This paper looks at representativeness in terms of policy dimensions. As previous studies also have demonstrated, the analysis provides evidence that the level of policy agreement varies across policy domains. The policy linkage is weak on questions of taxation and government administration. Only on contemporary liberalism does the level of policy agreement begin to meet the standards of representational theory. The occurrence of elections is found to be a particularly important determinant of legislative voting vis-à-vis constituency preferences. California senators, elected for four-year terms, are undeniably unrepresentative to direct opinion during the first three years of their terms; representativeness increases dramatically during the final year. Senators facing the possibility of having their reelection fortunes adversely affected by a presidential campaign are particularly attuned to district opinion during the final year of their terms. Assemblymen, who are elected for two-year terms, are attuned to the wishes of their constituencies throughout their terms. As the Founding Fathers believed, the frequency of elections conditions representatives' loyalty to the preferences of the represented.

It is well established that various characteristics of a congressional committee may shape and, to an extent, standardize its handling of a range of policy areas. This article, however, examines the substantial variations that most committees continue to display as they move from issue to issue. Why is it that the House Commerce Committee, for example, approaches issues like major-disease research, health care delivery, cable television development, and power plant siting in such radically different ways? What determines the incentives of legislators to invest time and effort in a policy area, and to orient themselves toward broad “public” interests, once involved? Focusing on the House and Senate Commerce Committees, the article takes as its data base patterns of legislative action and inaction in major areas of the committees' jurisdiction during 1969–1974. Particular attention is given to how perceived levels of group conflict and of public salience affect a legislator's orientation toward a policy area, and to the level and direction of executive involvement as an intervening variable of major significance. High-salience, low-conflict areas (e.g., health research) generally offer the strongest incentives to congressional involvement, and low-salience, high-conflict areas (e.g., communications regulation) the weakest, while mixed cases (e.g., a high-salience, high-conflict area like health care delivery) display considerable variability. Issues may change considerably with time in their perceived levels of salience and conflict, and legislators can influence, as well as respond to, such changes. Congressional initiatives often respond to perceived “neglect” on the part of the executive, or disagreement with the content of its moves. But particularly in high-conflict areas, congressional activists will often find that their success requires executive involvement.

Lack of a clear definition of political corruption has limited its systematic study by analysts of American politics. This article offers a conceptual framework with which to view corruption. A corrupt act is categorized by its four components: the donor, the favor, the public official and the payoff. For each component, propositions about perceived corrupt and noncorrupt elements can be formulated and tested. The usefulness of this scheme in analyzing attitudes about corruption is demonstrated with data from state legislators. Finally, the article suggests some future research possibilities using this scheme to compare elites and public or other groupings in the political system.

This article reports the findings of a series of experiments on committee decision making under majority rule. The committee members had relatively fixed preferences, so that the process was one of making decisions rather than one of problem solving. The predictions of a variety of models drawn from Economics, Sociology, Political Science and Game Theory were compared to the experimental results. One predictive concept, the core of the noncooperative game without side payments (equivalent to the majority rule equilibrium) consistently performed best. Significantly, however, even when such an outcome did not exist, the experimental results did not display the degree of unpredictability that some theoretical work would suggest. An important subsidiary finding concerns the difference between experiments conducted under conditions of high stakes versus those conducted under conditions of much lower stakes. The findings in the two conditions differed considerably, thus calling into question the political applicability of numerous social psychological experiments in which subjects had little or no motivation.

Systematic testing of Downsian voter rationality is accomplished using a computer simulation technique on the 1964 SRC voting survey. The simulation tests both the hypotheses predicting whether an individual will vote and for whom an individual will vote. To evaluate the results of the tests we develop a statistic analogous to Pearson's r. This statistic measures the percentage improvement over a random guess technique. Utilizing this statistic, Downs explains 68.5 percent of the unexplained variance in the voters' choices of party. Three alternative interpretations of the turnout decision are then considered, each premised on a different notion of how the costs of voting are distributed among the voters. Here we use an Engel Curve technique to develop the turnout decision and explain 92 percent of the variance. The importance of the various elements of the Downsian theory are evaluated and, in contrast to some recent conjectures, the probability of making a difference on the outcome of the election is shown to have an effect on the turnout decision. Finally, to determine the viability of the results, the SRC “6 factor” model is developed in an analogous fashion and used to predict both turnout and direction of vote.

This study empirically tests three theoretical approaches to explaining specific support for a policy output among members of its target group. The utilitarian model posits support as a function of objective costs and benefits to the individual stemming directly from the policy. The attitudinal model relates specific support to diffuse predispositions rooted in socialization. The perceptual model holds that specific support derives from beliefs about the character of the political decision process by which the policy was formulated. Tests of these three approaches are based on survey data on specific support for school district desegregation plans among a large sample of black and white parents of public school children in Florida. In both subsamples, the utilitarian approach explained very little of the variance in support, but the attitudinal and perceptual models were corroborated. Implications of these findings are drawn for desegregation policy making and for public policy theory.

This study concerns the analysis of diffusion and contagion processes using a lognormal model of overdispersion phenomena. The urban disorders of the past decade are examined and two processes are found to exist in the 1966–67 period. One is a classic diffusion effect in which disorders are precipitated by events which are independent of each other, but lead to outcomes such as numbers of arrests which are proportional to previous disorders. The second process is a contagious one in which disturbances occur as a consequence of smaller cities imitating the behavior of large ones experiencing a disorder. It was found that the explanatory power of the interaction effect between police and black city residents tended to increase as city size increased. Concomitantly, the effects of environmental variables tended to decrease in explanatory power as city size decreased.

This essay defines and experimentally tests a new solution concept for n-person cooperative games—the Competitive Solution. The need for a new solution concept derives from the fact that cooperative game theory focuses for the most part on the special case of games with transferable utility, even though, as we argue here, this assumption excludes the possibility of modelling most interesting political coalition processes. For the more general case, though, standard solution concepts are inadequate either because they are undefined or they fail to exist, and even if they do exist, they focus on predicting payoffs rather than the coalitions that are likely to form.

The Competitive Solution seeks to avoid these problems, but it is not unrelated to existent theory in that we can establish some relationships (see Theorems 1 and 2) between its payoff predictions and those of the core, the V-solution and the bargaining set. Additionally, owing to its definition and motivation, nontrivial coalition predictions are made in conjunction with its payoff predictions.

The Competitive Solution's definition is entirely general, but a special class of games—majority rule spatial games—are used for illustrations and the experimental test reported here consists of eight plays of a 5-person spatial game that does not possess a main-simple V-solution or a bargaining set. Overall, the data conform closely to the Competitive Solution's predictions.

The model of comparative state policy focusing on economic development and interparty competition was reformulated by Edward Carmines to include the mediating impact of state legislatures. This study challenges his initial conclusions, poses an alternative hypothesis, and finds that interparty competition has a consistently stronger impact on “progressive” state policies among states with organizationally weak, ineffective legislative institutions, than among those with organizationally strong, capable legislatures. The findings also reveal that legislative decision-making capability is distinct from the concept of legislative professionalism.

The consistent theme in Charles E. Lindblom's work is a vision of political economy as constitutional engineering. Lindblom sees the question of institutional design in terms of a mechanical metaphor in which political economic systems are contrived out of relatively simple components. Politics and Markets compares a broad range of capitalist and socialist systems as a means of evaluating market mechanisms and authority structures as instruments of social coordination and control. Lindblom's argument that the privileged power of the corporation poses a problem for liberal market-oriented societies is logically distinct from his case that the corporation fits “oddly” with democratic theory, and the latter may be the more significant theme for further inquiry in political economic theory.