This article proposes an authority based conception of the phenomenon of institutionalization. Whereas most social science writing on the subject focuses either upon the organization's internal structural integration (such criteria as well-boundedness, universalism, complexity, and coherence often are employed) or upon its ability to cope with environmental challenges (the concepts of adaptability and autonomy have been suggested), I propose that an organization's offensive capabilities vis à vis environmental actors be viewed as a measurement of its institutionalization.

Principally based upon fieldwork in New Zealand bolstered by additional research in Scandinavia, Britain, and Hawaii, this study focuses upon the institutionalization of the ombudsman—an increasingly popular bureaucratic control mechanism. A sociometric analysis of ombudsman-bureaucratic interaction is undertaken, and four questions are investigated: How extensive is the interaction? How consequential is the threat posed by complaints? What demands does the ombudsman make? How cooperative is the agency in responding? The investigation provides answers which are indicative of the ombudsman's successful institutionalization. That is, the office performs its mission and has established itself with the environmental actors as an authority figure.

Implicit in Dahrendorf's Society and Democracy in Germany and explicit in Moore's Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy are respectively a liberal and a radical model of democratic development. Neither of these models adequately accounts for the experience of Sweden, a remarkably successful “late developer.” Although Swedish industrialization proceeded with little public ownership of the means of production, with limited welfare programs until the 1930s, and above all with restricted military expenditure—all factors Dahrendorf implies are crucial for democratic development—it did not produce the traditional liberal infrastructure of bourgeois entrepreneurs nor a vigorous open market society. Similarly only three of Moore's five preconditions for democracy obtained in Sweden: a balance between monarchy and aristocracy, the weakening of the landed aristocracy, and the prevention of an aristocratic-bourgeois coalition against the workers and peasants. There was no thorough shift toward commercial agriculture and, most important, there was no revolutionary break with the past. Consequently, one has to evolve a radical liberal model of development which states the conditions for the emergence of democracy in Sweden without revolution. This model contains implications for the further modernization of American politics.

It is often asserted that state legislatures are characterized by low membership stability, attributed to low career commitment on the part of individual legislators. Such assertions are usually based on the high proportion of first-term members in most legislatures, even though the available data on this subject are limited and contradictory. Two better measures of career commitment and membership stability are: (a) the number of incumbents seeking reelection, and (b) average prior legislative service. Data for these variables are presented for 20 sessions of the Connecticut, Michigan, and Wisconsin legislatures. The data show a gradual but substantial decline in the number of first-term legislators and a gradual but substantial increase in membership stability. The computation of such data is an essential first step in documenting the causes and consequences of membership stability.

In this paper one party leadership strategy with respect to the committee system of the House is examined. Building on several relatively clear concepts such as compliance, quality of assignment, expectation, scarcity, and exchange, a very elementary, yet explicit, theory is constructed. It is shown that the leaders pursue a strategy of accommodation. The leaders increase the number of positions on those committees prized by the members in order to guarantee a steady supply of resources to gain leverage with the members. But a steady increase in the supply of positions reduces the scarcity of positions and hence their value to the leaders. Thus, a consequence of the strategy is the need periodically to reorganize or make adjustments in the committee system.

In “Abstract Right,” the first part of the Philosophy of Right, Hegel criticizes the usual content and formulations of liberal theories of rights. In terms of content, Hegel argues that the subject of rights is only a narrow abstraction from the full human being; that he has limited self-determination and limited political freedom; and that, when he acts on his rights, he produces terror and destruction. In terms of formulations, Hegel argues that the pervasiveness of contract relations is inaccurate and undesirable; that the state cannot be derived from the natural man's alienating his right to punish; and that it is inaccurate to conceptualize civil society as only limiting natural man's freedoms. By transforming natural to abstract rights, Hegel retains much of the substance of rights, while concurrently preparing for the later sections of his text which try to overcome the inadequacies of a political theory based only on rights.

The purpose of this article is to assess the effect of the winner-take-all feature of the Electoral College on the allocation of resources by candidates to the states in a presidential campaign. Conceptualizing the campaign as a two-person zero-sum infinite game, it is found that the main effect of this feature is to induce candidates to allocate campaign resources roughly in proportion to the 3/2's power of the electoral votes of each state, which creates a peculiar bias that makes voters living in the largest states as much as three times as attractive campaign targets as voters living in the smallest states. Empirically, it is shown that the 3/2's rule explains quite well the time allocations of presidential and vice-presidential candidates in the 1960, 1964, 1968, and 1972 campaigns; for presidential campaigns in 1976 and 1980, optimal allocations are indicated for all fifty states and the District of Columbia. A comparison with optimal allocations under a system of direct popular-vote election of the president reveals that such a system would be less susceptible to manipulative strategies than the Electoral College as well as being compatible with the egalitarian principle of “one man, one vote.”

The research reported in this article involved tests of a model by which voting decisions can be explained and predicted. Data for the tests came from surveys conducted in five presidential elections by the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan. Predictions made in terms of the model show it to be a good basis both for predicting the division of the vote and for predicting the votes of individual voters. Extensive analyses of incorrect predictions suggest them to be in great part the sort of errors one would expect, were voters arriving at their voting decisions in the manner described by the model. The validity of the model has implications of importance for practical politics, political history, and political theory.

Ethnic groups argue that a certain proportion of administrative positions should be filled by their members. This concern assumes that a bureaucrat applies to his tasks the values and interests of his social background. Evidence from Zambia, a country in which ethnic and regional differences have been highly politicized, suggests that this assumption lacks empirical support. The fundamental guidelines that appear to shape administrative behavior in Zambia are the calculations of what must be done to achieve individual career advancement. Administrators are, in addition, constrained from pursuing parochial interests by the range of authority and discretion attached to their particular positions.

Although bureaucrats do not appear to provide ideal representatives for ethnic interests, the ethnic composition of the most visible echelons of the government is of critical political significance. This is particularly evident in a country like Zambia where ethnically defined groups are contending for positions in the new postcolonial society. The symbols of power can be as important as power itself.

Recent studies of regional economic development of the Soviet Union have suggested that since 1958, Soviet union republics have become less equal in their levels of industrialization, share of investments, and living standards. This paper assesses the degree to which equality of social and cultural development characterizes Soviet ethnic groups and union republics. Drawing aggregate data chiefly from the 1926, 1959, and 1970 Soviet censuses, the analysis shows that: (1) relative variation (inequality) in the sociocultural development of Soviet nationalities has declined continuously and markedly over time on measures of education and occupational structure, but that large inter-nationality disparities remain in the development of skilled manpower; (2) inter-nationality variation in family role structures has been slower to decline than differences in education and appears to follow a curvilinear pattern: for a time during the Soviet era, inter-nationality differences increased but have been followed recently by significant declines. Furthermore, it is shown that (3) on the average the sociocultural development of union republic populations well exceeds the development of the indigenous nationalities in these republics.

This study focuses on A. Lawrence Lowell's classic thesis that a parliamentary democracy must possess a majority party system if durable cabinets are to exist. The argument of this study is that majority party government is not essential to cabinet durability. Rather, in line with the British analyst W. L. Middleton as well as more contemporary game-theoreticians, the critical factor is held to be the coalitional status of the cabinet: (1) cabinets of minimum winning status should be durable; as cabinets depart from minimum winning status, cabinet durability decreases; (2) the coalitional status of the cabinet that forms is partially a product of party system fractionalization, instability, and polarization. Hypotheses derived from the theory are tested with data drawn from 17 Western parliamentary democracies, from 1918 to 1940 and from 1945 to 1970. The findings generally support the theory. A key to durable government is the minimum winning status of the cabinet. Minimum winning cabinets are possible in multiparty and majority party systems.

Understanding of the phenomenon of political protest has been inhibited by the view that protest is fundamentally extraordinary or unconventional in character and that those who use it do so because they lack the resources to employ more conventional means of political expression. This article challenges this unqualified view by examining survey data based on black and white samples from the city of Milwaukee which relate to racial attitudes toward protest, the social characteristics of protest participants, and to the uses and organization of protest in the two racial communities. The analysis reveals widespread support for protest in the black community in contrast to the general antipathy found among whites. Both black and white protesters are found to be socioeconomically better-off than nonprotesters in their respective racial communities, but a variety of indicators suggest that black protesters are more integrated and typical members of their community than white protesters are of theirs. Data on the uses and organization of protest show that it has become an institutionalized feature of the black pursuit of urban politics in Milwaukee in contrast to its generally ad hoc and less frequent role for whites.

We may conclude from all this that protest represents a widely accepted, integral part of black politics in the city, while for whites protest is indeed unconventional, a violation of dominant social norms. This conclusion is used as a basis for speculating on the relationship of protest participation to the possession of social resources and on the capacity of social resources to offset the costs incurred in the form of social disapproval for violating white norms against protest behavior.

This essay ascertains some general conditions for equivalence and nonequivalence among six election objectives: 01, maximizing expected plurality; 02, maximizing proportion of expected vote; 02, maximizing expected vote; 04, maximizing probability that plurality exceeds some level; 05, maximizing probability that proportion of vote exceeds some level; 06, maximizing probability that vote exceeds some level. The major findings are these: (1) 01, 02, and 03 are equivalent if the election is zero-sum-like in expected vote; (2) 01 and 02 are equivalent if competition is strongly symmetric. A necessary condition for this equivalence is also presented for 2-candidate elections: (3) 01 and 04 are equivalent, as are 03 and 06, if the candidate's forecasting error is independent of all strategies; (4) 01 and 04 are equivalent for two-candidate elections, and for n-candidate elections 02 and 05 are equivalent, as are 03 and 06, if the distribution of a candidate's forecasting error is multivariate normal, and if the level of plurality, proportion, or vote to be exceeded is the minimax value of the election game under 01, 02, or 03; (5) findings of equivalence and nonequivalence depend upon the definition of equivalence (findings 1 and 2 rely upon an election with all candidates at equilibrium strategies, while findings 3 and 4 do not); (6) equivalence and nonequivalence among election objectives may be sensitive to the candidate's attitude toward risk, i.e., to the functional form of his utility function in pluraliy, vote proportion, or vote; election objectives depend on information, competitive environment, and constitutional arrangements. Hence, statements of preference for alternative election systems, laws, and reforms perforce entail reasonable theoretical expectations about the way in which these systems, laws, and reforms affect the candidates' campaign objectives, as well as about equivalence and nonequivalence among these objectives.

This is a study of the relationship between partisan preference and social integration in natural work groups in several automobile plants. The basic finding is that the number of work group friends increases from the Democratic to the Republican end of a standard party identification scale. Since the political context of the study sample is heavily Democratic, attention is focused on the fact that Republicans in this environment are political deviants. It is suggested that friendship integration is a function of perceived deviance in that deviating from group norms leads to social insecurity, cognitive dissonance, and a need for opinion evaluation, all of which motivate affiliative behavior. Several hypotheses are deduced from this proposition. The first is that Republicans have less political contact in nonwork contexts, but more in the work group, than Democrats do. Second, the relationship between partisanship and friendship integration should be greater for members of social groups in which the pro-Democratic norm is stronger than for those in which this norm is weaker. Third, strength of identification with the norm-bearing group ought to be positively related to friendship integration among deviants, since identification would make the group's norms more salient and increase the deviant's discomfort. Fourth, political deviants should tend to choose each other as friends to a greater extent than political conformers do. Finally, since friendship alliances apparently serve a protective function for political deviants, it is hypothesized that among deviants (but not among conformers), friendship integration should be related to political participation. All the hypotheses are supported. The results are interpreted in terms of the critical function of social support for political deviants in pluralist societies. Since pressures for conformity are strong, it is important to understand the ways in which minorities deal with them. Friendships in work groups, ostensibly nonpolitical, therefore have important political functions.

The purpose of this paper is to reformulate the linkage between interparty competition and welfare policies in the American states. Specifically, it is hypothesized that this linkage should be substantially greater among states with strong, effective legislatures than among states with weak, ineffective legislative systems. When legislative effectiveness was defined in terms of professionalism and welfare effort was assessed by seven specific measures, it was found that the link between party competition and welfare expenditures was indeed stronger among states with effective, as opposed to ineffective, legislative systems. Further, when controls were introduced for several socioeconomic factors, the linkage continued to be stronger among states with professional legislatures. It is concluded, consequently, that the influence of party competition on state welfare policies is mediated by the differential effectiveness of state legislatures.

The choice among measures of relationship has increasingly become a matter of the interpretation of their intermediate values. Interpretations are important, but a prior question is the statistic's implicit model of a relationship—what it considers a perfect relationship, and what it considers a null relationship. A family of models based on combinations of certain maximum- and null-value conditions is analyzed in this paper. The distinction between the models can be used to shed light on the stakes involved in the choice among dichotomous variable measures as well as that among familiar ordinal statistics.

The models are ordered in terms of their leniency, and the coefficients based on each model are specified. An empirical analysis shows that the different measures are positively correlated, but those measures based on different models can differ sharply from one another. Statistics based on the same model covary regardless of differences in their interpretations. Since different models are intended to measure different concepts, multiple coefficients can allow investigators to examine their data in greater detail. Several political examples of the use of multiple models are provided.

The argument of this essay is that Talmon and Popper are mistaken in their suggestion that speculation about human affairs is governed by an inexorable logic of political consequences: that there exist certain broad perspectives or ‘paradigms” that impel men willy-nilly to pathological extremes in their political views, apart from intention or historical circumstance.

I seek to demonstrate that the general perspective which informed the thought of Helvétius—unquestionably one of the most manipulative of thinkers in his conception of politics—was simply the framework of early-modern science, as it was understood in France. It was the same philosophy which served his unequivocally libertarian contemporaries, such as Voltaire and Diderot, as well as their predecessors. Helvétius' political conclusions resulted, not from pathological attitudes or doctrines, but rather from his attempt to resolve a problem engendered within the new science, a fundamental dilemma in French thinking concerning the relationship of the individual to society and the state.