.

32 Pyithu Hluttaw Election Law, Chapters IX and X.

33 UEC Law, s 14.

34 UEC Law, s 16.

35 Amyotha Hluttaw Law 2010 (State Peace and Development Council Law No 4/2010, Pyithu Hluttaw Law 2010 State Peace and Development Council Law No 3/2010, and Region Hluttaw or the State Hluttaw Election Law (State Peace and Development Council Law No 5/2010) (electoral laws).

36 For example, the 2011 amendment to the Political Parties Registration Law that enabled Aung San Suu Kyi to stand for election. Recent amendments to the electoral laws include the possibility to retain and update the voter register instead of preparing a new one; the removal of military polling stations without observer access inside military installations to polling stations for members of the military and their families in publicly accessible locations; and the reduction of residence requirements from 180 to 90 days as a prerequisite to apply for a vote transfer from one constituency to another.

37 Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, s 402.

38 UEC Law, s 8.

39 UEC Law, s 13.

40 UEC Law, s 11.

41 Lidauer & Saphy (n 21).

42 Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, s 402.

43 The Constitutional Tribunal has confirmed that decisions of the Election Commission cannot be challenged in the Tribunal, so see Kachin Race Case No 1/2014 (September) cited in Crouch (n 10) 71.

44 Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, s 404.

45 Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, s 405.

46 Political Parties Registration Law, s 5(a).

47 The UEC has deregistered a total of 35 parties since 2010; 9 for not being able to contest elections in at least three constituencies, 18 as they merged with others, 4 for not abiding by the Law or UEC directives, and 4 deregistered on their own initiative.

48 The UEC issued Directive No 1 of 2014, which regulated the campaign ahead of the 2015 general elections, with highly prescriptive rules appearing to limit campaign freedom. The directive was amended in 2015 to extend the campaign period to 60 days ahead of the elections, with a campaign silence on the day before the polls. Ahead of the 2020 elections, UEC instruction 173/2020 referenced earlier notifications and added the political parties Code of Conduct (amended from a 2015 version), guidelines related to Covid-19 issued by the Ministry of Health and Sports, and orders and instructions by relevant local administrations for parties to follow: cf Michael Lidauer and Gilles Saphy, 'Running Elections under Stringent Covid-19 Measures in Myanmar' International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (8 July 2021) <https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/elections-under-stringent-covid19-measures-in-myanmar.pdf> accessed on 26 October 2021).

49 Pyithu Hluttaw Election Law, s 69(d).

50 Pyithu Hluttaw Election Law, s 69(a) states: the Commission ‘may’ form the following Election Tribunals to examine into electoral objection…’.

51 The other tribunal members may be 2 other members of the UEC; or 2 other legal experts. They must not be members of any political party.

52 Pyithu Hluttaw Election Law, s 71.

53 Pyithu Hluttaw Election Law, ss 74(a) and 75.

54 Pyithu Hluttaw Election Law, s 70.

55 Pyithu Hluttaw Election Law, s 64, states: ‘whoever is found guilty of dishonestly and fraudulently lodging any criminal proceedings against any person regarding offences relating to elections shall, on conviction be punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or with fine not exceeding three hundred thousand kyats or with both’.

56 Pyithu Hluttaw Election Law, s 61.

57 Turnell describes widespread instances of intimidation, fraud and other irregularities, that did not allow for free speech, as well as low voter turnout. See Sean Turnell, ‘Myanmar in 2010: Doors Open, Doors Close’ (2011) 51(1) Asian Survey 148.

58 Michael Lidauer, ‘Democratic Dawn? Civil Society and Elections in Burma/Myanmar 2010/2012’ (2012) 31(2) Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 87.

59 EU Election Observation Mission to Myanmar (EU EOM), ‘General Elections 2015, Final Report’ (2016) 4f <https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/relations-non-eu-countries/types-relations-and-partnerships/election-observation/mission-recommendations-repository/missions/91> accessed 20 February 2021.

60 Freedom House, ‘Freedom on the Net 2020: Myanmar’ (2020) <https://freedomhouse.org/country/myanmar/freedom-net/2020#footnote1_8bzecnm> accessed 21 January 2021; Free Expression Myanmar, ‘Myanmar's Media Freedom at Risk’ (May 2018) <https://freeexpressionmyanmar.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/myanmars-media-freedom-at-risk.pdf> accessed 21 January 2021; Hanna Ellis-Petersen, ‘Censorship and Silence: South-east Asia Suffers under Press Crackdown’ The Guardian (London, 25 February 2019) < https://www.theguardian.com/media/2019/feb/25/censorship-and-silence-south-east-asia-suffers-under-press-crackdown> accessed 21 January 2021.

61 However, the second round of broadcasts was aired on digital rather than nationwide-available terrestrial channels, and both state funded newspapers terminated publication of party presentations after the first round, see EU EOM 2015 (n 59) 26.

62 Nay Myo Htun (reported) & Ye Kaung Myint Maung (tr), ‘Myanmar Censorship of Party Messages on State Media Draws Fire’ Radio Free Asia (30 September 2020) <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/party-censorship-09302020201609.html> accessed 2 February 2021.

63 San Yamin Aung, ‘Political Party Withdraws Election Broadcast After Censorship by Myanmar Authorities’ Irrawaddy (21 September 2020) <https://www.irrawaddy.com/elections/political-party-withdraws-election-broadcast-censorship-myanmar-authorities.html> accessed 2 February 2021.

64 Phadu Tun Aung, ‘Election Officials Censor Parties’ Campaign Speeches ‘Like the Dictatorship did’’ Myanmar Now (24 September 2020) <https://www.myanmar-now.org/en/news/election-officials-censor-parties-campaign-speeches-like-the-dictatorship-did> accessed 2 February 2021.

65 Shwe Aung, ‘Controversial Campaign Guidelines Drafted’ DVB Online (12 May 2014) <https://www.dvb.no/news/controversial-campaign-guidelines-drafted-burma-myanmar/40592> accessed 2 February 2021; Shwe Aung, ‘Election Commission Backtracks on new campaign rules’ DVB Online (2 August 2012) <https://www.dvb.no/news/election-commission-backtracks-on-new-campaign-rules-burma-myanmar/42947> accessed 2 February 2021.

66 The Carter Center, ‘Observing Myanmar's 2015 General Elections. Final Report’ (1 February 2016) <https://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/news/peace_publications/election_reports/myanmar-2015-final.pdf> accessed 20 February 2021.

67 Heinrich Böll Foundation Yangon, ‘Myanmar on the Road towards the 2020 Elections. A Pre-Electoral Assessment’ (July 2020) <https://mm.boell.org/sites/default/files/2020-07/HBS_Myanmar_Pre-elections_Assessment_EN_July_2020.pdf> accessed 20 July 2021, following European Commission, ‘EU Election Follow-Up Mission (EFM) Myanmar 2019, Final Report’ (5 June 2019) <https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/relations-non-eu-countries/types-relations-and-partnerships/election-observation/mission-recommendations-repository/missions/161>.

68 Simon Kemp, ‘Digital 2020: Myanmar’ (Datareportal, 18 February 2020) <https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2020-myanmar> accessed 20 February 2021.

69 Matthew J Walton & Susan Hayward, Contesting Buddhist Narratives: Democratization, Nationalism, and Communal Violence (East-West Center 2014).

70 UN Secretary General, ‘Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar’ (1 September 2020) UN Doc A/75/335.

71 Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, s 391.

72 Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, s 345.

73 Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, s 346.

74 The distinction between citizens and associate or naturalized citizens is significant. Associate citizens are determined by a central body that exists under the auspices of the Ministries of Home Affairs, Defence Service, and Foreign Affairs. Associate citizens cannot become full citizens, even if they marry a full citizen. Naturalized citizens are those who have conclusive evidence of their naturalization by the former Union Citizenship Act of 1948. Sections 43 to 45 of the Citizenship Law provide the qualifications for naturalization, which include a family record history, national language (Bamar) proficiency, adult age, good character and good morality. Children lose the right to nationality if their parents fail in applying.

75 There were also other colours introduced, such as brown cards for monks.

76 Gabrielle Paluch, ‘Myanmar Begins Controversial Citizenship Verification Process’ Voice of America Online (7 July 2014) <http://www.voanews.com/content/myanmar-begins-controversial-citizenship-verification-process/1952081.html> accessed 2 February 2021; Yen Snaing, ‘President signs Amended Law barring Non-Citizens from Politics’ The Irrawaddy (3 October 2014) <http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/president-signs-amended-law-barring-non-citizens-politics.html> accessed 20 February 2021.

77 Crouch, Melissa, ‘States of Legal Denial: How the Rohingya Lost the Right to Vote and the Role of Legal Denial in Myanmar’ (2021) 51(1) Journal of Contemporary Asia 87CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

78 Michael Lidauer, ‘Boundary Making in Myanmar's Electoral Process: Where Elections do not take place’ [2021] Modern Asian Studies 1.

79 Nyi Nyi Kyaw, ‘Islamophobia in Buddhist Myanmar: The 969 Movement and Anti-Muslim Violence’; and Nicholas Farrelly, ‘Muslim Political Activity in Transitional Myanmar’, in Melissa Crouch (ed) Islam and the State in Myanmar (Oxford University Press 2016).

80 Lidauer (n 78).

81 Ei Ei Toe Lwin, ‘We won't retreat’: Muslim Candidates prepare for Election Battle’ The Frontier (27 July 2020) <https://www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/we-wont-retreat-muslim-candidates-prepare-for-election-battle/> accessed 21 February 2020.

82 Michael Lidauer, 'The Politics of Election Cancellations in Myanmar' Oxford Tea Circle (19 May 2021) <https://teacircleoxford.com/2021/05/19/the-politics-of-election-cancellations-in-myanmar/> accessed 26 October 2021.

83 ibid.

84 The UEC Law uses both ‘cancellation and ‘postponement, while the electoral laws only use the latter term.

85 Lidauer (n 78).

86 TCC, ‘Carter Center Interim Statement 2 on Myanmar General Elections October 30, 2020’, <https://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/news/peace_publications/election_reports/myanmar-interim-statement-103020.pdf> accessed 21 February 2021.

87 Mary Callahan & Myo Zaw Oo, ‘Myanmar's 2020 Elections and Conflict Dynamics’ (United States Institute of Peace, Report No 146, April 2019) <https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2019-04/pw_146-myanmars_2020_election_and_conflict_dynamics.pdf> accessed 21 February 2021.

88 In the interim, the AA and Tatmadaw became unlikely allies in demanding that the cancelled elections should take place before the formation of the new Hluttaws. In mid-December 2021, this demand was supported by the President, and the Rakhine State sub-commission reportedly started preparations. Fighting has ceased and tens of thousands have reportedly been able to return home. In mid-January 2021, the Rakhine State Hluttaw passed a proposal to urge the government to remove the AA's ‘terrorist’ designation which had been seen as an impediment to ceasefire negotiations. cf Radio Free Asia, ‘Myanmar President Appeals for Rakhine Elections Amid Truce in Conflict’ (15 December 2021) <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/president-appeals-12152020175950.html> accessed 2 February 2021. See also International Crisis Group, ‘From Elections to Ceasefire in Myanmar's Rakhine State’ (23 December 2020) <https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/b164-elections-ceasefire-myanmars-rakhine-state> accessed 21 February 2021.

89 Lidauer (n 82).

90 ibid.

91 Robert Taylor, ‘Myanmar 1990: New Era or Old?’ [1991] Southeast Asian Affairs 199.

92 Election Watch Burma, ‘Burma Post-Election Watch: November 2010 Parliamentary Elections’ (The International Republican Institute, 7 November 2010) <https://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/Burma%20Post-Election%20Watch,%20November%202010%20Parliamentary%20Elections.pdf> accessed 2 February 2021.

93 Personal statement to one of the authors.

94 Kyaw Zwa Moe, ‘Tin Aye: I want the USDP to Win, but to Win Fairly’ The Irrawaddy (29 June 2015) <https://www.irrawaddy.com/election/interview/tin-aye-i-want-the-usdp-to-win-but-to-win-fairly> accessed 1 March 2021.

95 ibid.

96 ibid.

97 Ei Ei Toe Lwin, ‘U Hla Thein: Myanmar's divisive election chief’ The Frontier (5 November 2020) <https://www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/u-hla-thein-myanmars-divisive-election-chief/> accessed 21 February 2021.

98 Sith Aung Myint, ‘USDP Risks Disorderly Election by Snubbing Code of Conduct’ The Frontier (1 March 2021) <https://www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/usdp-risks-disorderly-election-by-snubbing-code-of-conduct/> accessed on 1 March 2021.

99 ibid.

100 San Yamin Aung, ‘Myanmar Election Official Scramble to Correct Error-Riddled Voter List’ The Irrawaddy (6 August 2020) <https://www.irrawaddy.com/elections/myanmar-election-officials-scramble-correct-error-riddled-voter-lists.html> accessed 21 February 2021.

101 The Defence Services Act 1959 was amended in 2016 to prescribe the age of retirement. See media reporting on the issue: Ei Ei Thu, ‘Commander-in-chief Retirement Age set at 65’ Myanmar Times (21 July 2016) <https://www.mmtimes.com/national-news/21491-commander-in-chief-retirement-age-set-at-65.html> accessed 21 February 2021.

102 Nyein Nyein, ‘Dozens of Myanmar Political Parties Seek Assurances From Military Chief Over Election Concerns’ The Irrawaddy (15 August 2020) <https://www.irrawaddy.com/elections/dozens-myanmar-political-parties-seek-assurances-military-chief-election-concerns.html> accessed 21 February 2021.

103 Sebastian Strangio, ‘Myanmar's NLD Draws More Criticisms Ahead of National Poll’ The Diplomat (4 November 2020).

104 Tatmadaw Information Team (5 November 2020) <http://dsinfo.org/node/657> accessed 6 November 2020 (no longer publicly available).

105 Htet Naing Zaw, ‘USDP's Call to Re-Run General Election Doesn't Reflect Military View: Spokesman’ The Irrawaddy (16 November 2020) <https://www.irrawaddy.com/elections/usdps-call-re-run-general-election-doesnt-reflect-military-view-spokesman.html> accessed 21 February 2021.

106 Melissa Crouch, ‘Myanmar Coup has No Constitutional Basis’ (3 February 2021) <https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2021/02/03/myanmar-coup-on-the-pretext-of-a-constitutional-fig-leaf/> accessed 21 February 2021.

107 The NLD's reluctance to convene the NDSC was a source of ongoing tension between the Tatmadaw, the USDP and the NLD prior to the elections. See Sithu Aung Myint, ‘Discord and Manoeuvring over “National Security’” Frontier Myanmar (9 October 2019) <https://www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/discord-and-manoeuvring-over-national-security/> accessed 2 February 2021.

108 In a parallel legal challenge, on 5 January, the USDP and another party had applied to the Supreme Court for writs against the UEC Chairman and members, as well as against President Win Myint. It was unclear whether this court could accept the case, as section 402 of the Constitution declares decisions of the Election Commission to be final. On 29 January, the Supreme Court accepted to hear the cases.

109 ‘Joint Statement by Domestic Election Observer Organizations’ (PACE, 29 January 2021) <https://www.pacemyanmar.org/mmobservers-statement-eng/> accessed 21 February 2021.

110 ‘Myanmar Tatmadaw's Response’ (31 January 2021) <https://dsinfo.org/929> accessed 31 January 2021 (no longer available online).

111 Myanmar News Agency, ‘Republic of the Union of Myanmar Office of the President Order Number (1/2021)’ Global New Light of Myanmar (1 February 2021) <https://www.gnlm.com.mm/republic-of-the-union-of-myanmar-office-of-the-president-order-number-1-2021/> accessed 22 February 2021. For early analysis of the coup, see Crouch (n 77); Andrew Harding, ‘The Tatmadaw's 1 February Actions are not an Emergency but a Coup’ (Blog of the International Journal of Constitutional Law, 1 February 2021) <http://www.iconnectblog.com/2021/02/the-tatmadaws-1-february-actions-are-not-an-emergency-but-a-coup/> accessed 22 February 2021; Sujit Choudhry & Asanga Welikala, ‘Myanmar's Military Coup d’État Is Unconstitutional’ (Verfassungsblog, 15 February 2021) <https://verfassungsblog.de/myanmars-military-coup-detat-is-unconstitutional/> accessed 22 February 2021.

112 Office of the Commander in Chief of Defence Services, Notification No. 1/2021, 1 February 2021.

113 Tatmadaw, Notification 9/2021, 2 February 2021.

114 The Irrawaddy, ‘Myanmar's Coup Leaders Name a New Union Election Commission’ The Irrawaddy (3 February 2021) <https://www.irrawaddy.com/elections/myanmars-coup-leaders-name-new-union-election-commission.html> accessed 22 February 2021.

115 The Irrawaddy, ‘Myanmar Military Rounds Up Former Election Commission Officials’ (11 February 2021) <https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmar-military-rounds-former-election-commission-officials.html> accessed 23 August 2021.

116 Myanmar News Agency, ‘Announcement of Union Election Commission’ Global New Light of Myanmar (5 February 2021) <https://www.gnlm.com.mm/announcement-of-union-election-commission-2/> accessed 22 February 2021.

117 See for example PACE, ‘Election Day Observation Preliminary Findings’ (9 November 2020) <https://www.pacemyanmar.org/2020-eday-eng/> accessed 1 March 2021; and Asian Network for Free Elections, ‘ANREL IEOM to the 2020 Myanmar General Elections Interim Report’ (10 November 2020) <https://anfrel.org/anfrel-ieom-to-the-2020-myanmar-general-elections-interim-report/> accessed 1 March 2021.

118 For example Melissa Crouch, ‘Why Myanmar's elections won't be free, fair or safe’ The Interpreter (The Lowy Institute, 12 October 2020) <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/why-myanmar-s-elections-will-be-neither-free-fair-nor-safe> accessed 1 March 2021; Human Rights Watch, ‘Myanmar: Elections Fundamentally Flawed’ (Bangkok, 5 October 2020) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/10/05/myanmar-election-fundamentally-flawed> accessed 28 February 2021; Sebastian Strangio, ‘Myanmar Election Will Fail to Meet Proper Standards: UN’ The Diplomat (24 September 2020) <https://thediplomat.com/2020/09/myanmar-election-will-fail-to-meet-proper-standards-un/> accessed 1 March 2021.