Numerous attempts have been made since World War II to reform U.S. government structure and procedures for managing foreign affairs, but success has been distinctly limited. In evaluating the procedures, proposals, accomplishments, and failures of the most recent State Department reform program, this review suggests some reasons why rationalization of foreign affairs organization has been so difficult to achieve. Unless fundamental questions of the Department of State's appropriate relationship to the rest of government are confronted directly, it is impossible to deal effectively with internal organization, operations, and staffing. Yet because of a restricted mandate, Diplomacy for the 70's did not address itself to these prior questions. And for a number of reasons, including a misplaced belief in the efficacy of management reforms as contrasted with political initiatives, lack of aggressive senior level support, ineffective followup, and budgetary restrictions, it fared no better than previous reform programs, even taken on its own limited terms. Unless such basic problems are dealt with, future reform attempts are likely to be no more successful.